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Visual surveillance is probably the second oldest investigative technique
known to man.' Such surveillance has two basic forms: overt and covert.
Overt surveillance has its uses. The visible presence of a uniformed police
officer, for example, usually deters the would-be criminal, if only
temporarily.
Covert visual surveillance, on the other hand, is far more useful to the
investigator. The ability to observe and follow a suspect, unseen or unno-
ticed by him, enables the investigator to catch the perpetrator in the act of
committing a crime, or to track the conspirator to his confederates or to his
cache of contraband.
The traditional methods of covert visual surveillance are well known.
Binoculars permit observation from a distance. Stealth or the anonymity of
plain clothes permit surveillance up close, albeit with a greater risk of detec-
tion. Recently, advances in technology have provided investigators with al-
ternatives unavailable even a few years ago. Electronic tracking devices, for
example, make it possible for investigators to follow a suspect over great
distances, and to monitor the location of particular objects, with little risk
that the detectives will be detected.
Recently, the nation's courts have struggled to fit the use of such devices
within the framework of the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The courts have faced such difficult questions as:
1. According to one Source, interrogation is an even older investigative technique. See
Genesis 3:11-:13.
2. Since 1975, there have been more than 60 reported cases addressing these issues. See,
e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 729 F.2d 1514, cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984) (attaching an electronic "beeper" to the interior of an aircraft
constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982) (using a beeper
to trace a parcel of heroin and to determine when the parcel was opened is not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 950, reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1117 (1981) (installing and monitoring a beeper on the
exterior of a vehicle to discover a defendant's "drug manufacturing apparatus" does not trans-
gress the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1387-88 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (if an electronic tracking
device is attached to a vehicle without a court order, but the attachment can be justified by
probable cause and exigent circumstances, such attachment does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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when does the use of an electronic tracking device constitute a "search";
under what circumstances is a warrant required; and what safeguards and
restrictions must such a warrant contain?
In each of the last two years, the United States Supreme Court has de-
cided a case requiring the application of the Fourth Amendment to such
devices. In 1983, in United States v. Knotts,3 a unanimous Court agreed that
the use of an electronic tracking device, or "beeper," to follow a drum of
chloroform being driven on public roads does not constitute a search. In
July of 1984, in United States v. Karo,4 the Court held that it also does not
constitute a search for law enforcement officials to install a beeper into a
container of chemicals with the consent of the seller but without the knowl-
edge of the purchaser. The Court also held, however, that it does constitute
a search, for which a warrant of some kind is required, to monitor the beeper
after the container has come to rest in a location where a person enjoys
Fourth Amendment protection.
The Karo decision is puzzling in many respects. For example, despite the
absence of a valid warrant, the agents in Karo monitored the beeper as it
passed through at least four different private residences, including the one
from which incriminating evidence was seized; yet, the Court reversed the
lower courts' suppression of the fruits of the beeper surveillance. The Court
stressed several times the need for a "warrant" to authorize monitoring a
beeper inside a suspect's home; nevertheless, despite the Fourth Amend-
ment's unequivocal mandate that "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause," the Court expressly held open the question whether such a warrant
could be issued upon the less demanding showing of a reasonable suspicion.
Knotts and Karo leave unanswered several other significant issues. Does it
constitute a search to install a beeper into or onto someone else's property
(for example, an automobile) without the owner's consent? Where is the pre-
cise dividing line between the warrantless monitoring that Knotts and Karo
held not to be a search, and the kind of monitoring that Karo holds must be
authorized by a warrant? Is probable cause required for such a warrant, or
will a reasonable suspicion suffice, and in either event, how is a court to
determine whether the appropriate standard has been satisfied? How will
the courts apply, to a form of surveillance radically different from traditional
searches and seizures, constitutional and statutory law governing the issu-
ance and contents of warrants?
This article will examine the Knotts and Karo decisions, analyze the unan-
swered questions relating to the use of electronic tracking devices, and out-
3. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
4. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
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line legislation that might best resolve those questions and strike a proper
balance between the often conflicting values of individual privacy and effec-
tive law enforcement.
I. THE DEVICE: DEFINITIONS
To understand the Fourth Amendment implications of an electronic
tracking device, it is first important to understand what such a device can
and cannot do.
An electronic tracking device-also called a 'beeper,' 'beacon,'
or 'transponder'-is a miniature, battery-powered radio transmit-
ter that emits a recurrent signal at a set frequency. When moni-
tored by directional finders, the beeper provides information as to
the location and movement of the object to which it is attached. A
beeper is incapable of transmitting conversation or recording
sounds. For this reason, beepers do not fall within the definition of
wiretapping devices.'
Two aspects of this definition merit further comment.
1. "Miniature." To describe a beeper as a "miniature transmitter" may
leave some readers with the impression that such a device could be slipped
unnoticed into a jacket pocket or hatband. Beeper technology may someday
reach this point, but it has not yet done so. During oral argument before the
Supreme Court in the Karo case, counsel for the government displayed what
he described as a typical beeper. It consisted of the device itself, appearing
to be somewhat larger than a pack of extra-long cigarettes, and batteries of
approximately the same size, implanted in a Styrofoam case.
2. "Beepers" and "Transponders." Although there are similarities be-
tween beepers and transponders, they differ in several significant respects. A
beeper utilized by the Drug Enforcement Administration operates on one
watt of power-as compared to five watts for a walkie-talkie-and sends out
continuous signals. When law enforcement agents monitor a beeper's signals
from two different points, by using principles of triangulation, they can de-
termine the beeper's approximate location. A transponder, on the other
hand, is utilized primarily to track the location of airplanes, which are re-
quired by the The Federal Aviation Administration to be equipped with
such devices. A transponder emits signals only in response to a signal sent
from a radar station. The radar equipment determines the plane's location
by calculating the time it takes for the transponder to respond to the initial
signal.6
5. Butts, 710 F.2d at 1142-43.
6. Reply Brief for United States at 8-9 n.6, United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
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The usefulness of a beeper or transponder in complementing visual sur-
veillance is obvious. If such a device is installed in or on an automobile, ship
or airplane, it becomes much easier for surveillants to follow that vehicle.
Because it is no longer necessary to keep the target vehicle constantly in
sight, there is less likelihood that those who are tailing it will be noticed. If
the operator of the targeted vehicle manages to "lose" his followers, the de-
vice makes it much more likely that they can find the vehicle again, either in-
transit or after it has reached its destination.7
Similarly, if a beeper is installed in an object, investigators can follow that
object wherever it is taken by monitoring the beeper. Once it has arrived at
a particular location, by periodically spot-monitoring the beeper, investiga-
tors can ascertain whether the object has been taken elsewhere. Thus, in a
limited sense, the beeper permits an investigator to "see" into a private place
where a "beepered" object has been taken, to determine whether it is still
there.' Furthermore, some beepers are capable of transmitting additional
information. For instance, if a particularly sophisticated beeper is installed
in a package that is then sealed, the beeper will alter its signal when the
package is later opened. Such a beeper enables the investigator to "see"
what is being done to the package in the privacy of someone's home, office,
or other location.
To facilitate the analysis of the issues presented by beeper surveillance, it
is helpful to develop a working vocabulary of terms that will be used fre-
quently. The following definitions are offered:
7. According to the government's reply brief in Karo, supra note 6, under normal operat-
ing conditions, a beeper's signal can be monitored for a distance of two-to-four miles on an
open road, and for up to twenty miles away in the air. In congested urban areas, interference
with the reception of the beeper's signals may reduce its effective range to about two blocks.
Reply Brief for the United States at 8 n.6, Karo.
8. The government asserted in Karo that it is often impossible for monitoring agents to
determine whether the beeper (and its host object) is inside a particular premises or only in the
vicinity of the premises. Brief for the United States at 25, Karo.
[A]gents can ascertain that the beeper is located somewhere in or around a particu-
lar structure or vehicle, but in the usual case they cannot determine its precise resting
place without exposing themselves to detection. Thus, as a practical matter, a beeper
ordinarily does not even disclose whether it has been taken inside a residence.
Id. The government further stated:
On a sidewalk, within 25 to 50 feet of a residence, agents may be able to ascertain
whether a beeper is broadcasting from the front or back of a house, or from the right
or left side of the structure. In order to avoid detection, however, agents monitor the
signals from a position where they are out of sight of the suspects. Thus, as was the
case here. . . the agents often do not get close enough to determine whether a beeper
is inside or outside of particular premises.
Id. at 9 n.6. The government emphasized this fact in arguing that monitoring a beeper after
the host object has arrived at a residence or other premises is not a search. See infra note 231.
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Consensual installation. Installation of a beeper into or onto an object,
such as a drum of "precursor chemicals" or a vehicle, with the consent of
the current owner of the item, that is thereafter sold or rented to the unwit-
ting target of the surveillance. 9
Monitoring. Use of the beeper to determine the movement and location
of, and sometimes additional evidence concerning, the object or vehicle into
which the beeper has been installed. In Knotts and Karo, the Court implic-
itly divided beeper monitoring into three discrete categories: in-transit mon-
itoring, general vicinity monitoring, and private location monitoring."°
In-transit monitoring. Monitoring a beeper from the time and place it was
installed into an object or vehicle until that object or vehicle has reached its
apparent, or at least its initial, destination."1
General vicinity monitoring. Conducting ground or aerial beeper surveil-
lance to determine the general vicinity, but not the precise private location,
to which the beepered object has been taken. The need for such monitoring
might arise if, despite in-transit monitoring, the investigators lose track of
the beepered object while it is in transit. In the Knotts case, for example, in-
transit monitoring did not provide the information the investigators sought
because they lost both visual and beeper contact with the beepered object
while it was in transit. They relocated it only when a helicopter equipped
with a monitor picked up the signal after the object already had arrived at its
destination in the general vicinity of the defendant's cabin.12 Alternatively,
agents who have tracked a beepered object to a particular location subse-
quently may learn that the object is no longer there. In Karo, the agents,
confronted with this situation, monitored the beeper to ascertain that the
object had been moved to a commercial storage facility. They did not, how-
ever, use the beeper to determine the particular locker in which the object
had been placed.13
Private location monitoring. Monitoring that reveals whether the beeper
9. In Karo, the Supreme Court held that such installation and sale does not constitute
either a search or a seizure. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3301-02. For a detailed analysis of this aspect
of the Karo decision, see infra notes 69-121 and accompanying text.
10. These terms and definitions are those of this author and not the Court's.
11. In Knotts, the Supreme Court held that if the beeper was lawfully installed in the first
place, in-transit monitoring does not constitute a "search" and, therefore, need not be justified
by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, nor authorized in advance by a search warrant or
other court order. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-84. For a detailed discussion of this aspect of the
Knotts decision, see infra notes 166-84 and accompanying text.
12. The Supreme Court in Knotts held that such monitoring, which enabled the officers to
determine the general vicinity to which the object had been taken, was in essence, no more
than a continuation of in-transit monitoring; hence, it did not constitute a search. Knotts, 460
U.S. at 285. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
13. In Karo, the Court held that such monitoring did not intrude upon the defendants'
1985]
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and its host object are inside a particular private location (such as a home,
office, or rented storage facility) where one or more individuals enjoy expec-
tations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
14
Precursor chemicals. Unregulated chemicals, lawful to possess, that are
necessary ingredients in the manufacture of illicit drugs.
Signal altering beeper. A beeper designed to alter the speed of its signals
upon the opening of the package in which it has been installed.
Trespassory installation. Installation of a beeper into or onto an object
(such as a vehicle) without the consent of someone who has authority to give
such consent. In practice, such installations are effected either by attaching
a beeper to the outside or undercarriage of a vehicle, or by entering the vehi-
cle and installing the beeper inside. 5
II. BEEPERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
1 6
If evidence is obtained in a manner that violates a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, the prosecutor is not permitted to utilize that evidence at
trial to establish that defendant's guilt.' 7 This principle, known as the
right to privacy in the locker and therefore did not constitute a search. Knotts, 104 S. Ct. at
3306. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
14. The Supreme Court in Karo held that private location monitoring of a beeper does
constitute a search for which a warrant of some as yet unspecified character is required. Karo,
104 S. Ct. at 3296. See infra notes 226-50 and accompanying text.
15. Some courts consider all trespassory installations, whether interior or exterior, to be a
"search," that is, an intrusion into the vehicle owner's legitimate expectation of privacy; other
courts have held that interior installation is a search, but that exterior installation is not. See
infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was proposed and ratified primar-
ily to preclude the issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance, forms of official intru-
siveness with which the American colonists had become quite familiar in the decades before
the Revolution. For a brief overview of the history of the Fourth Amendment, see 1 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-6 (1978 & Supp. 1984). For more detailed accounts, see
generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT ch. 1 (1966); N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
17. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It is
important to remember that the fact that evidence was seized unlawfully does not automati-
cally bar its use at trial; only those defendants whose personal Fourth Amendment rights were
[Vol. 34:277
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"Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule," is intended to deter law enforce-
ment officials from conducting unlawful searches and seizures by depriving
them of the incentive to do so.' 8
A. Searches and Seizures
Before a defendant may bring a challenge under the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, he or she must show that either a "search" or a "seizure"
occurred.' 9 The scope of the Fourth Amendment thus depends upon the
definitions given to the words "search" and "seizure." Each of these terms
has been the subject of extensive judicial analysis.
Analysis of the term "seizure" has focused primarily on what constitutes a
seizure of a person,2° but the Supreme Court has also debated what consti-
tutes the seizure of inanimate objects. The Court in 1984 set forth the rule:
"A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in that property."'" Presumably, if
violated have the right, or "standing," to prevent that evidence from being introduced against
them. See infra notes 309-27 and accompanying text.
18. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508-10 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 458 n.35 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. at
657-58. In Mapp, the Court emphasized other purposes for the rule as well, including "the
imperative of judicial integrity," 367 U.S. at 659. More recently, the Court has stressed the
deterrent rationale as the primary reason for the rule's existence.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (the detention of a defend-
ant while police officers search his premises constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (per curiam) (the detention
of a defendant based solely on the fact that he fits the "drug courier profile" constitutes an
unlawful "seizure" in violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 551-54 (1980) (the brief detention of a defendant does not constitute a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if she is merely stopped for identification and is
free to proceed on her way); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (the detention of a defend-
ant constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if he is not free to
walk away); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (the detention of a
defendant by restraining his freedom to proceed on his way constitutes a "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973) (the deten-
tion of a defendant against his will solely to take fingernail scrapings constitutes a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27
(1969) (the detention of a defendant solely to obtain his fingerprints constitutes a "seizure" and
is thus subject to Fourth Amendment constraints); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19 n. 16
(1968) (the detention of a defendant that restrains his freedom to walk away constitutes a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
21. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656 (citing United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2641
(1983)) (temporary detention of air passenger's luggage constitutes a seizure); Texas v. Brown,
103 S. Ct. 1535, 1546 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (taking a tied-off balloon from possession
of defendant constitutes a seizure); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n.8 (1977) (tak-
ing possession of defendant's footlocker constitutes a seizure); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
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there has been no "meaningful interference" with the individual's "posses-
sory interests in that property," no "seizure" has occurred. While this defi-
nition seems straightforward enough, in United States v. Karo, the Court
divided sharply on its application.22
The term "search" has been the subject of even greater judicial scrutiny.
Until 1967, the Supreme Court consistently held that police investigative
conduct did not constitute a "search" unless that conduct physically invaded
a defendant's premises, property or possessions. 21 In Katz v. United States,2 4
however, the Supreme Court declared that the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment were not limited to those of property and freedom from
physical trespass. Rather, the Court, per Justice Stewart, emphasized:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.2 5
Although "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," the real
question, as Justice Harlan stressed in his concurring opinion, is "what pro-
(1906) (overly broad subpoena duces tecum requiring defendant to surrender books and
records constitutes an unreasonable seizure).
22. See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.
23. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment was inapplicable to wiretapping unless government officials had physically invaded the
defendant's premises, 277 U.S. 438, 457-66 (1928). Similarly, in Goldman v. United States, the
Court applied the same requirement to eavesdropping (bugging), 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942).
In Goldman, federal agents overheard conversations between defendants Goldman and Schul-
man by pressing a listening device against the wall adjoining Shulman's office. Since there had
been no physical trespass into Schulman's premises, the Court reasoned that no search had
occurred. Id. On the other hand, in Silverman v. United States, the Court held that an illegal
search had occurred when police drove a microphone several inches into a party wall of the
suspect's house, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Finally, in Clinton v. Virginia, the Court arrived at the
same conclusion where the microphone penetrated only a thumbtack's depth, 377 U.S. 158
(1964) (per curiam).
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Government agents placed a listening device on the outside of a
public telephone booth, used it to overhear what Katz said during two telephone conversa-
tions, and then testified as to what they heard at Katz' trial. The litigants had argued the case
before the Supreme Court in terms of whether a telephone booth was a "constitutionally pro-
tected area" and whether actual physical penetration into such an area was a prerequisite to
the application of the Fourth Amendment. The Court, per Justice Stewart, "decline[d] to
adopt this formulation of the issues." Id. at 350.
25. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). Although the agents had probable cause to believe
that Katz's conversations would be incriminating and they acted with restraint by listening
only when Katz was in the booth, the Court suppressed the agents' testimony as to what Katz
said because the agents had failed to obtain a warrant authorizing the use of the listening
device. Id. at 356-57.
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tection [the Fourth Amendment] affords to those people."26 Justice Harlan
reasoned that Fourth Amendment protection exists only if two conditions
exist: "[F]irst, that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "27
Justice Harlan's formula has since become the basic definition of the rights
protected by the Fourth Amendment.2" Thus, if a defendant seeks to sup-
press evidence or information obtained by a law enforcement official, he
must first establish that the official engaged in conduct that intruded upon
his "reasonable (or 'legitimate,' or justifiable') expectation of privacy." If
the defendant can establish that there was in fact such an intrusion, a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred, and the defendant is entitled to challenge
the legality of that search. If the prosecutor cannot demonstrate that the
investigators had obtained a valid search warrant supported by probable
cause, 29 or that the circumstances fit within an exception to the warrant or
probable cause requirements,3 ° the information or evidence obtained as a
26. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Justice Stewart's majority opinion includes the observation that while the Fourth
Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, ...
its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." Id. at 350. In
subsequent decisions, however, the Harlan concurrence has supplanted the Stewart majority
opinion as the definitive statement of what the Fourth Amendment protects. See, e.g., Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring)
("Consistent with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a
'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government
action.")). See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 n.9 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion).
See generally Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 154 (1977).
29. The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause,. . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the. . . things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend IV. Two Supreme Court decisions handed down in June of 1984,
however, have rendered the probable cause and particular description requirements less abso-
lute than they previously had been adjudged. In United States v. Leon, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not bar a prosecutor from using evidence obtained
by law enforcement officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant that
was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but that was ultimately found to be not sup-
ported by probable cause. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require exclusion of evidence
seized by police officers pursuant to a warrant subsequently held to be invalid because of tech-
nical errors on the part of the issuing judge, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). Despite these decisions, a
valid warrant supported by probable cause is still the constitutional norm. Leon and Sheppard
merely create reasonable and narrow exceptions to that norm.
30. For example, in many circumstances, a warrant is not needed to authorize a search of
an automobile, so long as probable cause exists. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
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result of the intrusion must be suppressed. 3' If, on the other hand, the de-
fendant is unable to establish that the investigators' conduct intruded upon
his reasonable expectation of privacy, then no search or seizure occurred, no
Fourth Amendment protected interest was infringed upon, and the defend-
ant is not permitted to challenge the manner in which the evidence or infor-
mation was obtained.32 Thus, in deciding whether the use of a beeper
violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, a key question is whether
the use of the beeper constituted an intrusion into the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy. If use of the beeper constitutes such an intrusion, its
use must be measured against Fourth Amendment standards. If the use of
the beeper does not constitute an intrusion, no justification for its use is
required.
B. The Issues Involved
The use of the beeper involves at least two, and sometimes as many as
four, separate activities on the part of the police. To determine the admissi-
bility of evidence derived from the use of a beeper, it is necessary to examine
the Fourth Amendment implications of each action. In addition, several
other issues, emerging from beeper case law, must be analyzed.
1. Installation. Does installation of a beeper constitute a "search" or
"seizure"? Assuming installation constitutes a search or seizure, what fac-
tual justification (reasonable suspicion, probable cause) must exist at the
time of installation? Under what circumstances must the police obtain a
search warrant or other court order to authorize an installation?
2. "In-transit" monitoring.33 Assuming the beeper was installed law-
52 (1970). Furthermore, some searches and seizures are valid even in the absence of probable
cause. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and
dangerous suffices to permit stop and frisk); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973) (if an arrest is lawful, no further justification is required to permit a search of the
arrestee).
31. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
32. Thus, it does not constitute a "search" if a person surreptitiously tape records or
transmits his conversations with a suspect. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Simi-
larly, it does not constitute a "search" if a telephone company, acting at the request of the
police, utilizes a pen register to make a record of the local numbers dialed from a suspect's
home. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In each case, the Court held that the suspect
had voluntarily shared his words or conveyed information; hence, he assumed the risk that the
recipient of this information might be recording it for the police. For a further discussion of
White, see Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title III,
Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41, 47-50 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Interception of Communications]. For a further discussion of Smith, see Fishman, Pen
Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional Intent, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 557, 565-74, 581-89 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Pen Registers].
33. For a definition of this term, see supra text accompanying note 11.
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fully, does it constitute a search to monitor the beeper while the vehicle or
object in which it was installed is in transit from the place of installation to
some other location?
3. "General vicinity" monitoring.34 If the investigators lose track of the
beeper at some point during an investigation, does it constitute a search if
the agents monitor the beeper to determine the general vicinity (but not the
precise private location) to which the beepered object has been taken?
4. "Private location" monitoring. 35 Does it constitute a search to utilize
the beeper to determine the precise private location to which the beepered
object has been taken? Once that location has been ascertained, does it con-
stitute a search to monitor the beeper to determine that the object is still
there-or that it is no longer there? If private location monitoring does con-
stitute a search, must a warrant or other court order first be obtained to
authorize such monitoring?
5. Factual justification. Is probable cause, or only a reasonable suspi-
cion, a prerequisite to lawful installation or monitoring? In either event,
how is the presence or absence of the requisite quantum of proof to be ascer-
tained in various circumstances?
36
6. Contents of warrant. Assuming the police are required to obtain a
search warrant or other court order prior to installing or monitoring a
beeper, what restrictions and provisions should or must such a court order
contain?37
7. Application of the exclusionary rule. Even if the police in a particular
beeper surveillance case failed to comply with the appropriate Fourth
Amendment standards, it is still necessary to determine whose rights, if any,
were violated thereby, and whether events subsequent to the surveillance but
34. For a definition of this term, see supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
35. For a definition of this term, see supra text accompanying note 14.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 704-06 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498, 1503-04 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cooper, 682 F.2d 114,
115-16 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 112 (1982); United States v. Ellery, 678 F.2d 674,
677-78 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 926 (1978); Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 888, 273 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1980).
Each of these cases discusses whether probable cause existed to install a beeper into a
container. See infra notes 453-66 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Flynn, 664
F.2d 1296, 1302-06 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930 (1982); United States v. Kupper, 693
F.2d 1129, 1130-33 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 863, 866-67 (5th
Cir. 1975), ajfd by equally divided court en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 150 (W.D. Tex. 1978). These cases discuss whether probable cause
existed permitting installation or attachment of a beeper into or onto a vehicle.
37. Several courts have opined that such a warrant must contain a termination date but
have not specified the maximum allowable period. See, e.g., Butts, 710 F.2d at 1150-51; United
States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944-46 (6th Cir. 1980); Cofer, 444 F. Supp. at 149-50. See infra
notes 426-41 and accompanying text.
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prior to the seizure of incriminating evidence cured the taint of the
surveillance.38
In United States v. Knotts,39 the Court focused on the second and third
issues, concluding that in-transit monitoring did not constitute a search'
and that, at least in some circumstances, neither did general vicinity moni-
toring.4' In United States v. Karo,42 the Court addressed the first issue, rul-
ing that consensual installation and subsequent sale of a beepered can of
ether was neither a search nor a seizure.43 With regard to issue number
three, Karo reaffirmed and extended the Knotts holding that general vicinity
monitoring is not a search.44 The Court in Karo also addressed the fourth
issue, holding that private location monitoring is a search, subject to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.45 Further, Karo cast an intrigu-
ing mixture of light and confusion upon issues five and six. The Court point-
edly refused to decide whether probable cause, or only reasonable suspicion,
is required to justify issuance of a beeper warrant.46 The Court volunteered
advice, however, on what such a warrant might contain.47 In addition, the
Court in Karo applied the exclusionary rule (issue number seven) in a man-
ner that may permit investigators to manipulate their way around the war-
rant requirement imposed in that case.48
Although the Supreme Court rendered the Knotts decision some sixteen
months prior to Karo,49 this article will begin by examining the first issue
addressed in Karo, that is, the constitutional implications of consensual in-
stallation of a beeper into a chemical container and the subsequent sale of
that container to a suspect.5" It will then discuss the law that has emerged
38. See infra notes 307-27 and accompanying text.
39. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
40. Id. at 282-84. See infra notes 166-84 and accompanying text.
41. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85. See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
42. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
43. Id. at 3302.
44. Id. at 3306.
45. Id. at 3303-05. See infra notes 226-50 and accompanying text.
46. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305 n.5. See infra notes 420-87 and accompanying text.
47. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305. See infra notes 427-28 and accompanying text.
48. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306-07. See infra notes 328-76 and accompanying text.
49. Knotts was decided on March 2, 1983; Karo was decided on July 3, 1984.
50. The discussion of Karo is divided and sandwiched around the Knotts decision for
several reasons. First, installation is the initial step in beeper surveillance; how a particular
installation is treated under the Fourth Amendment significantly affects how the subsequent
issues are to be resolved. If a particular installation is held to be unlawful in the absence of a
warrant, for example, this initial illegality may irremediably taint all information derived from
installation and monitoring. See infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text. Second, while the
Knotts decision noted the importance of the installation question, that issue was not before the
Court in Knotts, and, except for one concurring opinion, none of the Justices in Knotts ad-
dressed the issue, 460 U.S. at 279 n.*. Hence, detailed familiarity with Knotts is not required
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to date with regard to installation of beepers in other contexts, including the
trespassory (nonconsensual) attachment of a beeper onto a suspect's vehicle.
Next, the article will analyze the Court's categorization and treatment of the
different classes of monitoring: the Knotts decision's treatment of in-transit
monitoring; Karo's holding regarding private location monitoring; and the
Knotts-Karo discussion of general vicinity monitoring. Thereafter, the arti-
cle will examine the Court's application of the Karo rule. Finally, it will
analyze, and offer answers to, several as yet unanswered questions about
beeper surveillance.
III. INSTALLATION
A substantial number of beeper cases, including United States v. Knotts 1
and United States v. Karo,5 2 involve consensual, nontrespassory installation
of beepers into containers of precursor chemicals that are thereafter sold to
suspects. 3 In holding that such installation is neither a search nor a seizure
and therefore not regulated by the Fourth Amendment, Karo resolved an
issue that had sharply divided the nation's courts, 54 and suggests how issues
relating to installation in other contexts will be resolved. Discussion of the
installation issue will, therefore, begin with an analysis of that aspect of the
to understand the Karo treatment of the installation issue. Finally, Karo's discussion of instal-
lation is readily separable, both factually and analytically, from the other issues decided or
discussed therein.
51. 460 U.S. at 276.
52. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
53. For a definition of "consensual installation," see supra text accompanying note 9.
54. Every court that has addressed the issue has held that the consensual installation of a
beeper into a container of precursor chemicals prior to its delivery to the suspect does not
constitute a search. United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); Moore, 562 F.2d at 111; United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d
515, 517 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Bailey, 628 F.2d at
943-44; United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976); State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 258 S.E.2d 872, 878 (1979) (inference); see also
Dunivant, 155 Ga. App. at 884, 273 S.E.2d at 625 (endorsing the conclusions reached in Moore
and Hufford, incorrectly cited as United States v. Martyniuk, but stating its holding in some-
what different terms).
Two courts had even so held where, prior to installation, the purchaser had made a down
payment for the chemicals. Lewis, 621 F.2d at 1388 ("Arcane distinctions in contract or prop-
erty law do not control for Fourth Amendment purposes"); Hufford, 539 F.2d at 33.
There was considerable disagreement, however, concerning whether search or seizure occurs
at the moment the purchaser takes possession of the container. Two federal courts had held
that this does not constitute a search or seizure. Knotts, 662 F.2d at 517 n.2; Hufford, 539
F.2d at 33-34. Two other federal courts and one state court, however, held that it does.
Moore, 562 F.2d at 111; Karo, 710 F.2d at 1334; Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. at 258 S.E.2d. at 878
(1979). For other pre-Karo discussions of the issue, see Bailey, 628 F.2d at 938; Dunivant, 155
Ga. App. at 884, 273 S.E.2d at 621; Lewis, 621 F.2d at 1388-89.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
Karo decision.55 The discussion will next focus on issues that have arisen or
may arise regarding other consensual installations. Those issues involve in-
stallation of beepers into vehicles that are then rented to suspects; the instal-
lation of beepers into contraband by United States Customs officials; and the
use of beepers in what might be called "inherently tainted transactions."
This section will conclude with a discussion of trespassory, that is, noncon-
sensual, installations of beepers.
A. Consensual Installation
1. United States v. Karo: Precursor Chemicals
Consensual installation of a beeper into a container of precursor chemicals
prior to its delivery to the suspect does not raise any Fourth Amendment
issues unless it is categorized as a "search" or a "seizure. ' ' 56 In United
States v. Karo, the Court held that it is neither.
In Karo, federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents learned
that three suspects, Karo, Horton, and Harley, had ordered fifty gallons of
ether from a government informant, Muehlenweg, who operated a photogra-
phy related business in Albuquerque, New Mexico.57 Muehlenweg told the
agents that the ether was to be used to extract cocaine from clothing that
had been imported into the United States.5 8 The agents obtained a court
order, later held to be invalid because the agents had made deliberate mis-
representations in the application for the order,59 authorizing the installation
of a beeper into one of the cans and the monitoring of the beeper. With their
55. For the aspects of Karo dealing with private location monitoring, see infra notes 208-
81 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
57. The three conspirators paid the informant $1,000 apiece for 10 five-gallon cans of
ether (and perhaps additional chemicals or equipment). Brief of Harley and Horton in Opposi-
tion [to Granting Ceritorart] at 4-5 n.2, Karo.
58. Cocaine had been dissolved into a liquid solution and absorbed into clothing, which
had then been imported into the United States; the conspirators planned to use the ether to
extract the cocaine from the clothing. Brief for the United States at 3-4, Karo; Brief for Re-
spondents Harley and Horton at 3, Karo.
59. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1435. The search warrant application named the informant as the
target of the investigation, even though he was providing information against the true targets,
the respondents. It listed seizures of evidence that had little or nothing to do with respondents;
and it allegedly implied that the investigation focused upon the manufacture of
methamphetamines, although the agents, in fact, had probable cause to believe the ether would
be used to precipitate cocaine from imported clothing. Brief for Respondents Harley and Hor-
ton in Opposition [to Petition for Certiorari] at 15, Karo. These misstatements were included
in the affidavit in a spectacularly misguided effort to preserve the informant's confidentiality.
Brief for United States at 4 n.3, Karo. The suppression hearing judge concluded that the
affidavit was "as phony as a three-dollar bill." Brief of Respondents Harley and Horton In
Opposition [to Petition for Certiorari] at 2, Karo. The government did not appeal that ruling.
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informer's consent, they substituted their own can containing a beeper for
one of the cans in the shipment and then had all ten cans painted to assure
that they looked alike. Between September 20, 1980, when the agents ob-
served Karo pick up the ether from the informer Muehlenweg, and February
10, 1981, the agents utilized a variety of surveillance techniques-including,
but not limited to, beeper surveillance-to track the ether to three private
houses, two rented lockers, the driveway of a fourth home, and, ultimately, a
fifth house, where incriminating evidence was finally seized.
The suppression hearing judge suppressed the fruits of the beeper surveil-
lance.6" The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the installation
and subsequent sale of the beepered can of ether to Karo constituted an
unlawful "intrusion" into Karo's Fourth Amendment rights.6" The
Supreme Court disagreed. Justice White, writing for a six-member majority,
concluded that the installation and sale constituted neither a "search" nor a
"seizure," and therefore did not violate Karo's Fourth Amendment rights.
a. "Search"
The Supreme Court began its analysis by observing that "the actual place-
ment of the beeper into the can violated no one's Fourth Amendment
rights."' 62 At the time of installation, the ether belonged to the informer,
and the can in which it was installed belonged to the DEA. Thus, the Court
reasoned, "by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that respondents
• . . had any legitimate expectation of privacy in [the can]" when the beeper
was installed.63 In so holding, the Court was merely restating the obvious:
60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. For the sequence of events after Karo took
possession of the cans of ether, see infra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
61. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1438-39. In so holding, the circuit court did not explicitly state
whether it was categorizing this intrusion as a search or as a seizure. Given that the Fourth
Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and not against "unrea-
sonable intrusions" per se, this shortcoming leaves the circuit court opinion open to criticism;
indeed, the Supreme Court did not pass up the opportunity. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302. For the
full text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also supra
note 29.
62. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3301.
63. Id. The Court further observed that even if the beeper had been installed in one of the
original cans, the informer's consent "was sufficient to validate the placement of the beeper in
the can." Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) and Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U.S. 731 (1969)). In Matlock, the Court held that
when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary
consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant [against
whom the fruits of the search are to be offered at trial], but may show that permission
to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effect sought to be inspected.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171. Similarly, in Frazier, the Court held that where a defendant had
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no judge or court has seriously disputed the right of investigators, acting
with the consent of the seller, to install a beeper in a chemical container
prior to the sale of that container to the targets of an investigation.'
Once ownership and possession of the container in Karo passed from the
seller to the buyer, however, the legal implications of the presence of the
beeper passed beyond the scope of existing Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Transfer of the beeper to the unwitting purchaser was not governed,
for example, by the law regulating consent searches65 or consensual elec-
tronic surveillance,66 because at the moment the container became the
buyer's, the seller no longer had the authority to give a binding consent.67
Based upon these principles, the Tenth Circuit in Karo previously con-
cluded that
an intrusion occurs at the time the item comes into the [buyer's]
possession. All individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy
that objects coming into their rightful ownership do not have elec-
tronic devices attached to them, devices that would give law en-
shared the use of his duffel bag with his cousin and had left the bag in the cousin's home, the
cousin had authority to consent to a search of the bag; hence, clothing seized therein was
admissible against the defendant at trial. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740.
64. Every court that has considered the issue has so held. See supra note 54. Indeed, two
courts have so held even though the purchaser had already made a down payment on the
chemicals prior to the installation. Lewis, 621 F.2d at 1388 ("arcane distinctions in contract or
property law do not control for Fourth Amendment purposes"); Hufford, 539 F.2d at 33.
65. As a general rule, a consent to search is constitutionally valid against a subsequent
Fourth Amendment challenge only if the government can show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the consent to search was freely and voluntarily given, Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), and if someone other than the suspect authorized the search,
that the consent was obtained from someone "who possessed common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." Matlock, 415 U.S. at
171 (footnote omitted). See supra note 63. Thus, a third party's consent is valid only if, by
consenting, he or she is compromising his or her own privacy interests, as well as those of the
target of the search. Hence, for example, a landlord may not consent to a search of his tenant's
premises, even though the landlord may have some right of entry for purposes of inspecting or
clearing the premises. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). Similarly, hotel em-
ployees may not consent to the search of a particular room during the period in which it has
been rented by a guest. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
66. It does not constitute a search for law enforcement officials to intercept a conversa-
tion, so long as a participant to the conversation gives prior consent. United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). Nor is a warrant
required to authorize such interceptions under title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1982). See C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING §§ 8, 9 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
67. See supra note 65. Thus, it is simply not enough to say, as did the Eighth Circuit in
Knotts, that "the consent of the owner at the time of installation meets the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, even if the consenting owner intends to soon sell the 'bugged' property to
an unsuspecting buyer. . . . Caveat emptor." Knotts, 662 F.2d at 517 n.2 (emphasis in
original).
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forcement agents the opportunity to monitor the location of the
objects at all times and in every place the objects are taken, includ-
ing inside private residences and other areas where the right to be
free from warrantless governmental intrusion is unquestioned.68
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. Observing that "a 'search'
occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed,' ,69 the Supreme Court concluded that no such in-
fringement occurred. "The mere transfer to Karo of a can containing an
unmonitored beeper infringed no privacy interest," the Court stated. "It
conveyed no information that Karo wished to keep private, for it conveyed
no information at all." 70
The Court conceded that the transfer of the beepered can of ether to Karo
"created a potential for an invasion of privacy .... ,71 The Court, how-
ever, stated that this was insufficient in and of itself to constitute an intrusion
68. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1438. The circuit court emphasized that its ruling-that an intru-
sion occurs at the moment the purchaser takes possession-was not based on the actual use to
which the beeper was subsequently put. Rather, the sale of the beeper impregnated container
constituted a search because the beeper "[gave] law enforcement agents the opportunity to
monitor the location of the objects at all times and in every place the objects are taken." Id.
(emphasis added).
69. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (citing Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656). For a detailed discus-
sion of Jacobsen, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
70. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (emphasis in original). The installation of a beeper into a
chemical container reveals nothing new to the authorities; they already know the nature of the
chemical involved. See Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1659-60 (after a delivery company's employees
examined a damaged package, found it to contain a taped tube within which were plastic bags
containing white powder, and so informed DEA agents, the fact that an agent might have
brushed aside a crumpled newspaper that was partially covering the tube did not constitute a
search, because the agent's manual inspection of the tube and its contents revealed to the agent
no more than he had already been told). Nor can the purchaser claim that he has a legitimate
expectation that the fact of his purchase will remain private. The very fact that the installation
is consensual presupposes that the authorities have learned of the impending purchase through
the cooperation of the seller. By approaching the seller and seeking to purchase the chemicals,
the purchaser assumes the risk that the seller will report the transaction to the authorities. See
Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (when a person dials his phone, he knowingly exposes numerical infor-
mation to the telephone company, thereby assuming the risk that the company will make a
record of this information at the request of the police); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442-44 (1976) (when a depositor reveals his financial affairs to a bank, by writing checks,
making deposits and withdrawals, and the like, he assumes the risk that the bank will disclose
this information to the government); White, 401 U.S. at 752 (it is not a search for an informer
consensually to record or transmit his conversation with a suspect, since the suspect assumes
the risk, when he confides in the informer, that the informer is doing so). The sale of the
container may provide new information concerning the identity of the nominal or actual pur-
chaser, but this information derives from the sale, not from the beeper installed inside the
container. The agents could at least theoretically have obtained the same information by con-
ducting visual surveillance of the sale and then following the purchaser. See infra text accom-
panying note 175.
71. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (emphasis in original).
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into Fourth Amendment interests: "[W]e have never held that potential, as
opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment. . . . It is the exploitation of technological ad-
vances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.", 72
The Court was correct in rejecting the Tenth Circuit's contention that the
mere potential for abuse renders the consensual installation and sale of a
beepered container a search. A beeper-precursor chemical investigation has
three stages: installation and sale; in-transit and (sometimes) general vicinity
monitoring; and private location monitoring. The mere possibility that law
enforcement officials might unlawfully engage in the third step should not
automatically render the first step a search, particularly when the Supreme
Court has held that the second step---constituting the immediate use to
which the beeper will be put-is not a search.73 Virtually any investigative
technique, including many which are not considered searches under the
Fourth Amendment, could be abused in a way that would intrude unlaw-
fully into someone's legitimate expectation of privacy. Surely this potential
for abuse is not in and of itself a reason to categorize, as a search, those
aspects of the technique which do not so intrude.74
72. Id. The Court likened the transfer of an unmonitored beeper to a police officer carry-
ing a parabolic microphone capable of picking up conversations in nearby homes. Possession
of the microphone does not constitute a search; the search occurs only when the microphone is
in fact turned on and used to overhear private conversations. Id.
73. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276. See infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
74. Thus, it does not constitute a search for an undercover agent or informer to finagle an
invitation into a suspect's home for the purpose of purchasing drugs or being made privy to the
suspect's criminal intentions. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (undercover
agent's purchase of narcotics); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (informer to whom
suspect confided his efforts to bribe a jury); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (in-
former wearing a transmitter while conversations with defendant were monitored by police
officers outside). Quite clearly, an informer or undercover agent could violate a suspect's
Fourth Amendment rights. For example, if a suspect unwittingly invites an informer into his
living room and then retires temporarily to a different part of the house, and in his absence the
informer searches the living room, the search would be unlawful. The mere fact that an in-
former might act unlawfully, however, is no reason to classify as searches all lawful "non-
search" activities in which informers engage. But see United States v. Padilla, 520 F.2d 526
(1st Cir. 1975). Padilla negotiated to sell drugs to an undercover agent, and instructed the
agent to rent a room in a particular hotel for Padilla's use. Id. at 527. Federal agents rented a
room for Padilla, then installed a listening device. Id. Had the undercover agent worn the
device into Padilla's room, to enable other officers to monitor the conversation, this would not
constitute a search. See infra note 140. Because they monitored the actual listening device
only while the agent was in Padilla's room, the government argued the fact that they instead
installed the bug in the room should require no different result. Id. at 527-28. The First
Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the potential for abuse was so great that the installation of the
bug constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 528. At least two courts have explicitly
rejected Padilla. See United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1347 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983) (the
"hypothetical risk that protected conversations may be intercepted" is no reason to suppress
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b. "Seizure"
The Court also concluded that the transfer of the beepered can of ether
did not constitute a seizure. Quoting from its recent decision in United
States v. Jacobsen,75 that "[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when 'there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
that property,' ,76 the Court stated:
Although the can may have contained an unknown and un-
wanted foreign object, it cannot be said that anyone's possessory
interest was interfered with in a meaningful way. At most, there
was a technical trespabs on the space occupied by the beeper. The
existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated,
however, for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish a constitutional violation.77
The Court completed its discussion of the seizure issue with the questionable
assertion that "if the presence of a beeper in the can constituted a seizure
merely because of its occupation of space, it would follow that the presence
of any object, regardless of its nature, would violate the Fourth
Amendment. "78
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented from
lawfully recorded conversations). But see Yonn, 702 F.2d at 1349-50 (Hatchett, J., dissenting)
(the entry into the suspect's room constituted an unlawful trespass); Rovinsky v. State, 605
S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. 1980). Indeed, it is questionable whether Padilla survives Karo.
75. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984). For a discussion of Jacobsen, see infra notes 88-92 and accom-
panying text.
76. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (quoting Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656).
77. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 34 as holding that a Fourth Amend-
ment violation can occur without a trespass). The Court also cited Oliver v. United States, 104
S. Ct. 1735 (1984), where the police had trespassed upon defendant's land; nevertheless, the
Court held the police had not thereby violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. For
a discussion of Katz, see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. In Oliver, the Court upheld
the constitutional validity of the "open fields" doctrine, originally enunciated in Hester v.
United States, which permits police to enter onto private land without a search warrant. See
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment expressly
protects only "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
from unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. CONST. amend. IV, (emphasis added), the
Court held that because an open field is neither a person, a house, papers, nor effects, police
had not violated a landowner's fouth amendment rights when they trespassed on his fenced
and posted land and discovered a cultivated marijuana field. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740. The
Court made it clear that Fourth Amendment protection did extend from a house to its "curti-
lage," which it defined as "the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home,"
that is, "the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life'..... Id. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)).
78. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302.
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the majority's conclusion that sale of the beepered can was not a seizure.
Basing his argument on the same text as the majority-the Court's pro-
nouncement in United States v. Jacobsen that "[a] 'seizure' of property oc-
curs when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property' "79-Justice Stevens vigorously pro-
tested the majority's application of that definition.
The owner of property. . . has a right to exclude from it all the
world, including the Government, and a concomitant right to use
it exclusively for his own purposes. When the Government at-
taches an electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes
that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the
property to its own use. Surely such an invasion is an 'interference'
with possessory rights; the right to exclude, which attached as soon
as the can respondents purchased was delivered, had been in-
fringed. That interference is also 'meaningful'; the character of the
property is profoundly different when infected with an electronic
bug than when it is entirely germ free."°
The dissent likened sale of the beepered can of ether to the "attachment of a
microphone to the heating duct of an apartment building in order to eaves-
drop on conversations in a nearby apartment, "81 conduct that the Court
condemned more than twenty years earlier as "usurping part of petitioners'
house" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2 By selling the beepered
can, Justice Stevens argued, the agents "usurped" the purchasers' right to
exclude the government from their "tangible personal property." Indeed,
Justice Stevens stated, "the Government in the most fundamental sense was
asserting 'dominion and control' over the property-the power to use the
property for its own purposes. And 'asserting dominion and control' is a
'seizure' in the most basic sense of the term.",8 3
79. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656.
80. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3311 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (foot-
note omitted). Ironically, it was Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Jacobsen, who had
coined the definition of "seizure" applied (or, according to Justice Stevens, misapplied) by the
Karo majority. Justice Stevens also argued that it was irrelevant that the beeper had been
installed prior to the delivery of the can to the respondents. "Once the delivery had been
effected, the container was respondents' property from which they had the right to exclude all
the world. It was at this point that the infringement of this constitutionally protected interest
began." Id. at 3311 n.2.
81. Id. at 3311.
82. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
83. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3311 (citing Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1660 (exercise of "dominion
and control" over an object constitutes a seizure of it).
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c. Evaluation
Neither opinion is entirely satisfactory. The dissent sweeps too broadly.
The property owner's right to "exclude from it all the world," and "to use it
exclusively for his own purposes," is far from absolute.84 Safety regulations,
registration requirements, and so on impose some significant restrictions
upon the owner's right to exclude the world from his possessions.85 Further,
to liken installation of a locational beeper in a can of ether to the use of an
apartment's heating system as a microphone ignores both the nature of the
object in question86 and the nature of the information revealed.87
Lastly, the Karo dissent relies too heavily and too literally upon the defini-
tion of "seizure" coined by the Court several months earlier in United States
v. Jacobsen,8 without sufficient regard for the context in which the definition
was coined or for the manner in which the term "seizure" had theretofore
been applied. In Jacobsen, the Court, per Justice Stevens, noted that its defi-
nition of "seizure of property"-a "meaningful interference with an individ-
ual's possessory interests in that property"89-was derived from the Court's
''oft-repeated definition of the 'seizure' of a person within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment-meaningful interference, however brief, with an indi-
vidual's freedom of movement." 90 In each of the cases cited in Jacobsen in
support of the definition, law enforcement officials had taken physical pos-
session of property from the actual or constructive possession of the defend-
ant.9' The same situation was present in Jacobsen.92 In Karo, by contrast,
84. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3311 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Thus, Karo did not have the
right to use the ether exclusively for his own purposes, where that purpose was the extraction
of cocaine from imported clothing.
85. See, e.g., 27 C.F.R. §§ 47.31-.36 (1984) (requirements for registration of persons im-
porting weapons into United States); id. §§ 55.1-.220 (regulations regarding commerce in ex-
plosives); 33 C.F.R. §§ 173.11-.35 (1984) (requirements for certification of vessels operated in
United States waters).
86. See infra notes 122-25, 142-48 and accompanying text.
87. See infra note 477 and accompanying text.
88. Jacobson, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
89. Id. at 1656.
90. Id. 1655 n.5.
91. For the "seizure of property" cases cited in Jacobsen, see supra note 21. For the
"seizure of person" cases cited in Jacobsen, see supra note 20.
92. During their examination of a damaged package, the employees of a private freight
carrier discovered that the package consisted of crumpled newspaper and a ten-inch tube of
silver tape, inside of which they found several plastic bags containing white powder. Jacobsen,
104 S. Ct. at 1655. Suspecting that the powder was narcotics, they notified Drug Enforcement
Administration agents. Id. Petitioners had conceded that based on this information, the
agents had probable cause to believe that the package contained contraband. Upon arrival, the
agents examined the tube (possibly brushing aside a crumpled newspaper to do so), observed
the white powder, removed a small sample, and performed a chemical test that revealed the
powder was cocaine. Id. After conducting a second positive field test, the agents rewrapped
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the DEA agents never interfered with respondents' freedom to move the can
of ether, and indeed never even laid hands on the can, once it was sold to the
respondents. 93 Hence, the presale installation and post-sale presence of the
beeper in the can did not constitute a seizure of the can-at least not as that
term was defined, and applied, in Jacobsen.
Concededly, there is nothing inherently implausible or illogical about the
application of the Jacobsen definition urged by the dissent in Karo. In a real
the package, obtained a warrant authorizing the search of the place to which it was addressed,
delivered the package and later returned to execute the warrant and arrest the respondents.
Id. Charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, respondents moved to sup-
press the evidence on the ground that the warrant was the product of an illegal search and
seizure. The trial judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. United States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court held, first, that it was not a
search if an agent had brushed aside a crumpled sheet of newspaper and that it was not unrea-
sonable for the agent to seize the tube from the box, since to do so compromised no privacy
interest that had not already been compromised by the conduct of the freight carrier employ-
ees. 104 S. Ct. at 1659-61. "Although respondents had entrusted possession of the items to
Federal Express, the decision [by the agents] to exert dominion and control over the package
for their own purposes, clearly constituted a 'seizure,' though not . . . an unreasonable one."
Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1660 n.18. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253
(1970). In Van Leeuwen, the Court had held that it was not an unreasonable seizure for law
enforcement officials to detain for a day a suspicious package that had been delivered to a post
office for mailing while they obtained a warrant authorizing the search of the package.
Second, the Court in Jacobsen ruled that the removal of a small quantity of powder from one
of the plastic bags, and the chemical analysis, "[did] not compromise any legitimate interests in
privacy." In other words, it was not a search because it did no more than reveal whether the
powder was a narcotic drug, the "private" possession of which would be illegitimate in any
event. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1662.
Finally, the Court held that while the removal (and destruction through analysis) of the
minute quantity of the powder was a Fourth Amendment "seizure," it was reasonable, and
therefore constitutionally permissible, for the agents to make this "seizure" without a warrant.
The law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were substantial; the suspi-
cious nature of the material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was in
fact contraband. Conversely, because only a trace amount of material was involved,
the loss of which appears to have gone unnoticed by respondents, and since the prop-
erty had already been lawfully detained, the seizure could, at most, have only a de
minimis impact on any protected property interest. Under these circumstances, the
safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment interests.
This warrantless 'seizure' was reasonable.
Id. at 1663 (citations omitted). The Court noted, "Where more substantial invasions of consti-
tutionally protected interests are involved," a seizure might be unlawful in the absence of a
warrant or exigent circumstances. Further, the Court cautioned that not all seizures "of a
small amount of material [are] necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take
the 'white powder' he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and subject it
to a field test for cocaine, might well work an unreasonable seizure." Id. at 1663 n.28.
93. Ultimately, after more than four months of visual and beeper surveillance, the agents
obtained a search warrant and seized the can of ether, as well as other incriminating evidence,
in a cabin rented by several of the respondents. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300-01. For a detailed
recitation of the facts in Karo, see infra notes 208-24 and accompanying text.
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sense, however, the approach urged by the dissent would constitute a signifi-
cant expansion of the meaning of the term "seizure." 94 This expansion
would in turn extend application of the Fourth Amendment in a way that is
difficult to anticipate or predict. 95 The failure of the dissent to recognize
these implications, or at least to address them squarely, is unfortunate.
The majority, on the other hand, by categorizing the presence of the
beeper in the can of ether as a mere "technical trespass," may have set an
unduly broad precedent in an age when progress in electronic miniaturiza-
tion may be outpacing the ability of nonscientists to grasp the implications of
that progress. In addition, in relegating the existence of a physical trespass
to near irrelevance in the application of the Fourth Amendment, the Karo
majority appears to have ignored and miscited prior case law.
Prior to Katz,96 the Court's basic rule under the Fourth Amendment had
been that investigative conduct constituted a search or a seizure if, and only
if, that conduct involved a physical intrusion or trespass into a defendant's
"personf, houseU, papers, or effects." 97 Since Katz, however, the Fourth
Amendment has been seen as protecting "a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' . . . ."" But where should the Court
turn for guidance in seeking to determine which expectations are justifiable,
reasonable, or legitimate? As the Court noted in Rakas v. Illinois:
It would . . . be merely tautological to fall back on the notion
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend pri-
marily on cases deciding exclusionary rule issues in criminal cases.
Legitimation of expectations of privacy must have a source outside
of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property
is the right to exclude . . . . [B]y focusing on legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
94. Traditionally, a "search" occurred only if government agents physically intruded into
a "constitutionally protected area." Katz redefined "search" in terms of "legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy," regardless of whether a physical intrusion occurred. See supra notes 23-28
and accompanying text. Similarly, "seizure" has always been understood to involve a physical
taking or detaining. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. The Karo dissent, had it
won a majority of the Court, would have redefined "seizure" in terms of" 'meaningful inter-
ference' with ... possessory rights" regardless of whether a physical taking or detaining oc-
curred. See Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Many may urge that such an expansion or extension of the Fourth Amendment is
essential if the protection guaranteed by that amendment is to remain vigorous in the fact of
technological advances in surveillance equipment and techniques. My own views are set forth
infra at notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97. See supra notes 23, 77 and accompanying text.
98. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
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has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in deter-
mining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected
by that amendment.99
Analysis of Karo reveals the Court's willingness to abandon this concern for
property concepts almost entirely. "The existence of a physical trespass,"
the Karo Court stated, "is only marginally relevant to the question of
whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated . .. . 100 In support of
this principle, the Court cited Oliver v. United States'01 with the parentheti-
cal comment: "trespass, but no Fourth Amendment violation."'10 2 This ci-
tation is inappropriate. Oliver involved a trespass onto an open field. The
Court in Oliver did not hold that a physical trespass, in all circumstances,
fails to implicate the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the Court held that the
trespass in that case did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
open field did not fall within the Fourth Amendment's explicit protection of
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects ... ."'03 Karo, in contrast to Oliver, involved a trespass upon tangi-
ble personal property. Such property is a personal "effect"'" and therefore
falls within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Karo and Oli-
ver are distinguishable; Oliver does not support the principle for which it is
cited.
Interestingly, neither opinion in Karo places any significance on the nature
99. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) (emphasis added). As an example
of the continued importance of property concepts, the Court cited Alderman v. United States,
wherein the Court held, inter alia, that a homeowner could object to electronic surveillance
conducted in his home, even though he himself was not a party to the conversations which
were overheard. See 394 U.S. 165 (1969). On the other hand, the Court observed in Rakas,
"even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation
of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted
thereon." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210;
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59). In Katz, the Court
observed that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ...... Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Lewis and
Lee are exemplary of that principle. In Lewis, the Court held that it does not constitute a
search for an undercover police officer to engineer an invitation into a suspect's home and
therein purchase marijuana. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210. In Lee, the Court ruled that use of a
searchlight to see what was piled on the deck of a ship did not constitute a search. Lee, 274
U.S. at 563. Hester first enunciated the "open fields doctrine," which was subsequently reaf-
firmed in Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). For a discussion of that doctrine, see
supra note 77 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
100. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302.
101. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
102. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302.
103. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740. For a further discussion of Oliver, see supra note 77.
104. "The Framers [of the Constitution and of the Fourth Amendment] would have under-
stood the term 'effects' to be limited to personal, rather than real, property." Oliver, 104 S. Ct.
at 1740 n.7.
[Vol. 34:277
Electronic Tracking Devices
of the object into which the beeper was installed. The privacy implications
of installing a beeper into a can of ether are obviously less significant than
the implications of installing a beeper into a suitcase or an attache case (as-
suming miniaturization permitted such an installation) that is then sold to
an unwitting suspect. A glance at the can-assuming, as is usually the case,
that it is labeled° 5-will reveal its contents. This fact, the Supreme Court
has commented, in itself is quite significant in determining the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment. 10 6 An examination of the can will also reveal its
contents, if it is imperfectly sealed." °7 A suitcase or attache case, by con-
trast, is often used as a place to store, and conceal, one's private and intimate
belongings or papers. Placing a beeper inside a suitcase or attache case
reveals nothing about what is later placed inside the case; it reveals no more
information than does the beeper in the can of ether (that is, the location of
the beepered object at a particular point in time). Yet, to conclude that the
transfer to a suspect of a secretly beepered suitcase or attache case is neither
a search nor a seizure leaves at least this writer with a far greater sense of
105. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000-.1045 (1984) (setting forth labeling requirements for
various chemicals, including ether).
106. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979), the Court observed:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will
deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for
example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their
outward appearance.
See also Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1661 (tube of silver tape containing clear plastic bags contain-
ing white powder: "it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags contained contraband [co-
caine] and little else"; hence, warrantless seizure was reasonable, as was removal of a small
portion of powder for field testing); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (opaque
party balloon, knotted a half-inch from the top, with white powder in the knotted portion:
"the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents [heroin]-par-
ticularly to the trained eye of the officer"; hence, seizure by officer and subsequent warrantless
analysis of it contents by a chemist did not constitute unlawful search or seizure) (plurality
opinion). Id. at 1545 (Powell, J., concurring in the result); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 428 (1981) (plurality opinion).
Sometimes, of course, a chemical container will not bear a label revealing its contents. For
example, the purchasers might remove or cover the label, or transfer the chemicals to a differ-
ent, unlabeled, container, or they might have obtained the chemicals from a source which
chose not to comply with the labeling regulations. Arguably, this would serve to enhance the
suspect's privacy in the container and contents: "[T]he Fourth Amendment provides protec-
tion to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view." United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) (emphasis added). See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 425-28;
Arkansas, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13 (1979). It would be anamolous, however, for a court to con-
clude that a person may enhance his constitutional protection by violating a safety regulation.
107. Indeed, investigators in Karo were able to detect the aroma of ether in the immediate
vicinity of one of the houses to which the can was taken and one of the lockers in which it was
stored. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300. For a detailed recitation of the facts in Karo, see infra notes
208-24 and accompanying text.
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disquiet than the same conclusion when applied to a can of ether or some
other container of chemicals."10
The Court's holding in Karo, that the transfer of a secretly beepered can of
ether to an unwitting suspect is neither a search nor a seizure, has its unset-
tling aspects. It is one thing to endorse the general principle that a mere
potential for abuse is insufficient reason to categorize an investigative proce-
dure as a search; it is quite another to say that we must assume the risk that
any item of personal property we purchase might be secretly equipped with a
device capable of electronically revealing its location to the police. In addi-
tion, beeper suppression litigation in most precursor chemical cases hence-
forth may focus exclusively on whether the initial owner consented to the
installation,' °9 while treating the authorities' motivation in seeking to con-
duct beeper surveillance as legally irrelevant."' The Karo ruling is likely to
increase the frequency of beeper surveillance subject to no judicial screening
or oversight.'
The Karo ruling has further Fourth Amendment implications. By catego-
rizing a beeper installation as a nonsearch, Karo creates the possibility that
similar investigative procedures, by analogy, might also be classified as
nonsearches. 2
108. For a discussion of consensual installation case law in other than a precursor chemical
context, see infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
109. Indeed, since the installation occurs before the suspect takes possession and owner-
ship, the suspect might lack standing to protest if the beeper is installed without the seller's
consent. Concerning the concept of standing, see infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
110. In this respect, the law governing beeper installation would parallel that governing
consent searches and consensual interceptions. In those areas, too, the focus is on the validity
of the consent, rather than on the enforcement agent's motives or justification. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); White, 401 U.S. at 745. The parallels, however, are not
exact. For a further discussion of consent searches, see supra note 63; concerning consensual
interceptions, see 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (1982) (if a consensual interception is not conducted
"under color of law" and is done "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act,"
the interception is unlawful, the evidence is suppressible, and the interception gives rise to a
civil cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982)).
The purposes and justification for beeper surveillance remain subject to judicial review in the
context of private location monitoring. See infra notes 226-50.
111. Upon inquiries to the Drug Enforcement Administration, I was told that while DEA
acknowledges that it uses beepers on occasion, it refuses to disclose information as to how the
agency regulates such use.
112. Thus, in White, the Court held that it does not constitute a search for a consenting
participant to secretly record or transmit his conversation with a suspect. White, 401 U.S. at
751. The Court reasoned that the suspect assumes the risk that the person to whom he is
speaking is cooperating with the authorities. Therefore, he must also assume the risk that the
cooperation includes transmitting or recording his words. In Miller, the Court held that when
a person "reveals" his financial affairs to a bank (by writing checks, filling out deposit slips,
and the like), he or she assumes the risk that the bank will disclose this information to the
government. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-44. The depositor, therefore, has no reasonable expecta-
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Two considerations not addressed by either the majority or the Stevens
dissent nevertheless confirm that the result arrived at on the installation is-
sue in Karo is correct. These considerations are the practical consequences
of a contrary conclusion, and the principle of judicial restraint.
Practical consequences. The question of private location monitoring aside,
the installation, sale, in-transit, and general vicinity monitoring of a beeper
do no more than facilitate the acquisition of information that the authorities
could lawfully obtain-albeit with less certainty and greater risk-without
the use of a beeper. This information is often essential if the authorities are
to identify coconspirators, locate clandestine laboratories, and acquire prob-
able cause for arrest and search warrants. If the sale of a beeper implanted
drum of chemicals had been categorized as a search or seizure, subject to
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements and restrictions, beeper sur-
veillance would have been rendered unavailable to the police in situations
where it is most greatly needed. Under such a ruling, the police would need
probable cause and a warrant before they could use a minimally intrusive
technique, the sole purpose of which is to enable them to obtain probable
cause for a search warrant. 1 3 Given society's substantial interest in prevent-
ing the manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs,' 4 and the compara-
tion of privacy if the bank actually does so. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court placed
heavy reliance on the White decision.
In Smith, the Court held that when a person dials his telephone, he knowingly conveys
numerical information to the phone company. Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). He, therefore,
assumes the risk that the phone company is making a record of the numbers he dials at police
request, and if this proves to be the case, no search has occurred. In arriving at this conclusion
the Court placed heavy reliance on the Miller decision. In Knotts, the Court held that in-
transit and at least some types of destination-determination monitoring do not constitute a
search because when a person travels the public roads, he assumes the risk that he is convey-
ing, to whomever is watching, his present location and his final destination. Knotts, 460 U.S.
at 281-82. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court placed heavy reliance on Smith. See also
Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1652. For a further discussion of the White decision, see generally
Interception of Communications, supra note 32, at 47-50. For a further discussion of Smith, see
Pen Registers, supra note 32, at 565-74, 581-89.
In offering this sequence of decisions, I do not intend to suggest that they represent a descent
from virtue. I am of the opinion that White, Miller, Knotts, and Jacobsen were correctly de-
cided. The sequence nevertheless demonstrates that the Court has built on prior precedent in
the past and is likely to continue to do so in the future. For example, several lower courts have
held that a trespassory-nonconsensual-installation of a beeper onto a target's vehicle is not a
search. See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text. One can readily foresee the Court
relying on Karo to arrive at the same conclusion.
113. As the Court correctly observed, "Despite this holding, warrants for the installation
and monitoring of a beeper will obviously be desirable since it may be useful, even critical, to
monitor the beeper [under circumstances requiring a warrant]." Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 n.3.
For a discussion of the contents of such a warrant, and the factual predicate required for its
issuance, see infra notes 426-87 and accompanying text.
114. See infra note 473 and accompanying text.
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tively minor intrusion involved," 5 such a result would have been most
unfortunate.
Judicial restraint. The Fourth Amendment phrase "searches and
seizures" traditionally has included only those investigative activities involv-
ing an overt physical seizure of or intrusion into "the people['s] . . . persons,
houses, papers, and effects."" ' 6 As a rule, the Supreme Court has declined
to broaden the definition of these terms or to apply the Fourth Amendment
to investigative procedures that do not involve a physical intrusion or
seizure. 117
115. See infra notes 394-97 and accompanying text.
116. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Thus, the Court has refused to extend
the Fourth Amendment to situations in which a suspect voluntarily conveys words or informa-
tion to another, where the latter similtaneously transmits or records, or subsequently reveals,
that information to the authorities. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (not a search for telephone com-
pany, acting at behest of police, to use pen register to make a record of the numbers dialed
from a suspect's phone and then give this information to the police); Miller, 425 U.S. at 435
(not a search for a bank to reveal to the authorities its records of a customer's accounts);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (when taxpayer voluntarily reveals business
records to an accountant knowing the accountant will have to disclose much of the informa-
tion contained therein on the taxpayer's tax return, taxpayer has no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the records if the IRS summons the accountant to surrender the
records); White, 401 U.S. at 752 (no search where wired informer is voluntarily admitted by a
suspect into the latter's home and transmits his conversation with suspect to police officers
equipped with receiver); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (no search for informer to repeat to federal law
enforcement agents his conversations with a suspect); Lewis, 385 U.S. at 206 (no search for an
informer or undercover agent, concealing his true identity and purpose, to gain an invitation
into a suspect's home to attempt to purchase narcotics); Lopez, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (no search
for informer or agent to secretly record his conversations with a suspect). Similarly, the Court
has refused to categorize as a search the acquisition by the police of information concerning
conduct that a suspect exposed to the public at large. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (not a Fourth
Amendment search to conduct in-transit and destination-determination monitoring of a
beeper); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (not a Fourth Amendment search to force
a suspect to provide a grand jury with a voice exemplar, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum);
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (same result with a subpoena duces tecum for
handwriting exemplar). See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. But see Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (where customers of a pornographic book store
would have to pay to peruse contents of magazines or view films in coin operated booths, it
constituted a search for a town justice with police escort to examine these materials without
first paying as an ordinary customer would). Further, it is not a search for an officer to see or
hear sounds or objects from within the home, so long as the officer is lawfully positioned where
he can see or hear them. See C. FiSHMAN, supra note 66, at § 26 (Supp. 1983) (overhearing
with the "naked ear"); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 2.2(a) ("plain view" observations).
It is axiomatic that the Court in Katz, freed the Fourth Amendment from the narrow con-
fines of property law. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected." 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted). See also
supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. In Katz, federal agents placed a listening device on
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This restraint is commendable for at least two reasons. First, traditional
Fourth Amendment concepts and precedents do not translate well when ap-
plied to nontraditional investigative techniques."' Indeed, the resulting
confusion has on occasion infected the law governing traditional investiga-
tive procedures.' 19 Second, whether and to what degree nontraditional in-
vestigative procedures should be restrained or regulated is primarily a policy
decision on which reasonable people can and do differ. Such a decision
should be made by Congress through legislation, rather than by the Supreme
Court in a constitutional decree."2 ° A decision that installation and sale
constitutes a search requiring probable cause and a warrant would have es-
tablished the point in constitutional concrete, and in all likelihood would
the outside of a phone booth Katz was known to frequent, and thereby overheard Katz' por-
tion of telephone conversations. The Court held that when Katz closed the door of a tele-
phone booth, thereby excluding the public ear (if not the public eye), he was constitutionally
protected against the warrantless use of the eavesdropping device. Katz, 398 U.S. at 352-53.
But Katz is the only case in which the Court has held that a search or seizure occurred without
a physical seizure of, or intrusion into, a suspect's "persono, houseo, papers, or effects"; and
nonconsensual electronic surveillance of communications is the only investigative technique
that has been so classified. See generally I W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at ch. 2.
118. See C. FISHMAN, supra note 66, at §§ 6, 7; Fishman, The "Minimization" Require-
ment in Electronic Surveillance: Title I1, the Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott Deci-
sion, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 315, 317-18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The "Minimization"
Requirement].
119. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Knotts appears to express some concern in
this regard:
Katz . . . made quite clear that the Fourth Amendment protects against govern-
mental invasions of a person's reasonable "expectation[s] of privacy," even when
those invasions are not accompanied by physical intrusions. Cases such as Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961), however, hold that, when the govern-
ment does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to
obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment even if the same information could have been obtained by other means. I do
not believe that Katz, or its progeny, have eroded that principle.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286 (emphasis in original); see also Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the
Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV.
151, 187-88 (1979). Burkoff argued that, in applying the Fourth Amendment to wiretapping,
the Court, in Scott v. United States, seriously undercut the deterrent rationale on which the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is primarily based. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128 (1978); see also C. FisHMAN, supra note 66, at §§ 152, 159, 159.1, 190; The "Minimiza-
tion" Requirement, supra note 118, at 332-35.
120. Congress, after all, is the primary policymaking branch of government, as well as the
most representative. The Court must consider the question in the context of one or at most a
few somewhat haphazardly selected cases, and is in significant measure restricted in sources of
information and opinion to the parties' briefs, amicus briefs, and scholarly publications. Con-
gress, in contrast, can conduct hearings, elicit testimony from experts, peruse newspaper arti-
cles and editorials, ascertain in a number of ways the concerns and views of their constituents,
and consider the question for an extended period of time. Congress is therefore in a better
position to guage what privacy expectations, if any, society does and should accept as reason-
able with regard to the installation and use of beepers. Finally, Congress is in a far better
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have stunted the development of creative and flexible ways to deal with the
still-emerging issues posed by beeper surveillance.
1 2
2. Other Consensual Installations
a. In General
The broad sweep of the Court's discussion of consensual installations and
position than the Court to revise a policy judgment that has been found wanting in the light of
experience.
Congress might decide ultimately to do nothing; it might forbid beeper surveillance alto-
gether, the way it did wiretapping between 1934 and 1968 (The Communications Act of 1934,
§ 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982)); see Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). It might enact a
statute similar in many respects to title III, requiring a warrant, regular reporting, and judicial
supervision; or it might direct the Attorney General to promulgate regulations governing the
use of beeper surveillance, without disturbing a judicial determination that consensual installa-
tion and sale do not constitute a search. See infra note 121.
121. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) provides a worthwhile example. In
Zurcher, the Court held that neither a newspaper office, nor nonsuspect third persons gener-
ally, enjoyed any special protection from having their premises searched pursuant to a war-
rant, so long as probable cause was shown that evidence incriminating someone would be
found on the premises. The Court therefore reversed a lower court ruling that before such a
warrant could issue, the authorities would also have to show probable cause to believe that
proceedings by means of a less intrusive subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable or
would result in destruction or removal of the desired evidence. The decision was roundly
criticized by the media as well as by prominent First and Fourth Amendment scholars. See,
e.g., Cantrell, Zurcher: Third Party Searches and Freedom of the Press, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 35
(1978); Note, Search and Seizure of a Third-Party Newspaper.: Zurcher, Chief of Police of Palo
Alto v. Stanford Daily, 20 B.C.L. REV. 783 (1979); Dash, Police Power.: An Ominous Growth,
Wash. Post, June 11, 1978, at Cl, col. 1; Lewis, The Court and the Press, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1978, at A27, col. 1; Reston, A Letter to the Whizzer, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1978, at A23, col. 1.
In response, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1982).
In general, the statute provides that, except as specifically provided, it is "unlawful" for a law
enforcement official to search for or seize journalistic or scholarly "work product" material or
other documentary material possessed for purposes disseminating information to the public.
Id. § 2000aa(a)-(b). The statute further provides that a person aggrieved by an unlawful
search or seizure shall have a cause of action for damages. Id. § 2000aa-6(a). However,
"[e]vidence otherwise admissible in a proceeding shall not be excluded on the basis of a viola-
tion of this Act." Id. § 2000aa-6(e). In other words, Congress enacted a civil remedy to pro-
tect or compensate journalists, scholars, researchers, etc., while nevertheless permitting a
federal prosecutor to offer in evidence at a criminal trial items seized in violation of the statute,
so long as the seizure was in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the statute
instructed the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines regulating the seizure of physical
evidence from nonsuspect third persons, and particularly seizures that might intrude upon a
confidential relationship such as clergyman-parishioner, lawyer-client, or doctor-patient. Id.
§ 2000aa-1 l(a). Again, however, evidence seized in violations of such guidelines is admissible
in a criminal prosecution, so long as the seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment. Id.
§'2000aa-12. The guidelines are set out at 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 (1984). In my view, Zurcher is an
appropriate exercise in judicial restraint and the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 is an appropri-
ate exercise of congressional responsibility.
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sales in Karot 2 2 appears on its face to be applicable to all such installations
and transfers, regardless of the sophistication of the beeper and regardless of
where the beeper is being installed. Issues far more delicate than those
before the Court in Karo, however, would be presented by the use of more
sophisticated equipment, 123 or by the installation of beepers into objects sig-
nificantly more "private" than a container of chemicals. 124 To date, few
such cases have been reported.
125
122. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
123. Suppose, for example, that the agents in Karo had installed, not merely a locational
beeper, but an eavesdropping device. As the Karo opinion is written, the same result would be
reached. The pretransfer installation of the device would not be a "search," because at the
time of the installation the can was not yet the property of the suspects. See supra notes 62-63
and accompanying text. The transfer of the can would not be a "search," because the presence
of the beeper revealed no information until and unless the device was monitored. See supra
notes 69-72 and accompaning text. Finally, its post transfer presence would not be a
"seizure," since it constituted no more than a technical trespass into the can. See supra notes
77-78 and accompanying text. Yet the threat to Fourth Amendment protected privacy posed
by the presence of even an unmonitored eavesdropping device is far greater than that posed by
a locational beeper-so much greater that principles applicable to the latter may be inadequate
to deal with the former.
The situation hypothesized here is distinguishable from the court's analogy to a police officer
"walking down the street carrying [but not using] a parabolic microphone capable of picking
up conversations in nearby homes .... ." Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302. Even assuming the
microphone and the bug are equally capable of monitoring conversations in the targeted prem-
ises, there are significant differences between carrying a microphone down the street and ar-
ranging for a suspect to unwittingly carry an eavesdropping device into his own home. One
difference is the existence of the technical trespass, not merely into the can, but into the home.
A second is that the device is a far more permanent fixture in the targeted premises than the
microphone. The microphone can be removed by the police at will; the device cannot, unless
the agents enter the host premises to remove it. A third is that the police are less able to
control whose privacy the device potentially compromises, because they cannot control where
the bugged container will be taken by the suspects (or by someone who is totally innocent and
above suspicion). Fourth, a parabolic microphone has ligitimate uses other than the invasion
of privacy; an eavesdropping device hidden in a can of chemicals does not. Finally, the physi-
cal presence of a device inside someone's home is far more Orwellian than a powerful
microphone across the street.
124. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
125. See United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976);
United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 843, 848 (1976). In
Bishop, the court was not called upon to determine the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
to installation or in-transit monitoring. The situation in Perez, and the legal principle that has
emerged from the case, is sufficiently unusual to merit separate discussion. See infra note 391
and accompanying text.
Several reported cases involve consensual installations into items other than precursor
chemicals, in which the installation was authorized by a warrant. Thus, the courts were not
called upon to consider whether such installation in fact constituted a search or seizure.
United States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2397 (1983) (tablet
press sold to purchasers suspected of manufacturing methaqualone); United States v. Dunn,
674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 712 F.2d 1416 (1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 1380
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b. Vehicles
Assume that police learn that X is about to borrow or rent an airplane or
automobile, and further suspect that he will use the vehicle for criminal pur-
poses (for example, to import marijuana). With the owner's consent, they
install a beeper or transponder' 26 into the vehicle prior to the time that X
takes possession. Thereafter, they utilize the beeper to monitor the wherea-
bouts of the vehicle. The surveillance results in the seizure of incriminating
evidence. X brings a motion to suppress, alleging that the installation and
monitoring of the beeper violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The pre-Karo case law can be summarized simply. Barring unusual cir-
cumstances, the consensual installation of a beeper into a vehicle provides no
basis for suppressing evidence obtained thereby. 27 Nor are Fourth Amend-
(1984) (lab equipment); United States v. Emanuel, 572 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (parcels
given to mailman suspected of stealing from the mails).
126. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
127. United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978)
(rented airplane, which was subsequently used to fly marijuana into the United States; without
addressing whether installation was a search, court concluded that owner's consent satisfied
the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 896 (1978) (rented airplane, which was subsequently used to transport marijuana into
the United States; defendant had already signed a rental agreement for that plane prior to
installation of the beeper; held, installation did not violate renter's Fourth Amendment rights);
United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977) (airplane used
to fly marijuana into the United States; unclear from opinion whether plane was rented, or
merely borrowed); United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (rented airplane, subsequently used to fly marijuana into the United
States; defendant had already signed a rental agreement for, and placed a down payment on,
the particular airplane before beeper was installed); United States v. Devorce, 526 F. Supp.
191, 199-200 (D. Conn. 1981) (rented automobile, which suspects used as getaway vehicle in
bank robbery; although police had obtained a warrant authorizing installation, court held that
since installation occurred while the car was still in the owner's possession, installation did not
violate Fourth Amendment); United States v. Tussell, 441 F. Supp. 1092, 1102 (M.D. Pa.
1977) (rented airplane, used to fly marijuana into the United States; beeper installed with per-
mission of informant/pilot who had rented the plane on marijuana importers' behalf; held,
that entry onto the plane to install the beeper was a search subject to Fourth Amendment
protection, but that pilot's apparent authority to consent to installation rendered the search
lawful); Houlihan v. State, 551 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955
(1977) (after negotiating to purchase 500 pounds of marijuana from suspect, undercover agent
loaned his van installed with a beeper to suspect to bring the marijuana to him).
Two courts have held, however, that in usual circumstances installation of a beeper violated
a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights despite the consent of the owner. In United States v.
One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, federal agents learned that a marijuana suspect was negotiating to
purchase (not merely rent) an airplane. 454 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (C.D. Cal. 1978). After the
suspect had made a down payment on the aircraft, the investigators persuaded the seller to
permit them to install a beeper by telling him that after the plane was seized in the possession
of the buyer, it would be returned to the seller as expeditiously as possible. Id. at 1354-55.
Some time after the sale was completed and the suspect took possession, government agents
searched the plane and found three flakes of marijuana. Id. at 1355. Thereafter, the govern-
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ment rights violated where an informant, who is invited to accompany the
suspect, wears a beeper on his or her body, 2 ' or installs the beeper in the
vehicle in which he and the suspect are traveling. 129
The Karo decision's treatment of consensual installations 3 ° appears to be
applicable as well to the prerental installation of a beeper into a vehicle.
Indeed, Karo appears to govern the consensual installation of a beeper into
ment brought a forfeiture action, alleging that the plane had been used to transport marijuana.
Id. at 1354. In refusing to grant the forfeiture, the court ruled, inter alia, that the owner's
consent was invalid because it had been obtained fraudulently and that the purchaser had
standing to assert the invalid consent because he had acquired a legal interest in the aircraft at
the time the beeper had been installed. Id. at 1357. In People v. Smith, police learned that
Smith, a suspected marijuana importer, had rented a plane only after he had already taken
possession. 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977). Nevertheless, the of-
ficers persuaded the owner to accompany them to the airport where Smith had parked the
plane and to assist in the installation of a beeper. Shortly thereafter, Smith took the plane out
of the United States. By monitoring the beeper, the officers were able to follow the plane as it
returned to United States airspace. A substantial quantity of marijuana was found on the
plane. Smith and two codefendants were convicted of possession and conspiracy. Id. at 644-
47, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 766-68. The appellate court reversed, holding that
the Cessna was under the posssession and control of Smith when the tracking
equipment was installed and this possession and control never was terminated by [the
owner], either before or after the entry [into the aircraft] was made. Clearly, [the
owner] did not have the authority to install the transponder into the airplane for the
police.
Id. at 647, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 768. The court also noted that even assuming probable cause
existed, there had been time enough to obtain a warrant authorizing installation. Id. at 648,
136 Cal. Rptr. at 769. Though Smith lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as to where
he flew or parked his plane, the unlawful entry and installation constituted a Fourth Amend-
ment violation. Because the police learned of the plane's return to the United States by ex-
ploitation of that illegality, the court ruled that the marijuana should have been suppressed.
128. United States v. Arrendondo-Morales, 624 F.2d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecu-
tion for importing undocumented aliens; informant wore the beeper during the entire automo-
bile trip; court likened this to the "wired informant" situation in United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745 (1971)).
129. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831
(1979). In Conroy, an informant crew member installed two beepers on a vessel, which then
sailed into Haitian waters. Seven thousand pounds of marijuana were ultimately seized. The
court reasoned that since the informant lawfully could have worn the beeper, was under no
legal obligation to conceal his whereabouts, and was on board the ship throughout the period
that the beeper was monitored, installation and use of the beepers "was not... an invasion of
the privacy of others .... " 589 F.2d at 1264. Similarly, several courts have also held that
the subsequent monitoring of a lawfully installed beeper violates no Fourth Amendment inter-
ests of those whose movements are revealed by the beeper. Indeed, every case cited in supra
note 127, with the exception of One 1967 Cessna Aircraft and People v. Smith, so holds. The
rationale for this latter ruling is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to his movements on the public streets or through the air. In arriving at this result,
these courts correctly anticipated the result and the underlying reasoning of United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
and the subsequent sale of a vehicle.' 3 1
3. Installation Into Contraband; "Tainted" Transactions
Several courts have held or stated in dictum that no Fourth Amendment
rights are violated by the installation of a beeper into contraband, so long as
the contraband is in the lawful possession of government agents at the
time.'3 2 The situation thus far has arisen only in cases involving the discov-
ery of narcotics by United States Customs officials, who are authorized by
law to open and inspect all packages and mail entering the United States
from a foreign country.' 33 Not surprisingly, packages mailed from overseas
are often found to contain contraband, such as heroin or cocaine, secreted in
a hidden compartment of an apparently inoffensive item of personal prop-
erty. When such a package has been discovered, law enforcement officials
have two basic options. The first is simply to confiscate the entire package.
Seizure prior to delivery, however, may make it difficult or impossible to
prosecute successfully the intended recipient. ' 34 From an investigative view-
131. If the sale of the can of ether in Karo did not render the presence of the beeper a
search or a seizure, the presence of a beeper (or transponder) in a vehicle should not do so,
either. Indeed, in one sense, a beepered vehicle jeopardizes privacy interests even less than a
beepered chemical container. See infra notes 149-62, 174-75 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 136-37.
133. In United States v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court held:
That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sover-
eign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into
this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border,
should, by now, require no extended demonstration ...
Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have
been considered to be 'reasonable' by the single fact that the person or item in ques-
tion had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional
requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of
probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without
probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless 'reasonable' has a history as
old as the Fourth Amendment itself. We reaffirm it now.
431 U.S. 606, 616, 619 (1977). In Ramsey, the Court upheld the opening and search of enve-
lopes mailed from Thailand (which proved to contain heroin). The search had been conducted
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1982), which authorizes customs officials to inspect incoming
mail when they have "reasonable cause to suspect" that the mail contains illegally imported
merchandise. Other statutes (and corresponding regulations) sweep even more broadly. For
example, 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1982) and 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1984) authorize the search of all
incoming international mail, even without "reasonable cause to suspect" that a letter or pack-
age might contain contraband. See, e.g., Sheikh, 654 F.2d at 1069-70. It should be noted that
while these statutes authorize the warrantless search of incoming international mail, they do
not authorize reading such mail, for which a warrant is required. See 19 C.F.R. § 145.3
(1984); cf 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1984).
134. Without proof that the intended recipient knew that the package contained contra-
band, it would be difficult to convict him or her of knowing possession or related crimes. See,
e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3323 n.3 (1983); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843-844 (1982).
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point, a far more productive procedure is to allow the package to reach the
intended recipient, wait until he or she has had time to open it, and then
seize the package and arrest the person in possession of it.
135
The use of a beeper greatly facilitates the latter technique. The officers
first replace most of the heroin or cocaine with an inert powder, then install
a beeper and reseal the hidden compartment. Next they either notify the
addressee to pick up the package, or deliver it under carefully controlled
circumstances. After the package is picked up or delivered, the police moni-
tor the beeper to determine where the package is being taken (and, if the
beeper is so equipped, to determine as well when the hidden compartment
has been opened). When the officers consider the time is appropriate, they
enter, search, seize, and arrest.
Every court that has considered the installation of a beeper under these
circumstances has upheld its legality, even in the absence of a warrant or
other court order. 1 36 Several other courts have endorsed this result in dic-
tum. 137 The underlying rationale for this result was first expressed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v.
Emery:
[T]he beeper was not attached. . . to an object legitimately pos-
sessed by [appellant] . . . . [R]ather, it was inserted into a pack-
age containing contraband, property which he had no right to
possess. Therefore . . . the appellant in the instant case could
have had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contra-
band. . . . [I]n inserting the beeper into the contraband, which
had been legitimately discovered and constructively seized at the
border, the government did not violate appellant's constitutionally
protected freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 '
135. The inference of knowing and unlawful possession flows automatically and persua-
sively when it can be proved that a person opened the hidden compartment in which the
contraband had been secreted.
136. United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (heroin from Thailand);
Sheikh, 654 F.2d at 1071 (two kilograms of heroin hidden inside a display case shipped from
Iran); United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 1978) (cocaine hidden in
wooden lamps or candle holders mailed from Panama); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d
208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) (heroin in hollowed-out walls of package mailed from Thailand);
United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979)
(cocaine hidden in leather handbags mailed from Colombia); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d
887, 888-90 (1st Cir. 1976) (cocaine hidden in sound speakers mailed from Cali, Colombia).
See United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (marijuana flown into
United States from South America).
137. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1436; Knotts, 662 F.2d at 517; Bailey, 628 F.2d at 942; State v.
Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 253-54, 258 S.E.2d 872, 878-79 (1979). See Houlihan v. State,
551 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955 (1977).
138. Emery, 541 F.2d at 889-90. Each of the cases cited in the two preceding notes en-
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Other courts have suggested that this reasoning is equally applicable to other
"inherently tainted" transactions.1 39
The Karo decision lends further support to this reasoning. If the presence
of a lawfully installed beeper in a can of noncontraband chemicals is neither
a search nor a seizure,' 40 the same result undoubtedly will attain for the
lawful installation of a beeper into a package containing contraband. Thus,
insofar as installation and delivery is concerned, Karo leaves little reason to
distinguish between contraband and noncontraband."4 '
B. Trespassory Installations
1. In General
In each of the situations discussed and cases cited thus far, the beeper was
installed without an unlawful trespass into the container or vehicle. Will
different standards apply if a beeper is installed into or onto an object with-
out the consent of the owner or of someone (such as customs officials) with
lawful authority to possess the object and examine its contents?
The nonconsensual, trespassory installation of a beeper to the inside of a
dorses this reasoning. The Supreme Court has utilized similar reasoning in two recent cases.
In United States v. Place, the Court held that exposing luggage to the sniff of a trained narcot-
ics detection dog, which reveals only whether the luggage contains narcotics, is not a search.
103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). See infra notes 394-96 and accompanying text. In Jacobsen, the Court
held that where Drug Enforcement Administration agents had probable cause to believe that a
tube containing white powder was cocaine, the act of opening the package, removing a small
sample, and subjecting the sample to a chemical test, which destroyed the sample and revealed
only whether the powder was a narcotic drug, "[did] not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy," since "the interest in 'privately' possessing cocaine [is] illegitimate . Jacobsen,
104 S. Ct. at 1662.
One Ninth Circuit panel, however, has expressed reservations:
There appears to be an inherent danger in conditioning the legitimacy or reasona-
bleness of the expectation of privacy on whether the item is contraband. Given full
rein, such a dividing line could then be used to limit Fourth Amendment protections
by the nature of the item seized, regardless of the reasonableness of the method used
to obtain it. Would the warrantless physical search of a residence be reasonable be-
cause the occupants had no 'legitimate' expectation of privacy in the heroin they kept
in the house?
United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271
(1983) (dictum). The simple answer to the Ninth Circuit's rhetorical question is no. Assum-
ing the suspects had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house itself, a warrant would be
required to enter and search the house, unless the situation fell within a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-28, 432-66
(1978 & Supp. 1984).
139. See infra notes 390-92 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
141. The contraband/noncontraband distinction may be quite significant, on the other
hand, with regard to the lawfulness of private location monitoring. See infra notes 387-409
and accompanying text.
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suitcase or similar container 142 should be, and in all probability would be,
categorized as a search, a seizure, or perhaps both. 143 Presumably, there-
fore, barring exceptional circumstances, a warrant based upon probable
cause would be required.'" The Karo decision strongly suggests, on the
other hand, that the nonconsensual, trespassory attachment of a beeper to
the outside of a package or container would not be considered a search or
seizure. 145 It would not be a search because the attachment, even though
trespassory, would "convey[] no information at all."' 146 And, if the attach-
ment of the beeper could be effected without physically transporting the
container, or interfering with the suspect's ability to dispose of or transport
it, 147 the attachment would be "[a]t most . . . a technical trespass on the
space occupied by the beeper,"' 148 and therefore not a seizure.
2. Vehicles
Entry by the police into the interior of a vehicle (without the consent of
the owner) to install a beeper is clearly a search and may require a war-
rant.149 A warrant is also necessary if attachment of the beeper requires
142. This situation is, as yet, purely hypothetical. To the author's best knowledge, beepers
are as yet neither small enough nor light enough to be put to such use without being discov-
ered. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
143. To open the container would reveal its contents, which itself should suffice to be cate-
gorized as a search. "[T]he Fourth amendment provides protection to the owner of every
container that conceals its contents from plain view." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
822-23 (1982). See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979). This principle should apply, even if the
container was empty, and even if the investigators did not care to discover its contents. Alter-
natively, such installation, if not a search, might nevertheless be a more "meaningful interfer-
ence with an individual's possessory interests in" that container than the transfer to a suspect
of a chemical container in which a beeper has already been installed, and therefore classifiable
as a seizure. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (quoting Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656)). See supra notes
75-77 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 266, 445 and accom-
panying text.
145. This assumes, of course, that the police have not unlawfully entered the target's home,
office, etc. to install the beeper. Such unlawful entry would in many circumstances taint (that
is, render suppressible) any information ultimately derived from the beeper surveillance. See
infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
146. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
147. Such interference might itself be considered a seizure. See supra notes 21-22, 89 and
accompanying text.
148. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
149. Butts, 710 F.2d at 1147 ("In our view, an individual clearly has a legitimate expecta-
tion that governmental agents will not encroach upon the interior of a vehicle [airplane] in
such a fashion."); Hufford, 539 F.2d at 34 ("Had the agents not resorted to a warrant, entrance
into the [defendant's private] garage and the opening of the truck's hood would have been an
invasion of an area in which [defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy"); United
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trespass onto private property.15 0
The law governing the trespassory installation of a beeper onto the exte-
rior of a vehicle parked in public is less clear.151 The prevailing view prior to
Karo was that a search warrant is not required to authorize the trespassory
(that is, nonconsensual) attachment of a beeper to the exterior of a vehi-
cle.' 52 The courts having so held justified the result by emphasizing the di-
minished privacy expectations a person enjoys in his automobile or airplane
and the comparatively minor intrusion involved in the attachment. 153 There
States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (airplane); People v. Smith, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 638, 654, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764, 773 (Ct. App. 1977) (airplane).
150. Hufford, 539 F.2d at 34; see also United States v. Rowland, 448 F. Supp. 22 (N.D.
Tex. 1977).
151. Prior to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court had at least twice held
that physical trespass into a suspect's property constituted a Fourth Amendment search. See
supra note 23. The question, however, is whether the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test supplements, rather than replaces, the traditional property based concept of Fourth
Amendment protection-a proposition the Court appeared to ratify as recently as 1978 and
one which still has adherents on the Court. See supra notes 99, 119 and accompanying text. If
pushing a microphone thumbtack deep into a suspect's wall is a sufficient invasion of property
rights to constitute a search, attaching a beeper to the undercarriage of an automobile arguably
is also a sufficient invasion of property rights to constitute a search. See Clinton v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 158 (1964), rev'g per curiam, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963). But this analogy
holds true only if one does not compare the investigative consequences of the "invasion." The
microphone reveals what one has a right to expect will remain private; the beeper attached to a
vehicle does not. See infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
152. Michael, 645 F.2d at 257-59 (assuming exterior attachment is a search, the intrusion is
so minimal that a reasonable suspicion suffices to justify it); Moore, 562 F.2d at 112-13 (exte-
rior attachment is a search requiring probable cause, but not requiring a warrant); People v.
Colon, 96 Misc. 2d 659, 409 N.Y.S.2d 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (apparently concluding that
reasonable suspicion suffices, although in dictum only, since defendant lacked standing to raise
the issue in the first place). See Karo, 710 F.2d at 1438 n.2 (in dictum cites Shovea, 580 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1978), as imposing probable cause requirement); United States v. Bailey, 628
F.2d 938, 942 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting and discussing the issues without deciding them); United
States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1387-88 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978) (without
deciding whether exterior attachment is a search, probable cause and exigent circumstances
suffice); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1046 (1977) (whether exterior attachment constitutes a search is a "difficult question," but the
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances satisfy the Fourth Amendment in any
event); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (sending mixed signals
by suggesting in the same paragraph that such attachment is not a search and that a United
States magistrate has the authority under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41 to issue
a warrant authorizing such attachment).
The Fifth Circuit had initially held that a warrant was required. See United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (equally
divided court). This precedent was, however, subsequently overruled in United States v.
Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 257-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981). See infra note 153.
153. See, e.g., Michael, 645 F.2d at 257-59 (target of investigation had little legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy with respect to the movements of his vehicle, to which a beeper was
attached shortly after target had picked up precursor chemicals; thus, neither installation of
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is disagreement, however, as to how much less than a warrant based on
probable cause is required.1 5 4 One court has held that such attachment is
lawful only if the authorities have probable cause to believe that evidence of
crime will be discovered thereby; 5 5 other courts have held that a reasonable
suspicion suffices;' 5 6 and several judges have argued that trespassory exterior
attachment is not a search at all.
15 7
The Karo decision suggests that the third viewpoint is the correct one.
External attachment of a beeper onto a vehicle "convey[s] no information"
to the installers,' at least no information that the operator of the vehicle
has not already "knowingly expose[d] to the public."'5 9 Granted, such in-
stallation creates a "potential" for the conveyance of information to the au-
thorities, but a Fourth Amendment search occurs only when an actual, not
merely a potential, invasion of privacy occurs.'6°
Jacobsen and Karo also strongly suggest that attachment of a beeper to a
vehicle's exterior does not constitute a seizure.' 6' The attachment does not
interfere with the vehicle owner's "freedom of movement"', 62 of, in, or with
the vehicle; it merely adds extra, unbargained-for optional equipment: an
invisible tail.
Thus, although most of the lower courts that have considered the issue
have held that the trespassory attachment of a beeper to a vehicle does con-
beeper nor subsequent monitoring intruded significantly into target's legitimate privacy expec-
tations). But see id. at 260 (Tate, J., dissenting) (seven other judges joining Tate's dissent).
154. For my views on the subject, see infra note 470.
155. Moore, 562 F.2d at 112-13.
156. Michael, 645 F.2d at 257-59 (where agents attached beeper to van of suspect who had
just made the most recent of several purchases of precursor chemicals and laboratory equip-
ment, assuming such installation is a search at all, reasonable suspicion suffices); Colon, 96
Misc. 2d at 659, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22 (efforts to locate defendant, who had been indicted for
five brutal homicides, had been unavailing; placement of beeper on defendant's brother's car
ultimately led police to defendant; dictum, since defendant lacked standing to challenge at-
tachment of beeper to his brother's car).
157. In Michael, seven of the twenty-four judges participating argued that the installation
was not a search. See Michael, 645 F.2d at 259 (Brown & Clark, JJ., concurring).
158. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
159. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52. See supra text accompanying note 25. The Court has fre-
quently observed that "one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in
one's residence." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). See Rakas, 439
U.S. at 149; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion) (noting in particular the greatly reduced expectations with
regard to the exterior of an automobile).
160. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302.
161. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1652.
162. Id. at 1656 n.5. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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stitute a Fourth Amendment intrusion, there is serious question whether
that result survives in light of the Karo and Jacobsen decisions.
IV. MONITORING
In United States v. Knotts," 3 the Supreme Court unanimously held that,
assuming the installation of a beeper into a drum of chloroform is lawful, the
in-transit and at least some forms of general vicinity monitoring of the
beeper do not constitute a search.164 The Court in United States v. Karo
held unequivocally that private location monitoring of a beeper is a search.
Karo also shed further light-and some confusion, as well-on the proper
treatment of general vicinity monitoring.1 6 This section of this article will
analyze these holdings.
A. In-transit Monitoring: Knotts
In United States v. Knotts,'166 Minnesota police discovered that Tristan
Armstrong periodically purchased chemicals that could be used to manufac-
ture illicit drugs. The officers further discovered that after Armstrong
purchased these chemicals, he would deliver them to an accomplice, Darryl
Petschen. With the consent of the supplying chemical company, the officers
installed a beeper in a five-gallon container of chloroform, one of the precur-
sor chemicals necessary to manufacture amphetamines. The next time Arm-
strong purchased chemicals, he was given the container in which the beeper
had been installed.
Using both visual surveillance and the beeper, the officers followed Arm-
strong to Petschen's home, where the container was transferred to Pet-
schen's automobile. The officers then followed the vehicle into Wisconsin.
During the latter part of his journey, Petschen began driving evasively, and
the agents lost both visual and beeper contact with his vehicle. Approxi-
mately one hour later, a helicopter equipped with a monitor detected the
beeper signal, now stationary, in the vicinity of a cabin occupied by Knotts
in a rural part of Wisconsin.' 67
After three days of intermittent visual surveillance of the cabin, police
officers obtained a search warrant. Searching the cabin, they found a fully
163. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
164. Although all nine justices agreed that no search had occurred, four of the nine ob-
jected to other aspects of the majority opinion. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
166. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
167. It is unclear from the opinions in the case whether the officers in the helicopter could
determine the precise location of the five-gallon drum, that is, whether it was in the cabin, on
the porch, outside near the front or outside near the back.
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operable, clandestine drug laboratory with equipment valued at more than
$10,000, formulas for amphetamine and methamphetamine, and chemicals
in sufficient quantity to produce fourteen pounds of pure amphetamine.
Under a barrel outside the cabin, they also found the five-gallon container
with the beeper."' 8
Armstrong, Petschen and Knotts were charged with conspiring to manu-
facture controlled substances. Armstrong pleaded guilty and testified for the
government; Petschen and Knotts were tried and convicted of manufactur-
ing controlled substances. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed Knotts'
conviction. The circuit court held that the use of the beeper to locate the
chloroform at Knotts' cabin constituted an intrusion into his reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, and that the failure of the police to obtain a warrant
authorizing such an intrusion rendered the intrusion an unlawful search and
seizure. 169 The government appealed and the Supreme Court reversed, rein-
stating Knotts' conviction.
To appreciate the limited nature of the Court's decision, it is important to
understand what issues were not before the Court. First, Knotts did not
challenge the lawfulness of the installation of the beeper., 70 Second, there
apparently was no indication that the officers continued to monitor the
beeper after they initially located the beeper in the vicinity of Knotts'
cabin.1 71  The only question before the Court in Knotts, therefore, was
whether it constituted a "search" for the police to use the beeper to follow
Petschen and, after having lost their quarry, to determine that the beepered
container of chloroform had come to rest in the vicinity of Knotts' cabin. 1
72
The Court held that it did not.
168. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-79; see Knotts, 662 F.2d at 516.
169. The court distinguished the use of a beeper in following a moving vehicle from the use
of a beeper in determining an object's final resting place. The court explained that
a principal rationale for allowing warrantless tracking of beepers, particularly
beepers in or on an auto, is that beepers are merely a more effective means of observ-
ing what is already public. But people pass daily from public to private spheres.
When police agents track bugged personal property without first obtaining a warrant,
they must do so at the risk that this enhanced surveillance, intrusive at best, might
push fortuitously and unreasonably into the private sphere protected by the Fourth
Amendment. It did so in this case, where the beeper's signal was lost and found
again only after the beeper-laden drum was on private property out of public view.
Knotts, 662 F.2d at 518. Petschen's conviction, however, was affirmed. The court reasoned
that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in Knotts' cabin. Id. The question of stand-
ing is discussed infra in notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
170. Knotts assumed that he lacked standing to do so. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279-80 n.**. He
was probably correct. See infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
171. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85. See infra text accompanying note 183.
172. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85.
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1. The Court's Reasoning
The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, first reiterated that "the application of
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protec-
tion can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of
privacy' that has been invaded by government action." That question, the
Court stated, must be answered by applying the two-step analysis first enun-
ciated by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States.173 The Court then re-
viewed its prior holdings that a person enjoys only a limited expectation of
privacy in an automobile. 174 The Court continued:
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another. When Petschen travelled over the public
streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular di-
rection, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private
property. 175
The Court acknowledged that Knotts, as the owner of the cabin and sur-
rounding land,
undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a
dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned. . . . But no
such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of
Petschen's automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a pub-
lic highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chlo-
173. Id. at 280-82 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979), and citing
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See supra notes 26-
28 and accompanying text for Justice Harlan's two-step analysis.
174. One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opin-
ion); citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153-54 n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)). In Cardwell, the Court held that it was
reasonable for police to seize a murder suspect's vehicle from the public lot where it had been
parked, tow it to a more convenient location, and then take tire casts and paint scrapings from
it, all without a warrant. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592-96. In Opperman, the Court upheld the
warrantless search of a car that had been towed after it collected several parking tickets. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. at 384.
175. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. In fact, however, Petschen did not "voluntarily convey"
his "final destination" to "anyone who wanted to look." Instead, he took evasive measures, in
an effort (which, but for the beeper, would have been successful) to prevent the police, "who
wanted to look [from learning his] final destination." For a further discussion of this aspect of
the Court's opinion, see infra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
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roform outside the cabin in the 'open fields.' 176
The Court emphasized that "[v]isual surveillance from public places...
adjoining Knotts' premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to
the police." 177 The fact that the police relied on the beeper in addition to
visual surveillance to acquire this information "does not alter the situa-
tion."' 17' The Court concluded this portion of its analysis with the observa-
tion, "Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case."
' 179
The Court noted that it was not authorizing the police to conduct
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen . . . without judicial knowl-
edge or supervision," commenting that "if such dragnet type law enforce-
ment practices . . . should .. .occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable."18
But the mere fact that "scientific devices such as the beeper enabled the
police to be more effective in detecting crime," the Court stated, did not give
rise to a constitutional violation. "We have never equated police efficiency
with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now."181
Finally, the Court rejected Knotts' claim-and the Eighth Circuit's con-
176. .Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, concurring in the result, ob-
jected to the citation to Hester and the "open fields" doctrine, noting that the Knotts case did
not involve the open fields doctrine and that citation to that doctrine was particularly inappro-
priate because cases concerning the open fields doctrine had recently been accepted by the
Court for argument and plenary consideration. Id. at 287 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Subse-
quently, in Oliver v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the "open fields" doctrine first enunci-
ated in Hester, holding that police officers may enter and search an unoccupied or undeveloped
area outside the "curtilage" of a dwelling without either a warrant or probable cause. Oliver,
104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). For a further discussion of Oliver, see supra note 77 and infra note 231.
177. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 282-83 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979); United States v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). In Lee, the Court held that it did not constitute a search for law en-
forcement officials on the high seas to use a search light to enable them to see cases of liquor on
the deck of a ship. The Court likened the use of a searchlight to the use of a field glass or
marine glass, and concluded that use of these devices would constitute a search. Lee, 274 U.S.
at 563. In Smith, the Court held that when the subscriber to telephone service dialed a
number, he "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company," and
thereby assumed the risk that the company was using special equipment at police request to
record the numbers dialed. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. If the subscriber had placed the calls
through an operator, the Court reasoned, he could have claimed no reasonable expectation of
privacy if the operator retained a record of the numbers dialed. Id. No "different constitu-
tional result is required," the Court stated, "because the telephone company has decided to
automate." Id. at 745.
180. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84.
181. d. at 284.
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clusion-that the use of the beeper involved "the sanctity of [r]espondent's
residence." 
182
[N]othing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was re-
ceived or relied upon after it had indicated that the drum contain-
ing the chloroform had ended its automotive journey at rest on
respondent's premises in rural Wisconsin. Admittedly, because of
the failure of the visual surveillance, the beeper enabled the law
enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the ultimate resting
place of the chloroform when they would not have been able to do
so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific en-
hancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual
surveillance would not also raise. A police car following Petschen
at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him leav-
ing the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respon-
dent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car. . . . [T]here is
no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal infor-
mation as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any
way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside
the cabin. Just as notions of physical trespass based on the law of
real property were not dispositive in Katz . . .neither were they
dispositive in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).183
The Court concluded that monitoring the beeper did not invade any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy that Knotts could claim; hence, "there was
neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' within the contemplation of the Fourth
Amendment."1
84
2. Concurring Opinions
All nine Justices concurred in the result. Four of the Justices, however,
declined to join Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, wrote separately to note his concern over the
"much more difficult" question of whether the installation of the beeper was
lawful.' 85 He also decried the "formalism and confusion in this Court's re-
cent attempts to redefine Fourth Amendment standing." '18 6 Justice Black-
mun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, objected to the
majority's "gratuitous" reference to the "open fields" doctrine and citation
182. Id.
183. Id. at 284-85.
184. Id. at 285.
185. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring). For an analysis of the Karo decision relating to
installation, see supra notes 56-121 and accompanying text. For other issues relating to instal-
lation, see supra notes 123-62 and accompanying text.
186. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of issues relating
to standing, see infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
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to Hester v. United States.18 7
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with the
majority that, putting the question of the beeper's installation aside, "it was
entirely reasonable for the police officers to make use of the information re-
ceived over the airwaves when they were trying to ascertain the ultimate
destination of the chloroform."18 8 Justice Stevens objected, however, to the
majority's statement that the Fourth Amendment does not inhibit "the po-
lice from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them," noting that the
Court in Katz held to the contrary. "Although the augmentation in this case
was unobjectionable," Justice Stevens stated, "it by no means follows that
the use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensi-
tive concerns."'
1 89
Justice Stevens is, of course, correct. Electronic detection techniques, and
other forms of scientific enhancement of the unaided eye and ear, do indeed
"implicate especially sensitive concerns." It appears, however, that the ma-
jority was adequately alert to these concerns. Thus, the majority specified
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the technological enhance-
ment of natural sensory faculties that occurred "in this case."'"9 Elsewhere,
the Court commented that "scientific enhancement of this sort raises no con-
stitutional issues that visual surveillance would not also raise."' 91 Still, Jus-
tice Stevens' separate opinion serves the worthwhile purpose of underscoring
the "especially sensitive" implications of the use of technology in
surveillance.
3. Evaluation and Analysis
The Court's unanimous conclusion, that the in-transit and general vicinity
monitoring did not constitute a "search," deserves further comment. The
Court's conclusion was based on the following reasoning:
a. The Fourth Amendment protects only legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy.1 92
b. Because Petschen was traveling in public, he assumed the
187. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 287 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra notes 176, 183 and
accompanying text.
188. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring).
189. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). It should be noted that the majority opinion specified
that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the technological enhancement of natural sen-
sory faculties "in this case." Id. at 282 (emphasis added). For the entire passage of the major-
ity's opinion, see supra text accompanying note 183.
190. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 280-81. See also supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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risk that his movements might be observed. 193
c. Had the police discovered Petschen's destination by con-
ducting visual surveillance, they would not have intruded into any
legitimate privacy expectation that Petschen could claim.' 94
d. Because the police could have learned what they did by vis-
ual surveillance, no additional constitutional issues arise because
they acquired that information by monitoring the beeper after they
lost sight of Petschen.' 95
This final step in the Court's analysis flows logically from the first three,
but a plausible argument to the contrary also exists, depending upon how
one determines which privacy expectations are reasonable. Granted, that in
Katz v. United States, the lodestone of Fourth Amendment analysis, the
Court, per Justice Stewart, observed, "What one knowingly exposes to the
public. . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."' 96 But how
"public" must the "exposure" be before Fourth Amendment protections are
waived; and are such protections waived regardless of the means utilized by
the police to observe or overhear such "public" conduct? It is well-estab-
lished that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy includes freedom from
unauthorized and unjustified intrusions into one's person,197 home,19 8 of-
fice,' 99 luggage, 2° or automobile.20 1 Might it not also include the right to
make a reasonable assessment of whether one's "public" conduct is being
monitored?
For example, if I make a phone call from a pay telephone-the kind with-
out an enclosed booth-and a stranger is standing a few feet away, I have no
193. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. See supra text accompanying note 175.
194. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. Up to this point, there is nothing particularly noteworthy
about the Court's reasoning, consisting, as it does, of little more than a restatement of firmly
established principles. But the police did not learn of Petschen's destination by visual surveil-
lance. They declined to conduct intensive, bumper-to-bumper surveillance, presumably be-
cause to do so would have alerted Petschen to the fact that he was being followed. This, in
turn, might have prompted Petschen to change his plans and his destination, thereby frustrat-
ing the officers' efforts to find the clandestine laboratory. Because the officers on the ground
conducted visual surveillance very cautiously, Petschen was able to elude them. His destina-
tion was not determined by visual surveillance but through the use of a helicopter equipped
with a monitor.
195. Id. at 285.
196. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The next sentence of Katz reads: "But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Id. at 351-52.
197. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
198. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
199. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
200. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977).
201. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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Fourth Amendment complaint to make if the stranger happens to be a police
officer who is listening to every word I say. By speaking loudly enough to be
overheard by the bystander, I "knowingly expose" my words to the officer.
If I want to avoid that risk, I can always wait until he moves out of earshot;
and if he does not do so, I can still protect my privacy by hanging up and
walking away. Suppose, instead, that when I approach the telephone, no one
is in earshot except two teenagers holding hands and gazing fondly into one
another's eyes. Assessing the probabilities, I place my call. I still have no
Fourth Amendment complaint if in reality the couple belongs to the police
department's special baby faced investigators' unit: that is the risk I choose
to assume. By assuming this risk, however, must I also assume the risk that
the police, acting without judicial authority, have attached an eavesdropping
device to the side of the phone, and are electronically monitoring my words
from several hundred yards away? For that matter, must I assume the latter
risk even if no one is within sight or earshot?
202
Drawing an analogy from this situation to the facts in Knotts, it might be
argued that this is precisely the reasoning the Court has adopted: since Pet-
schen assumed the risk that the police might be able to follow him to Knotts'
cabin by visual surveillance without being noticed by him, he also assumed
the risk that the drum of chloroform he received from Armstrong was
equipped with a beeper that rendered visual-and visible-surveillance un-
necessary. The analogy, however, is far from exact.20 3 Surveillance of one's
location and surveillance of one's words differ, not merely in degree, but in
kind. Under most circumstances, a person's location and travel simply are
not "private," and surveillance, though potentially offensive, does not in-
trude as deeply or as dangerously into privacy and individual liberty as does
surreptitious surveillance of what one says to friends, relatives and other
confidants. Thus, it is not at all inconsistent for the Court to have held that
electronic surveillance of communications is a search subject to Fourth
Amendment protection,2° while also holding that electronic surveillance of
public travel is not.
Individual privacy would have been enhanced if the Court had held that
in-transit monitoring is an unlawful search unless authorized in advance by a
202. The facts in this hypothetical are essentially similar to those in Katz. See Katz, 389
U.S. at 347. In Katz, federal agents attached a listening device to the outside of a telephone
booth. Id. at 348. The Court in Katz held that this constituted a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Id. at 353. Under title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, this would also constitute an
"interception." See C. FISHMAN, supra note 66, at § 7.2 (Supp. 1984).
203. Analysis by analogy is inherently risky in attempting to apply Fourth Amendment
concepts to new forms of surveillance. See C. FISHMAN, supra note 66, at §§ 6-7.
204. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
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search warrant supported by probable cause. This enhancement would have
come, however, at the cost of diminishing the efficiency of law enforcement,
because in some circumstances, the use of this technique would thereby be
rendered legally impermissible.20 5 Individual privacy and effective law en-
forcement are both essential if we are to continue to exist as a free society.20 6
When these concerns come into conflict, as inevitably they do, the key ques-
tions are where the balance between them should be struck, and by whom.
The in-transit monitoring of the beeper did no more than frustrate Pet-
schen's efforts to evade lawful visual surveillance. The Court struck the
proper balance in United States v. Knotts, holding that the in-transit moni-
toring of the beeper did not implicate legitimate privacy expectations and,
therefore, did not constitute a search.20 7
B. Private Location Monitoring: Karo
The facts in United States v. Karo20 8 are as complex as those in Knotts
were simple. In August of 1980, Karo and two codefendants, Horton and
Harley, ordered fifty gallons of ether from an informant, who alerted DEA
agents to the shipment and told them that the ether would be used in the
production of cocaine.20 9 With the consent of the informer, the agents sub-
stituted their own can containing a beeper for one of the cans in the ship-
ment and then had all ten cans painted to give them a uniform
appearance.21°
On September 20, 1980, the agents watched as Karo picked up the ether at
the informant's house. By visual surveillance and in-transit monitoring, they
followed Karo to his home. Later the same day, the agents monitored the
beeper to determine that the can was still in Karo's home; still later, they
205. In Knotts, the police used the beeper in order to learn the whereabouts of, and to
acquire probable cause to search, the clandestine drug laboratory. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. A
court should be reluctant to require probable cause before the police are permitted to use an
investigative technique that itself is primarily useful as a method to acquire probable cause.
It is, of course, difficult to assess the degree to which imposition of a warrant requirement
would hamper police efficiency without an appreciation of what factual showings do or do not
amount to probable cause. See infra notes 453-66 and accompanying text.
206. Nothing is more destructive of individual liberty than unchecked lawlessness.
207. Where the issue under consideration is more one of public policy than of fundamental
constitutional principles, the decision should be made by the Congress, not by the Court. See
supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
208. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), rev'g, 710 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1983).
209. See supra note 58.
210. 104 S. Ct. at 3300. Deliberately falsifying the facts in an effort to protect the identity
of their informer, the agents obtained a warrant authorizing installation of the beeper. The
warrant was later ruled invalid because of deliberate misrepresentations in the application, and
the courts treated the case as if no warrant had been obtained. Id. at 3300-01. See supra note
59 and accompanying text.
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discovered that it had been removed. Using the beeper, they located the can
again, this time in Horton's home, where they could detect the smell of ether
from the public sidewalk. Two days later, the agents discovered that the can
had been moved a third time. Using the beeper, they learned that it was now
in Horton's father's home.
The following day, the agents discovered that the can had been moved a
fourth time. By monitoring the beeper, they traced it to a commercial self-
storage facility. 211 By subpoenaing the storage facility's records, 212 they de-
termined that Horton and Harley had rented a particular locker at the facil-
ity. Using the beeper, the agents confirmed that the can was in the row of
lockers indicated in the records, and then verified that the locker in question
contained the ether when they detected its distinct odor surrounding the
locker. 213 Approximately seventeen days later, the manager of the storage
facility informed the agents that the ether had been moved yet a fifth time.
Using their directional finder, the agents picked up the beeper signal three
days later at another self-storage facility.21 4 This time they determined the
number of the locker by questioning the manager of the facility. With the
permission of the manager, they installed in a separate locker a closed circuit
video camera focused on the locker containing the ether.215 For three-and-
a-half months they watched the locker, during which time their otherwise
unremitting boredom was relieved by the occasional visits of defendants
Horton and Harley to the locker. Finally, on February 6, 1981, the agents
watched on the closed circuit camera as a fourth defendant, Rhodes, re-
moved the cans of ether from the locker. Using both visual and beeper sur-
veillance, the agents followed the ether to Rhodes' residence, where it
remained for a time in a truck parked in Rhodes' driveway. Later that day,
the truck was followed to a residence in Taos, New Mexico, rented by Hor-
ton, Harley, and a fifth defendant, Steele. The agents monitored the beeper
for three days to ascertain its continued presence inside the Taos resi-
211. 104 S. Ct. at 3300.
212. The monitoring equipment was not sensitive enough to reveal precisely which locker
the ether was in. Id.
213. Id. On October 8, 1980, the agents obtained a court order authorizing the installation
of an entry tone alarm in the door of locker 143. The alarm was designed to emit an electronic
signal at the opening of the door. While installing the alarm, the agents observed that the cans
of ether were still inside the locker. On October 16, Horton retrieved the contents of the
locker; the alarm apparently failed to function. Id.
214. The agents did not learn that the ether had been removed until the manager of the
storage facility informed them that Horton had been there. Id.
215. Id. The agents had obtained another order authorizing the installation of an entry
tone alarm in locker 15, but decided to rely on the camera instead of installing the alarm. Id.
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dence,2 16 and noticed on one cold, windy day that all the windows of the
cabin were open, suggesting that the ether was being used. The agents then
obtained and executed a search warrant. Horton, Harley, Steele, and a sixth
defendant, Roth, were arrested at the residence.2 17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit suppressed the
evidence as to Steele, Horton, Harley, and Roth, reasoning that each of them
enjoyed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house in Taos, and that
that expectation was violated by the private location monitoring of the
beeper in that house.2 18 In Karo, therefore, the Supreme Court squarely
faced the issue of private location monitoring2 19-an issue that had confused
the nation's courts,2 2 0 and that the Court had avoided in Knotts.2 21 Part III
216. Id. at 3300-01. The agents relied on the beeper, rather than on visual surveillance, for
fear of being observed from the cabin.
217. Id. at 3301. The government maintained that, before it was moved to the Taos resi-
dence, the beeper revealed only that the can of ether was in the general vicinity of the various
houses and lockers storing the ether, without revealing whether the can was actually inside a
particular house or locker. See Brief for Appellant at 5. The government conceded, however,
that the beeper had pinpointed the ether can's location as inside the Taos residence. Id. at 25.
Although the government argued that this fact was constitutionally insignificant, the Court
held otherwise. See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
218. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1440-41. The Tenth Circuit also held that because ether is not
contraband, special rules relevant to the installation and monitoring of a beeper in contraband
cases were not applicable in Karo. Id. at 1436. The government did not appeal this aspect of
Karo. The Tenth Circuit also held that the sale of the beepered can of ether to Karo violated
Karo's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1438-39. The Supreme Court reversed this aspect of
the decision. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
219. "Private location monitoring," as used herein, means monitoring a beeper after the
object into which it has been installed has been taken into a place in which privacy expecta-
tions are sufficiently great that barring exigent circumstances, a warrant is required before law
enforcement officers are permitted to enter or search. See text accompanying supra note 14.
220. Several courts have held, or opined in dictum, that private location monitoring is
lawful without a warrant in cases involving contraband or inherently tainted transactions.
This doctrine probably survives the Karo decision. See infra notes 387-409 and accompanying
text. In cases not involving contraband, on the other hand, most courts had held (prior to
Karo) that a warrant is required to authorize private location monitoring. United States v.
Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir. 1983) (fruits of surveillance suppressed for lack of valid
warrant), aJfd in part and rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 662
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (adopting the view
expressed in Bailey and Moore); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980)
(private location monitoring in two apartment buildings over a two-month period; although a
warrant had been obtained, its lack of any time limit was held to have rendered it invalid; fruits
of surveillance suppressed); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (private location monitoring of precursor chemical in defendant's
home for two weeks; fruits of surveillance suppressed); State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245,
254-55, 258 S.E.2d 872, 880-81 (1979) (warrant based on probable cause had been obtained;
hence, fruits of surveillance admissible). The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, had held that
in at least some circumstances, private location monitoring is not a search. United States v.
Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
221. The Knotts Court observed:
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of the Karo decision and (less directly) portions of Part IV are devoted to
that issue.
In Part III of Karo, the Court held, apparently unequivocally, that private
location monitoring of a beeper constitutes a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Later in the opinion, however, the Court
applied this holding in a manner that appears to substantially reduce its sig-
nificance.22 2 In addition, the Court left several important questions un-
resolved. In particular, the Court explicitly refused to consider whether a
beeper surveillance warrant must be supported by probable cause, or
whether the lesser showing of a reasonable suspicion will suffice.2 2 3 Further,
Karo reaffirmed and broadened the Knotts holding that general vicinity mon-
itoring is not a search, but did not draw a clear line between it and private
location monitoring (which is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement). 224
1. The Court's Reasoning
In its discussion of private location monitoring, the Court first held that
such monitoring constitutes a search. It then held that such a search is, as a
rule, unlawful unless authorized by a warrant.22 5
[N]othing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied
upon after it had indicated that the drum containing the chloroform had ended its
automotive journey at rest on respondent's premises in rural Wisconsin .... [T]here
is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the
movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85. See also Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303 ("In Knotts, the record did not
show that the beeper was monitored while the can containing it was inside the cabin, and we
therefore had no occasion to consider whether a constitutional violation would have occurred
had the fact been otherwise.").
222. See infra notes 328-65 and accompanying text.
223. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305 n.5. See infra notes 442-87 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 282-306 and accompanying text.
225. Karo, 104 . Ct. at 3303-05. Seven of the nine Justices concurred in this conclusion,
and the reasoning whereby it was reached. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, in
which the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with most aspects of this section of Justice White's
opinion, although they dissented from most other aspects of the decision. See supra notes 79-
83 and accompanying text (dissenting from conclusion that installation and sale do not consti-
tute a seizure). See also infra notes 367-68 (dissenting from conclusion that the evidence seized
is admissible as to all defendants). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred
in most aspects of the White opinion, but disagreed with some aspects of the White analysis of
the private location monitoring issue. See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
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a. Search
The Court began its discussion by distinguishing the facts and holding in
Knotts from the facts in Karo.
[In Knotts, t]he Court held that since the movements of the auto-
mobile and the arrival of the can containing the beeper in the area
of the cabin could have been observed by the naked eye, no Fourth
Amendment violation was committed by monitoring the beeper
during the trip to the cabin. In Knotts, the record did not show
that the beeper was monitored while the can containing it was in-
side the cabin ... 226
In Karo, by contrast, "there is no gainsaying that the beeper was used to
locate the ether in a specific house in Taos, New Mexico, and that that infor-
mation was in turn used to secure a warrant for the search of the house. ' '2 27
Unlike Knotts, therefore, Karo "presents the question whether the monitor-
ing of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveil-
lance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence . . . . [W]e think that it does."'221
In supporting its conclusion, the Court began by restating fundamental
Fourth Amendment principles. First, "private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intru-
sion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. ' 229 Second, "[s]earches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable
absent exigent circumstances.
230
Next, the Court considered whether the private location monitoring con-
stituted a sufficient intrusion into the residence to be considered a search,
226. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303 (emphasis added).
227. Id. (emphasis added). The Court quoted directly from the DEA agent's affidavit for a
warrant to search the Taos residence. The affidavit specified that during a multiday period, the
beeper's signals were "emanating from inside the ... residence." Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). In Welsh, the Court
held that it is unconstitutional for police to forcibly enter a person's home to arrest him for
driving while intoxicated, especially where that offense is considered only a civil violation.
Welsh, 104 S. Ct. at 2098-99. The Court stated that concern over the evidence of intoxication
dissipating while a warrant is being obtained is insufficient reason to dispense with the warrant
requirement. Id. at 2099-100. In Payton, the Court held that, absent exigent circumstances,
entry into a suspect's home to effect a routine felony arrest in the absence of an arrest warrant
is unconstitutional. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-89. In Steagald, the Court held that, barring
exigent circumstances, police may not enter the home of a third person to arrest a suspect
whom they believe is hiding therein unless they first obtain a search warrant authorizing them
to search that premises for the suspect. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213.
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and concluded that it did. Certainly, the Court reasoned, if a DEA agent,
surreptitiously and without a warrant, entered the Taos residence to verify
the ether's presence therein,
there is little doubt that he would have engaged in an unreasona-
ble search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For
purposes of the Amendment, the result is the same where, without
a warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic
device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by
observation from outside the curtilage of the house. The beeper
tells the agent that a particular article is actually located at a par-
ticular time in the private residence and is in the possession of the
person or persons whose residence is being surveilled.23'
231. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303. The government protested that often this is not the case;
rather, "agents monitoring a beeper are often unable to determine whether the beeper is lo-
cated inside a particular house, rather than on a porch or in an adjacent yard." Reply Brief for
the United States at 8, Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984). The government argued that, in such
situations, no true private location monitoring has taken place. Such surveillance, the govern-
ment reasoned, is therefore no more intrusive than that which occurred in Knotts-that is, it
should not be classified as a search. Id. at 25-27, Karo. Even where the beeper reveals the
presence of chemicals inside a particular residence (which the government conceded occurred
with regard to the house in Taos), the government argued, no different result should attain,
because this information would be no more helpful to the investigators than the knowledge
that the container was in the immediate vicinity of the residence.
[T]o agents attempting to track the movement of precursor chemicals, the infor-
mation conveyed by a beeper has essentially the same utility whether the beeper is
broadcasting from inside or outside a particular structure: for purposes of following
the chemicals to the next location, or of obtaining a warrant to search the place
where the chemicals are presently situated, the precise location of the chemicals is of
little or no moment.
Reply Brief for the United States at 8-9, Karo. Even assuming the government's factual asser-
tions are correct, however, they do not necessarily support the legal conclusions the Govern-
ment urged. The protection of privacy that the Fourth Amendment affords to a person's
house also extends to some extent to the "curtilage" of his residence, that is, "the land immedi-
ately surrounding and associated with the home." Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
[T]he curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," and therefore has been con-
sidered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have
extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the
curtilage.. . by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reason-
ably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, whether the beeper implanted can had been inside the house, or
(as the government hypothesized in its reply brief) on the front porch or in an adjacent yard,
private location monitoring of its presence arguably constituted a search within the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.
Naturally, if investigators had been able to see and recognize the can from a place where
they had a right to be-the street, the sidewalk, or even the front porch-this would not have
constituted a search. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351. But
there is no suggestion in Karo that such a "knowing exposure" occurred.
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And this would have been true, the Court emphasized, even if the agents had
tracked the beepered article to the residence by visual surveillance, for "the
later monitoring not only verifies the officers' observations but also estab-
lishes that the article remains on the premises., 232
In its brief and again at oral argument, the government argued that pri-
vate location monitoring is so minimal an intrusion that it should not be
considered a search. 233 The Court conceded that such monitoring is
less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical
fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is ex-
tremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise
obtained without a warrant. The case is thus not like Knotts, for
there the beeper told the authorities nothing about the interior of
Knotts' cabin. The information obtained in Knotts was 'volunta-
rily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look. . . . [H]ere, as we
have said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the
house, a fact that could not have been visually verified.
We cannot accept the Government's contention that it should be
completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to
determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particu-
lar article-or a person, for that matter-is in an individual's home
at a particular time. Indiscriminate monitoring of property that
has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious
a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some
sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.2 34
Although the specific factual context under discussion in Part III of Karo
was a private residence (the house in Taos), 2 35 the rule enunciated therein
(that private location monitoring constitutes a search) is not limited to resi-
dential monitoring. Later in the opinion, the Court explicitly stated that this
232. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303. Thus, private location monitoring differs from consensual
installation: the latter reveals no information, and therefore is not a search while the former
does reveal information, and therefore is a search. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying
text.
233. This theory was only one of several upon which the government sought to secure a
reversal of the suppression of the evidence. At oral argument, however, once counsel for the
government enunciated this theory, the Justices never allowed him to leave it, despite several
attempts on his part. Thus, the government was forced to devote its entire time allottment to
defending what in my opinion was its least plausible theory. Ironically, the Court ultimately
did reverse the lower court's judgment, on a theory neither briefed nor argued by the parties.
See infra note 368 and accompanying text.
234. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303-04 (citation omitted).
235. Later in the opinion, the Court also indicated that the nonwarranted private location
monitoring of the beeper in Karo's home (the beepered can's first stop on its five-month tour)
also constituted an unlawful search. Id. at 3307 n.7.
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holding applies as well to other locations in which privacy expectations are
recognized as reasonable.23 6 The Court drew a careful distinction, however,
between monitoring that reveals an object's presence inside such a location
and therefore constitutes a search 237 and monitoring that only reveals that
the object is in the general vicinity of such a location. Such monitoring, the
Court made clear, is not a search.2 38
b. The Warrant Requirement
The Court then turned to a determination of the "sort of Fourth Amend-
ment oversight" required,2 39 and concluded that, barring exigent circum-
stances, private location monitoring of a beeper inside a private residence is
lawful only if authorized by a warrant. "We . . . reject the government's
contention," the Court stated, "that it should be able to monitor beepers in
private residences without a warrant" whenever the requisite factual basis
(probable cause? reasonable suspicion?) suggests that criminal activity is
afoot.
The Court again commenced its discussion by enunciating a fundamental
Fourth Amendment principle: "Warrantless searches are presumptively un-
reasonable, though the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to this
general rule." 241  The government had argued that beeper surveillance
should be excepted from the warrant requirement, asserting that to require a
warrant would do little to protect individual privacy while imposing sub-
stantial practical problems on investigators. The Court disagreed with this
argument, noting that it had already rejected the contention that "the beeper
constitutes only a miniscule intrusion on protected privacy interests.
24 2
Significant privacy interests were indeed at stake, the Court found.
The primary reason for the warrant requirement is to interpose a
236. In discussing the beeper surveillance that enabled the agents to track the beepered can
to the second storage facility, the Court emphasized that the beeper revealed only that the can
was somewhere in the warehouse; the specific locker in which it was located was discovered by
other means. Id. at 3306. "Monitoring the beeper revealed nothing about the contents of the
locker that Horton and Harley had rented and hence was not a search of that locker." Id. The
Court noted: "Had the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container within a particular
locker the result would be otherwise, for surely Horton and Harley had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their own storage locker." Id. at 3306 n.6.
237. See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 226, 233-34 and accompanying text.
239. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304. See supra text accompanying note 234.
240. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304-05.
241. Id. at 3304 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobiles);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (exigent circumstances)).
242. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304-05.
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'neutral and detached magistrate' between the citizen and 'the of-
ficer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. . . . Requiring a warrant will have the salutary effect of
ensuring that use of beepers is not abused, by imposing upon
agents the requirement that they demonstrate in advance their jus-
tification for the desired search.243
The Court added that "if truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is
required under general Fourth Amendment principles.",24"
The government had protested that requiring a warrant to authorize pri-
vate location monitoring would for all practical purposes require investiga-
tors to obtain a warrant whenever they seek to use a beeper, because there
would be no way of knowing in advance whether the beepered object would
be taken inside private premises. 245 The Court dismissed this complaint,
observing, "The argument that a warrant would oblige the Government to
obtain warrants in a large number of cases is hardly a compelling argument
against the requirement.,
246
The Court ended its discussion of private location monitoring by address-
ing the application of the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement to
beeper surveillance. The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to "partic-
ularly describ[e] the place to be searched . ... 24" Because the "place" to
which the beepered object will be taken cannot be known until the object
arrives, how could a warrant "describe" that place in advance? The Court
held that this conundrum provided neither a reason against imposing the
warrant requirement, nor a particularly difficult barrier for investigators to
overcome when seeking a warrant:
[I]t will still be possible to describe the object into which the
beeper is to be placed, the circumstances that led agents to wish to
243. Id. at 3305 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 383 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). The Court
added: "Those suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to [the protection of a detached
and neutral magistrate] than those suspected of nondrug offenses." Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The government probably exaggerated. No warrant is needed to authorize in-
transit and general vicinity monitoring; often-as in Knotts-such monitoring will provide
investigators with all the information they need. Thus, even where the grounds for a warrant
are lacking, investigators may be willing to gamble that they can achieve their goals without
conducting private location monitoring, or that in-transit and general vicinity monitoring, vis-
ual surveillance, and other sources of information will eventually provide enough information
to enable them to obtain a private location monitoring warrant. See infra notes 295-304 and
accompanying text.
246. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305. The Court added: "It is worthy of note that, in any event,
this is not a particularly attractive case in which to argue that it is impractical to obtain a
warrant, since a warrant was in fact obtained in this case, seemingly on probable cause." Id.
247. The text of the Fourth Amendment may be found supra at text accompanying note
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install the beeper, and the length of time for which beeper surveil-
lance is requested. In our view, this information will suffice to per-
mit issuance of a warrant authorizing beeper installation and
surveillance.248
The Court concluded, "In sum, we discern no reason for deviating from
the general rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a
warrant.,2 49 The Court refused, however, to address a crucial issue:
whether a showing of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause would
suffice for the issuance of such a warrant.25 °
2. Dissenting and Concurring Opinions
The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice White, was joined by only
three other justices: the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Powell.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the result and
in the Court's analysis of the installation issue. Justices O'Connor and
Rehnquist also concurred in the general principle that private location moni-
toring is a search, but argued that this is so only in very limited circum-
stances. According to Justice O'Connor, "When a closed container is moved
by permission into a home, the homeowner and others with an expectation
of privacy in the home itself surrender any expectation of privacy they might
otherwise retain in the movements of the container-unless it is their
container or under their dominion and control." '251 By giving permission to
the container's owner to move the container in and out of the house, Justice
O'Connor reasoned, the homeowner
has effectively surrendered his privacy insofar as the location of
the container may be concerned, or so we should assume absent
evidence to the contrary. In other words, one who lacks dominion
and control over the object's location has no privacy interest in-
vaded when that information [that is, the object's location] is dis-
closed. It is simply not his secret that the beeper is disclosing
252
It is difficult to grasp Justice O'Connor's reasoning. If I give a friend
permission to store a container in my home, surely I retain the right to
change my mind and to order him to remove it. Thus, it would seem that,
even if it is not my container (and I would lack power to lawfully consent to
248. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 3305 n.5. See infra notes 442-87 and accompanying text.
251. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3308 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 3310 (emphasis in original).
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an examination of its contents by police), while it is in my house I do not
"lack[] dominion and control over the [container's] location."
It is true, of course, that by giving my friend permission to store the object
in my home, I am sharing the privacy of my home with him to that extent,
and I have no Fourth Amendment complaint to make if my friend later tells
the police where the object is; that is the risk I assume whenever I share
private information with anyone.253 Arguably, I also assume the risk that
my friend had consented in advance to the installation of a beeper in the
container, to enable the police to ascertain its continued presence in my
home. 54 But surely I do not thereby also assume the risk that the authori-
ties have, unbeknownst to both me and my friend, installed a beeper in the
container. z5
Whereas Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist complained that the Court's
ruling on the private location monitoring issue swept too broadly, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with the rule enun-
ciated by the Court, but protested that the Court had applied that rule in too
narrow a fashion. 56 Justice Stevens interpreted Part III of the Court's opin-
ion as "correctly conclud[ing] that when beeper surveillance reveals the loca-
tion of property that has been concealed from public view, it constitutes a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I join Part III on
253. See supra notes 25-27, 117 and accompanying text.
254. By monitoring the beeper, installed with my friend's consent but without my knowl-
edge, the police arguably are learning no more than what I have already revealed to my friend,
that is, the object's continued presence in my home. Obviously, however, in the absence of a
warrant, the police could not lawfully monitor an eavesdropping device hidden inside the
container, even if my friend had consented to the installation. I am not "knowingly exposing"
to him what is said in my home in his absence, and he therefore lacks the legal authority to
give the police permission to overhear such conversations. See supra notes 63-67, and infra
note 477 and accompanying text.
255. As Justice White observed in commenting on the O'Connor concurrence:
A homeowner takes the risk that his guest will cooperate with the Government but
not the risk that a trustworthy friend has been bugged by the Government without
his knowledge or consent .... There would be nothing left of the Fourth Amend-
ment right to privacy if anything that a hypothetical government informant might
reveal is stripped of constitutional protection.
Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304 n.4. Justice Stevens, dissenting from other aspects of the Karo deci-
sion, agreed with the Court's rejection of Justice O'Connor's approach to post transit monitor-
ing, and added: "I do not believe that electronic surveillance has become or ever should be
permitted to become so pervasive that homeowners must expect [that is, must assume the risk
in a constitutional sense] that containers brought into their homes are infested with electronic
bugs." Id. at 3312 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and dissenting in the judgment).
256. Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall dissented from the majority's conclusion that
consensual installation and subsequent transfer of a beeper is not a seizure. See supra notes 79-
83 and accompanying text. They also dissented from the majority's conclusion that, despite
the unlawful private location monitoring that had occurred at the house in Taos, the evidence
was admissible against all defendants. See infra notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
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that understanding." '2 57 The Stevens opinion stressed that "[t]his protection
is not limited to times when the beeper was in a home,"' 258 but also exists in
other locations-even in the trunk of an automobile, under appropriate cir-
cumstances.2 59 Justice Stevens' opinion may perhaps emphasize this point
more dramatically than does the White opinion, but there is no substantial
divergence between the two in this regard. 2" The two opinions disagree
dramatically, however, in the application of the rule announced in Part III
of Karo, particularly in how that rule interacts with the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" doctrine. This aspect of Karo will be discussed below.26 1
3. Evaluation
In holding that private location monitoring of a beeper constitutes a
search subject to Fourth Amendment regulation, the Court properly re-
solved the conflict thus posed between protection of privacy and the promo-
tion of efficient and effective law enforcement. Private location monitoring
of a beeper implicates "especially sensitive concerns"2 62 under the Fourth
Amendment precisely because it occurs after the object installed with a
beeper has been taken to a "place"-most often the home of one or more of
the defendants263-where Fourth Amendment protection is at its
257. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3310 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. Id. at 3313.
259. When a person drives down a public thoroughfare in a car with a can of ether
concealed in a trunk, he is not exposing to public view the fact that he is in possession
of a can of ether; the can is still 'withdrawn from public view' and hence its location
is entitled to constitutional protection.
Id.
260. See supra note 236 and accompanying text and infra note 276.
261. See infra notes 328-68 and accompanying text.
262. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 288 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra
notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
263. Although private location monitoring cases preceding Karo involved a variety of
"places," most involved homes. See United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983) (cabin rented or owned by defendants); United States v.
Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982) (U.S. Customs-contra-
band case; hotel room); United States v. Cassity, 631 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1980) (home); United
States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980) (undetermined location in one apartment com-
plex, then a locked storage room in the basement of a second apartment complex); United
States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1980) (farm); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979) (U.S. Customs-contraband case; defendant's
apartment); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978) (home of a defendant,
then a warehouse); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (U.S. Customs-
contraband case; home of an uninvolved acquaintance of defendant); United States v. Moore,
562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (home); United States v. Emery,
541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976) (U.S. Customs-contraband case; home); State v. Hendricks, 43
N.C. App. 245, 258 S.E.2d 872 (1979) (home).
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greatest.2 64
As a rule, police intrusion into a person's home or other private location is
unlawful unless the officer has first obtained a warrant.265 Exceptions to the
warrant requirement exist, but only in narrow and carefully restricted cir-
cumstances.2 66 More specifically, virtually every investigative technique
that reveals information about the contents of or activities within a person's
home or other private location is classified as a search. Investigative intru-
sion into private locations has been exempted from the protection of the
264. "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). The Fourth Amendment thus codifies the immortal
words of William Pitt:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Quoted in 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4 (1978 & Supp. 1984). For purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, "home" includes other residential premises. See, e.g., Clinton v. Vir-
ginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (apartments); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel and
motel rooms); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (rooms in rooming houses).
Fourth Amendment protection extends to nonresidential locations as well. See, e.g., Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (automobiles); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(luggage); Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (offices).
265. The Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. United States:
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to
society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or govern-
ment enforcement agent.
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Johnson was quoted with approval in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 282 (1983) and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). According to Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (placement of listening device on outside of phone booth
constitutes a search and is lawful only if authorized in advance by a warrant), the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy interests even if there has been no physical penetration into a
location where a defendant enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy.
266. Entry and, depending upon the circumstances, search without a warrant, is permissi-
ble if officers are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). When there is probable cause to believe that
readily destructible evidence is present, the Supreme Court has on several occasions suggested,
but has never explicitly held, that under some circumstances it may be permissible to enter for
the limited purpose of securing the premises, while holding that a warrant is required before
the premises may be searched. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson, 333 U.S. 10
(1948). See Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984). Warrantless entry is also lawful if
valid consent is obtained. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.5 (1978
& Supp. 1984).
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Fourth Amendment only when it involves information or activities that a
suspect "knowingly exposes to the public," '267 or when the investigative pro-
cedure reveals only the presence or absence of contraband.26 s Because the
target of beeper surveillance has not "knowingly expose[d]" his home or
other private location to beeper surveillance, this exclusion from the defini-
tion of "search" does not apply.269 To exclude private location monitoring
of a beeper within a person's home from the definition of "search," therefore,
would be to go further than any Supreme Court ruling to date.27°
To be sure, such a holding would not have posed a major threat to the
privacy that we enjoy as members of a free society. 27' To exclude private
location monitoring from the reach of the Fourth Amendment would, how-
ever, in significant measure rewrite the Court's formula, promulgated in
Katz v. United States,272 defining the reach of the Fourth Amendment. Af-
ter such a ruling, that which "a person [carefully conceals from] the public,
267. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967). See supra notes 25-27, 117 and accompanying text. Thus, if a suspect stores a beeper
implanted container in a place accessible to the public, monitoring the beeper arguably would
not constitute a search. For example, if a drum of a precursor chemical is stored inside a
privately owned premises, but in a place where passersby or public invitees can readily see it,
this "knowing exposure" of the drum might strip the defendants of their otherwise valid expec-
tation of privacy with regard to the presence of the object inside that premises.
268. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984), discussed supra at notes
89-92 and accompanying text. In Jacobsen, a chemical test revealed no more than whether the
substance in a lawfully seized package was cocaine. This, the Court stated, was not a search,
because the chemical analysis "[did] not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy," as
there is no legitimate right to possess cocaine in the first place. See also United States v. Place,
103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45 (1983) (allowing a narcotics trained dog to sniff a suitcase is not a
search in part because the only information revealed is whether the suitcase contains contra-
band), infra note 395.
269. This presupposes that the "private location" is one in which the defendants enjoy a
"reasonable expectation of privacy." See infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text. If the
defendants lack such an expectation in the location in question, a search of that location does
not violate their rights. For example, if the defendants secrete an object in an empty house
without the knowledge or permission of the owner, they have no basis to complain if the police
enter and search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141 n.9 (1978); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The same would be true if instead of entering and searching, investi-
gators monitored a beepered container in the house.
Concerning the Fourth Amendment implications of private location monitoring of a beeper
installed into a package containing contraband, see infra notes 387-98 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
271. Considerations of cost, manpower, and simple common sense on the part of investiga-
tors would suffice to protect against wholesale beeper surveillance.
272. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-
52.
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even in his own home or office, [might not be] a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. '273 Such a precedent would have threatened a principle
that is fundamental and central to our nation's history and values.274 In
holding that private location monitoring is a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court paid proper heed to that history and re-
mained true to those values.
The statements in the White and Stevens opinions extending the Karo rule
to locations other than residences, such as storage lockers 275 and automobile
trunks,276 are constitutionally sound. Such locations traditionally enjoy
Fourth Amendment protection; 277 the fact that beeper surveillance intrudes,
even minimally, into these locations suffices to categorize the surveillance as
a search. Thus, the Court correctly rejected the government's argument that
the intrusion entailed by private location monitoring is so slight as to remove
it from the category of Fourth Amendment searches.278
The same may be said for the Court's imposition of the warrant require-
ment. By requiring a warrant, the Court assured that the use of private
location monitoring will be subject to impartial oversight and review. Impo-
273. Cf supra note 272.
274. It is worth remembering, and repeating, that a major cause of the American Revolu-
tion was unwarranted intrusion by officers of the Crown into the colonists' homes. See supra
note 16.
275. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that in Knotts, "agents
watched as [the beepered container] was delivered to Knotts' codefendant and placed in his
car." Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3312 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (empha-
sis added). Similarly, in Karo, "the ether was seen being loaded into Horton's truck" after its
removal from the second locker and before its trip to the house in Taos. Id. at 3306 (emphasis
added). This was a fact of some significance in the ultimate resolution of Karo. See infra notes
335, 347-52 and accompanying text. The key point here is that in each case, the agents learned
that the beepered container was placed into the vehicle in question, not by monitoring the
beeper, which would have constituted a search of that vehicle, subject to Fourth Amendment
standards and requirements, but by visual surveillance of conduct "knowingly exposed to the
public"--conduct which, the Court emphasized in Katz, is "not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Katz is discussed in greater detail in supra notes 24-
28 and accompanying text.
277. Although "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," Katz, 389 U.S. at
351, the protection it affords to those people "[g]enerally ... requires reference to a 'place.'"
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
278. Twice in recent years the Court has held that it does not constitute a search for police
to use an investigative procedure that reveals only whether an object, otherwise protected by
the Fourth Amendment, contains contraband. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652
(1984) (removal of a small quantity of powder from a tube and performance of a chemical
analysis did not constitute a search); United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (permitting
a trained narcotics detection dog to sniff a suspected drug courier's suitcases did not constitute
a search). In Karo, the government did not claim, and logically could not, that the ether in the
beepered can was contraband. Whether private location monitoring of a container containing
contraband is a search is discussed infra at notes 387-409 and accompanying text.
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sition of the requirement should also help assure that those whose privacy is
intruded upon will eventually receive notice of that fact.27 9 The ruling is
also likely to check any tendency on the part of law enforcement officials to
install beepers into containers indiscriminately without a valid factual ba-
sis.2 8  The key question-as yet unanswered-is what that factual basis
must be: probable cause or the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion? To
this question Karo provides no answer.2 8" '
C. General Vicinity Monitoring :282 Knotts and Karo
In Knotts, the Court held that in-transit monitoring is not a search, be-
cause such monitoring only enables investigators to learn what visual sur-
veillance would also reveal: the public travels of the beepered object. As it
turned out in Knotts, in-transit monitoring did not suffice to enable the inves-
tigators to discover the beepered object's location. To determine the destina-
tion of the can of chloroform, it was necessary to conduct aerial beeper
surveillance, that revealed that the object had come to rest in the general
vicinity of Knotts' cabin in rural Wisconsin.28 3 The use of the beeper did
not constitute a search because visual surveillance of Petschen's route,
though unsuccessful in this case, could have revealed the same information
without intruding into the privacy of Knotts' cabin.
28 4
Similarly, in Karo, in-transit monitoring was of no use to the investigators
in tracing the can of ether from the first storage facility to the second. The
investigators did not discover the can's removal from the first facility until
the manager informed them of this fact several days later. The agents had to
monitor the beeper to ascertain that the can had been taken to the second
facility. 28 5 Here, as in Knotts, the Court held that no search occurred be-
279. A judge issuing such a warrant has the authority to insist upon post surveillance no-
tice, and should do so, while permitting. investigators to obtain postponement of notice on a
showing that earlier notice would jeopardize an ongoing investigation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(8)(d) (1982) (requiring notice of wiretapping or eavesdropping to be served within 90
days of the termination of the wiretap or eavesdrop order, unless the judge authorizes post-
ponement of notice); see also C. FISHMAN, supra note 66 §§ 203-213 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
Notice and other issues relating to the warrant requirement, are discussed more fully infra at
notes 419-41 and accompanying text.
280. Knowing that they will not be permitted to conduct nonwarrant monitoring of a
beeper once it has been taken into a private location, investigators are unlikely to use a beeper
unless there is a realistic chance that eventually they will be able to obtain a warrant, based on
whatever factual showing (probable cause or reasonable suspicion) is ultimately held to be
required. See supra note 245 and infra text accompanying notes 295-301.
281. See infra notes 442-87 and accompanying text.
282. "General vicinity monitoring" is defined in text accompanying supra notes 12-13.
283. Knotts, 406 U.S. at 285. See supra text accompanying note 167.
284. Knotts, 406 U.S. at 285.
285. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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cause this monitoring did not reveal-and, therefore, did not intrude upon
the privacy of-the specific locker the defendants had rented at the second
facility.286
The rule that emerges from these decisions is that even where in-transit
monitoring is unavailing, it does not constitute a search for agents to use a
beeper to determine the destination of a beepered object-so long as the
monitoring reveals only the general vicinity, and not the precise private loca-
tion, of the object.287
Justice Stevens, dissenting, took strong exception to the majority's conclu-
sion that no search occurred when the agents used the beeper to determine
that the ether was somewhere in the second storage facility:
The agents did not know who was in possession of the property
or where it was once it entered Karo's house. From that moment
on it was concealed from view. Because the beeper enabled the
agents to learn the location of property otherwise concealed from
public view, it infringed a privacy interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment.2"'
Justice Stevens reasoned that the use of the beeper constituted a search:
"[The ether container's] location [continued to be] a secret and hence by
revealing its location the beeper infringed an expectation of privacy. With-
out the beeper, the agents would have never found the warehouse . . . ;2
the visual surveillance of the locker within the warehouse, he argued, was
therefore tainted by this search.
Neither the majority's logic nor the dissent's is compelling. The dissent
sweeps too broadly. Many investigative techniques "enablefl agents to learn
the location of property otherwise concealed from public view [without] infr-
ing[ing] a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment., 290 Had
the agents maintained visual surveillance of the first storage facility, they
could have observed the suspects transfer the ether from the first to the sec-
ond warehouse. 29 Further, upon learning that the ether had been removed
from the first facility, the agents could have interviewed personnel at every
286. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
287. "Had the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container with in a particular
locker," the Karo Court stated, "the result [that is, the conclusion that no search occurred]
would be otherwise, for surely Horton and Harley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their own storage locker." Id. at 3306 n.6. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
288. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3314 (Stevens, J., dissenting in relevant part) (footnote omitted).
289. Id. at 3314 n.ll.
290. Compare supra text accompanying note 288.
291. Indeed, the agents attempted the electronic equivalent of such visual surveillance by
installing-pursuant to a warrant-an entry tone alarm into the door jamb of the locker. The
alarm was intended to alert the agents to the fact that the locker was being opened; presuma-
bly, upon receiving such an alarm, they would have rushed to the storage facility to conduct
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other storage facility in Albuquerque until, with luck, they found the ware-
house in question.292 Alternatively, in theory, an informer might have
learned of the ether's new location and reported it to the authorities. Any of
these techniques would have "enabled the agents to learn the location of
property otherwise concealed from public view," yet none of them would
have "infringed upon a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.",2 9 3 Why should using a beeper, to determine only the general vicinity
to which the ether had been moved, be regarded differently? 294 Justice Ste-
vens enunciates no persuasive reason.
The rule enunciated by the Karo majority appears, on initial examination,
to have the virtue of simplicity: monitoring that reveals a beepered object's
presence in a particular private location is a search, while monitoring that
reveals only the general vicinity of the object is not a search. But where is
the line between the two to be drawn?
Suppose, for example, investigators suspect that an about-to-be-purchased
container of a precursor chemical will be used to manufacture illicit drugs,
but lack sufficient information to obtain a beeper surveillance warrant.295
Nevertheless, with the consent of the seller, they install a beeper for the
purpose of discovering where the container will be taken. The agents hope
that this information, coupled with what they already know, will enable
them to obtain such a warrant. They watch as the container is loaded into a
vehicle; thereafter, by visual surveillance and in-transit monitoring, they fol-
low the container to a multistory building housing numerous small busi-
nesses--offices, light industry, and the like. Knotts makes clear that this is
visual surveillance of the suspects' activities. The alarm, however, failed to function. Karo,
104 S. Ct. at 3300.
292. By renting a locker in and bringing the ether to the second storage facility, the defend-
ants "knowingly exposed" these acts to employees of the second warehouse. See Katz, 389
U.S. at 351; see also supra note 117 and accompanying text. Absent the beeper, of course, the
agents would have had no way of knowing that the ether was still in Albuquerque, let alone in
another storage facility in that city. Whether they would have canvassed personnel at all such
facilities in the city, therefore, is problematical at the least. Nevertheless, had they done so,
and had they learned thereby the ether's new location, their investigative activity would not
have been categorized as a search.
293. Visual surveillance of conduct "knowingly exposed to the public" is not a search.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Nor does it constitute a search if a defendant "knowingly conveys...
information" to a civilian who then reveals it to the police. See supra note 117.
294. It is probably quite significant that the agents learned that the ether had been moved
from the first locker, not by monitoring the beeper, but from the manager of the first storage
facility. Detecting the ether's removal by monitoring the beeper would have constituted an
unlawful search of the locker. See supra note 276 and infra notes 347-50 and accompanying
text.
295. The quantum of information required to obtain such a warrant is itself a matter of
considerable uncertainty. See infra notes 442-87 and accompanying text.
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not a search.296 Alternatively, suppose the agents lose track of the vehicle
after it leaves the seller, and subsequently locate the beepered object in the
building by general vicinity monitoring-a use of the beeper that Knotts and
Karo hold not to be a search.297
Suppose further that the information acquired thus far is helpful, but not
helpful enough: there are thirty-two different companies in the building,
eight on each of four floors. The agents know, from Karo, that they cannot
use the beeper to determine the precise office or business in the building to
which the beepered object was taken because this would constitute private
location monitoring for which a warrant is required.298 If they can eliminate
some or most of these establishments from suspicion, however, they will be
able to focus their nonelectronic investigative efforts accordingly. Would it
constitute a search to use the beeper to determine to which floor the
container had been taken-thereby reducing the foci of subsequent attention
from thirty-two establishments to a more manageable eight?299 And if this is
not a search, that is, if this information is still "general" enough to avoid
being categorized as an intrusion into the privacy of the eight businesses on
that floor, would it constitute a search to use the beeper to determine
whether the container is in one of the offices or shops to the right or to the
left of the elevator-thereby reducing the foci of suspicion from eight to
four?3°° Suppose there had been only four businesses on that floor, and us-
ing the beeper enabled the investigators to eliminate from suspicion the two
establishments to the right of the elevator. Would this constitute a
search?3'
It is, to say the least, far easier to pose these questions than to offer ra-
296. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. If an officer
is able to follow the possessor into the building and to the door to which the container is being
delivered, the officer has not engaged in a search because he has simply observed conduct that
the deliverer "knowingly exposed to the public."
297. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285; Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306 (discussion of second storage facil-
ity). See supra notes 174-84, 236 and accompanying text.
298. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303-05. See supra notes 226-43 and accompanying text.
299. Such a limited use of the beeper would probably require access to the elevators and
central corridors of the building. If these areas were closed to the public at large, nonconsen-
sual police presence there might itself constitute an unlawful intrusion into the privacy of the
building's occupants. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 2.4(b). On the other
hand, by monitoring the beeper while driving around the building, the police perhaps could
accomplish the same objective.
300. Although this procedure arguably intrudes upon the privacy of those offices or busi-
nesses, it also has a significant privacy-enhancing impact: the beeper frees the agents of the
need to investigate the affairs of the other 24 or 28 companies, and of their owners, employees
and customers.
301. Similarly, in Karo, suppose the agents had used the beeper to determine the floor on
which the can of ether had been stored; the quadrant of the floor; the row of lockers?
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tional answers to them. Taking the Court's holding to its logical conclusion,
however, it would appear that so long as the monitoring does not disclose
conclusively which of two or more private locations (houses, hotel rooms,
lockers, automobile trunks, or whatever) contains the beepered object, moni-
toring the beeper does not constitute a search.3"2 Such a rule would signifi-
cantly diminish the privacy-enhancing impact of the Court's holding in Karo
that private location monitoring constitutes a search.3" 3 On the other hand,
it would provide a "bright line" whereby investigators and judges alike could
distinguish between general vicinity monitoring, which is not a search, and
private location monitoring, which is."
Until the law is clarified considerably, investigators may be forced to play
a form of "Fourth Amendment roulette." Each additional piece of informa-
tion they derive from the beeper--each narrowing of the investigative fo-
cus-puts them a step closer to what is needed to obtain a beeper
302. The precise language of the Court bears repeating:
[T]he beeper informed the agents only that the ether was somewhere in the ware-
house; it did not identify the specific locker in which the ether was located. Monitor-
ing the beeper revealed nothing about the contents of the locker that Horton and
Harley had rented and hence was not a search of that locker.
Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306. In a footnote immediately after this passage, the Court added: "Had
the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container within a particular locker the result
would be otherwise, for surely Horton and Harley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their own storage locker." Id. at 3306 n.6 (emphasis added).
303. Often, investigators may be able quickly to eliminate all but one of the locations indi-
cated by the beeper. On the other hand, the same is often said with regard to the use of
traditional, nonelectronic investigative techniques.
304. Even assuming a "bright line" exists between "general vicinity" and "private loca-
tion" monitoring, drawing a legal distinction between the two may easily lead to absurd re-
sults. Consider again the facts in Karo. The agents learned that the ether had been moved
from the first storage facility only when the manager informed them of this fact. Suppose,
when they activated the beeper, the agents discovered that the ether was being moved through
the streets of Albuquerque. Given the rule enunciated in Karo, if the agents had used the
beeper to locate and identify the particular car or truck that was transporting the ether, this
would have constituted a search: the contents of a truck or automobile usually (to paraphrase
Katz) are not "knowingly exposed to the public," and therefore are "subjects of Fourth
Amendment protection." See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Although automobiles may often be
searched without a warrant under circumstances in which a warrant would be required for
fixed premises, intrusions into such areas are unquestionably searches, lawful only if Fourth
Amendment standards are satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982);
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). If a court
subsequently concluded that the agents lacked the factual basis required to justify such a
search, this illegality would very likely have tainted the agents' subsequent discovery that the
ether was being taken to the second warehouse, which in turn might have tainted all subse-
quently discovered information and evidence. Concerning "taint" and related issues, see infra
notes 309-27 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if the agents had forborne closing in
on the ether while it was in transit, and, once it had come to rest, utilized the beeper to deter-
mine only the general vicinity of its destination (that is, the second warehouse), this, we know
from the actual resolution of the Karo case, would not have constituted a search at all.
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surveillance warrant permitting private location monitoring. 305 Yet, the
agents will have no sure way of knowing at what point the use of the beeper
crosses the line that separates nonsearch from search-a crossing that could
prove fatal to the investigation. 30 6 To say the least, this state of affairs is
unsettling; it promotes neither police efficiency nor individual privacy.
V. APPLICATION OF THE KARO RULE
In Karo, the Court held that it violates the Fourth Amendment for law
enforcement officials to engage in nonwarrant private location monitoring.
The agents engaged in such monitoring on several occasions. After the can
arrived in Karo's home, it was only through unlawful private location moni-
toring of the beeper that the agents learned that the can had been removed
from the premises.37 Using the beeper, they traced the can to Horton's
home. It was only through further unlawful private location monitoring
that the agents learned that the can had been moved from that location to
Horton's father's residence. Once again, only by conducting additional un-
lawful private location monitoring did the agents learn that the can had been
removed from that premises and was resting somewhere in the first commer-
cial storage facility.30 8 Many additional moves and months later, the agents
305. Suppose, for example, police lose track of a vehicle carrying a beepered container of a
precursor chemical, and subsequent surface or aerial surveillance locates the container in a
suburban development of single-family houses. Would it constitute a search if the beeper re-
vealed the block the container was on? The side of the street? Suppose the beeper enabled the
investigators to pinpoint the container as being in one of a group of four houses? If, upon
subsequent investigation, the officers learn that one (and only one) of those houses is occupied
by someone with a lengthy record of involvement in illicit manufacture or distribution of
drugs, probable cause presumably would then exist to believe that the container is in that
house, and that the chemical is likely to be used in the manufacture of illicit substances; and
the agents would be able to obtain a beeper surveillance warrant authorizing private location
monitoring of the beeper.
306. Continuing the situation hypothesized in supra note 305, suppose the beeper surveil-
lance reveals that the container is either in a particular house or in its backyard. Conceivably,
this discovery could be made inadvertently, despite efforts on the part of the officers to restrict
their discovery to the more general information that the container is somewhere within a
group of houses and their yards. Is this a permissible nonsearch, because the agents still do not
know whether the container is inside the home or in the yard, where it might be visible from a
neighboring yard? Alternatively, does it constitute an unlawful warrantless search, on the
theory that the yard constitutes the curtilage of the home? See supra notes 77, 231 and accom-
panying text.
307. The Court noted that "the unwarranted monitoring of the beeper in Karo's house"
was unlawful. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3307 n.7. For a detailed recitation of the facts in Karo, see
supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
308. Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the monitoring in Horton's home or in
his father's home, clearly these incidents of warrantless monitoring were no more lawful than
the earlier private location monitoring in Karo's home or the later private location monitoring
at the house in Taos.
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conducted unlawful private location monitoring of the beeper for several
days in the Taos house rented by Horton, Harley, and another defendant,
Steele.
Thus, it was only by unlawful use of the beeper on several separate occa-
sions that the agents were able to keep track of the beeper until the ether
arrived at the house in Taos, where the incriminating evidence that was the
subject of the suppression litigation was seized. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held that the evidence was admissible against each of the defendants.
Though the Court, in so holding, acted in a manner consistent with accepted
Fourth Amendment principles, it significantly undermined the substantive
rule-that private location monitoring is unlawful in the absence of a war-
rant-it had just enunciated.
A. Applying the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Certain basic principles have emerged from the Supreme Court's decisions
applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. To comprehend the
reasoning and ultimate result in Karo, it is necessary to understand these
principles as well as three underlying concepts: standing, taint, and taint
aversion.
1. Standing
It is a well-established principle that "Fourth Amendment rights are per-
sonal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicari-
ously asserted. ' 309
The established principle is that suppression of the product of a
Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by
those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those
who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.
Co-conspirators and co-defendants have been accorded no special
standing.310
309. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
310. Id. at 171-72. In Alderman, the Court considered several unrelated cases with a com-
mon factual setting. In each case, after several defendants had been convicted for conspiring
to commit various crimes, it was discovered that the government had engaged in warrantless
electronic surveillance of some defendants' conversations. The Court held, inter alia, that only
those defendants whose conversations had actually been overheard, or on whose premises the
surveillance had occurred, had standing to challenge the legality of the surveillance. Code-
fendants whose personal Fourth Amendment rights were not violated could not seek to sup-
press the intercepted conversations.
Nine years after Alderman, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court explicitly endorsed the reasoning
and result in Alderman. Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978). The Rakas Court, however,
expressed doubts
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An example will illustrate the impact of this principle. Assume that police
unlawfully search X's home, hoping to obtain evidence incriminating X, Y,
and Z, and in fact seize such evidence. The government seeks to use this
evidence against all three defendants. All three move to suppress, arguing
that the unlawful search of X's home requires the exclusion of the evidence
at trial. X's motion to suppress will be granted, and the evidence excluded
as to him, because his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the un-
lawful search of his home. Unless Y or Z can show that their privacy was
also violated by the search of X's home, however, the evidence will be ad-
missible against each of them.3" Y, to win suppression of the evidence,
must demonstrate that he had a right to privacy in X's home and that the
search violated this right.3 2 Even if Y succeeds in doing so, this would avail
whether it serves any useful analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter
of standing, distinct from the merits of a defendant's Fourth Amendment
claim. . . . [W]e think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a
particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theo-
retically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-39. Nevertheless, the term "standing" facilitates ease of expression.
As used herein, a person has "standing" under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the legal-
ity of police conduct only if he can show that the police conduct intruded upon his own Fourth
Amendment protected privacy.
311. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-76 (1969). Alderman is summarized supra in note 310. Payner is an extreme example
of the impact of the standing requirement. An Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent, learning
that a Bahamian bank official was in Miami on business, arranged to introduce the banker to a
female dinner companion. While the banker was at a restaurant, the agent unlawfully broke
into the banker's hotel room, removed the banker's locked briefcase, unlawfully opened it and
photographed the 400 bank records contained therein. The briefcase and papers were then
returned to the banker's hotel room. The agent was well aware of the lawlessness of his con-
duct, but guessed, correctly, that the documents would reveal criminal conduct on the part of
American customers of the bank. The agent was also aware that the customers so exposed
would not have standing to challenge the search. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113,
131 & n.69 (1977). Payner was one such customer. Indicted for making false statements on
his income tax return, he moved to suppress evidence derived from the illegal search. The
Supreme Court ruled that the motion should have been denied. Although the IRS agent's
conduct clearly violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the Bahamian banker, the Court
held that Payner had no Fourth Amendment right to privacy within the banker's hotel room
or briefcase; hence, the agent's violation of the banker's rights did not violate Payner's consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy. In other words, Payner did not have standing to assert
the agent's violation of the banker's rights as a basis to suppress the evidence.
312. Even if Y had been "legitimately on the premises" at the time of the search, this fact,
without more, would not give Y standing to challenge the legality of the search or win suppres-
sion of the evidence. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. Alternatively, if Y had been a houseguest of X's
for several days and was still staying there on the date of the search this probably would suffice
to show that rs Fourth Amendment rights, as well as X's, were intruded upon by the search.
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259, 267 (1960); see
generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
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Z nothing; to win suppression of the evidence, Z must make his own individ-
ual showing.
Applying this example to the context of beeper surveillance, assume un-
lawful private location monitoring of the beeper in X's home enables the
police to acquire evidence incriminating X, Y, and Z.313 As a rule, X will
succeed in suppressing the fruits of the beeper surveillance,314 because the
unlawful surveillance violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure
against an unreasonable search. Barring additional facts or unusual circum-
stances, however, Y and Z will not win suppression on this ground.
2. "Poisonous Trees" and "Tainted Fruit"
Suppose police unlawfully enter X's home. Once inside, they see, in plain
view, contraband or other clearly incriminating evidence. Is it admissible
against X at trial?
There is nothing per se unlawful about the seizure of the evidence; the
police have the right to seize incriminating evidence when they come upon it
in plain view.315 Nevertheless, the evidence must be suppressed; the unlaw-
ful entry into X's home taints the otherwise lawful seizure.31 6
Suppose further that the evidence seized from X's home provides police
with probable cause to believe that additional contraband may be found in
Y's home. They proceed thence, and seize evidence incriminating both X
and Y. X seeks to suppress this evidence. Unless X can establish that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in Y's home, he cannot challenge the
legality of the search of Y's home. That search intruded upon only Y's
privacy.317 X has standing, however, to seek, and in all likelihood to win,
suppression of the evidence seized from Y's home, because, insofar as X is
concerned, the police obtained that evidence by exploiting the earlier, unlaw-
313. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
314. The concept of "tainted fruit" is discussed infra at notes 315-20 and accompanying
text.
315. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion). See 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.7 (1978 & Supp. 1984). The police may also seize incrim-
inating evidence when they discover it during a "hot pursuit." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967).
316. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (drugs suppressed); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (shell casing connecting defendant to a homicide suppressed). "Poi-
sonous trees" are not limited, of course, to unlawful entries into a person's home. An unlawful
arrest, unlawful seizure of evidence, or unlawful interrogation may provide the initial illegality
that taints subsequently obtained evidence. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 312, at
§ 11.4; Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
579 (1968).
317. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
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ful search of X's home.3 8  To use a time-worn metaphor, the unlawful
search of X's home is a "poisonous tree"; the evidence subsequently seized
from Y's home is, as to X, the tainted, and therefore suppressible, "fruit of
the poisonous tree." 319
Quite clearly, unlawful private location monitoring in appropriate circum-
stances may constitute a "poisonous tree," requiring the suppression of
otherwise lawfully seized evidence-suppression, that is, as to those defend-
ants with standing to complain of the unlawful monitoring. 32 °
3. Averting Taint. Independent Source, Inevitable Discovery,
Attenuation
The Court has rejected the proposition that "all evidence is 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police."32 Several concepts have emerged under which
rigid application of the taint rule may be averted.
The situation in which the most persuasive theoretical case can be made
for nonapplication of the taint rule arises when the authorities can demon-
strate that they would have acquired the evidence in question even without
the prior illegality. There are two variations on this theme: the "independ-
ent source" doctrine and the "inevitable discovery" doctrine.
The "independent source" doctrine holds that if the authorities had an
318. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (discussion of defendant
James Toy's motion to suppress heroin seized in Johnny Yee's home).
319. The phrase is Justice Frankfurter's. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
320. For example, assume that government agents conduct warrantless private location
monitoring of a beepered chemical container, and discover that the container is in X's home.
This information provides the missing link necessary to establish probable cause for a warrant
to search X's home. The officers enter and seize other chemicals, laboratory equipment, and
illegally manufactured methamphetamine. Subsequent investigation reveals that Y and Z had
purchased most of the chemicals and equipment seized in X's basement. Based on this and
other information, Y and Z are indicted along with X and charged with conspiring to manufac-
ture methamphetamine.
Prior to trial, all three defendants move to suppress everything that was seized from X's
basement. X's motion will be granted. Even though the evidence was seized pursuant to a
warrant based upon probable cause, the probable cause depended upon information derived
from unlawful private location monitoring. The monitoring taints everything seized pursuant
to it.
In all probability, however, Y's motion and Z's will be denied. Although the monitoring of
the beeper without a warrant violated X's rights, Y and Z lack standing to complain of this-
or of the resulting search of X's basement-unless they can somehow show that they, too, had
a Fourth Amendment protected right to privacy in X's basement. Their status as X's code-
fendants and coconspirators avails them nothing for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Alder-
man, 394 U.S. at 172; supra text accompanying note 310.
321. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
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untainted source that provided the same information as they obtained from
the tainted source, the information thus obtained is considered to be un-
tainted.322 The "inevitable discovery" doctrine provides that if the police
seize evidence illegally, but subsequently demonstrate to a judge that, em-
ploying lawful techniques, they inevitably would have come upon the evi-
dence in question, the evidence is admissible.323
More difficult conceptually is the principle of "attenuation" or "dissipa-
322. Thus, for example, if a search warrant is issued on an investigator's affidavit that
included information that was tainted or that included factual allegations that the affiant knew
to be false, a reviewing court in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the warrant should
excise retroactively the offensive portion of the affidavit. If what is left suffices to establish
probable cause, the warrant is valid despite the presence of tainted information or untrue asser-
tions in the supporting affidavit. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305-06 (tainted information); Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (deliberately false information). Concerning Karo, see
infra note 341 and accompanying text. See also Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380
(1984).
323. The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the doctrine in Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct.
2501, 2509-10 (1984). This remarkable case merits at least brief discussion. On Christmas
Eve, 1968, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from a YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa. Evidence very
quickly came to light implicating Williams, who had recently escaped from a mental hospital.
The next day, Williams' car was found in Davenport, Iowa, 160 miles east of Des Moines, and
items of clothing belonging to Williams and the girl were found at a rest stop between the two
cities. Id. at 2504-05. Police and volunteers immediately began a systematic, detailed, large-
scale search of the area. Meanwhile, Williams surrendered to local police in Davenport and
was promptly arraigned. He contacted a Des Moines attorney, who arranged for a Davenport
attorney to represent Williams temporarily. Des Moines police informed counsel that they
would drive to Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him to Des Moines without question-
ing him. Id. at 2505.
During the drive from Davenport back to Des Moines, Detective Leaming, one of the of-
ficers assigned to transport Williams, asked Williams to think about these facts: that Williams
was the only person who knew where the girl's body was; that a major snowstorm was ex-
pected to hit the area soon; that after the storm, even Williams might not be able to find the
body; and that "the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the
little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas eve and murdered." Id. at 2505.
Williams thought about this for several minutes, then took the officers to his victim's corpse.
Prior to trial and on appeal following his conviction for murder, Williams sought to sup-
press the fact that he had taken the authorities to the girl's body, arguing that Detective Leam-
ing's "Christian burial speech" constituted unlawful interrogation in violation of Williams'
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Further, he sought to suppress the corpse and physical
evidence found in its immediate vicinity, arguing that all such items were tainted by the illegal
interrogation. Id.
From virtually every imaginable perspective, Detective Leaming's conduct was exemplary.
He employed no force, no threats, no coercion; rather, he appealed to Robert Williams' sense
of decency and compassion, by urging Williams to have pity on his victim's family. In 1977,
the Supreme Court held, nevertheless, that in the peculiar and abstract context of constitu-
tional law, Detective Leaming, by appealing to a child murderer's better nature, had acted
unlawfully: he had interrogated Williams in violation of the latter's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The Court remanded for a new trial, at
which the jury would not be permitted to learn that Williams led the police to the victim's
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tion" of the taint. Under this theory, even if one can trace a direct, "but for"
causal chain from the initial illegality to the ultimate acquisition of the evi-
dence in question, intervening events and the passage of time may combine
to attenuate the taint sufficiently so that the evidence is not considered
tainted, and, therefore, is admissible at trial.3 24 While there is no simple test
body. The Court withheld judgment on whether the corpse itself, and the physical evidence
found nearby, should also be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the unlawful interrogation.
On remand, the state court concluded that, had Williams not brought the police to his
victim's body, the meticulous, systematic search then in progress inevitably would have uncov-
ered the grisly evidence within a short period of time, in essentially the same condition in
which it was actually found. Testimony concerning the discovery of the body and its condi-
tion, an autopsy report, and the physical evidence found near the body were again admitted at
trial (although the jury was not permitted to learn of Williams' role in the discovery of the
body). Williams was again convicted and the state supreme court affirmed. State v. Williams,
285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, ruling that evidence relating to the victim's corpse and nearby evidence should not
have been admitted at trial. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (1983).
The Supreme Court reversed the federal circuit court, reinstating the conviction. Nix v.
Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984). The Court reasoned that where the prosecution can show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means (in the instant case, the foot-by-foot search of the area in which the
body was in fact found), suppression of the evidence would have virtually no deterrent effect
on future potential police misconduct; hence, such evidence should be admissible at trial. Id.
at 2508-09.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). In December of 1974, Biro,
a police officer assigned to traffic patrol, was chatting with a friend, Lois Hennessey, in Cec-
colini's flower shop, where she was employed. Noticing an envelope with money sticking out
of it lying on the drawer of the cash register behind the counter, the officer picked up the
envelope, glanced through its contents, and discovered that it contained not only money but
policy slips, that is, notations of unlawful gambling. Replacing the envelope, and without
telling Ms. Hennessey what it contained, he asked her about it. She replied that Ceccolini had
given her the envelope and instructed her to give it to someone else.
The next day, Biro told a local detective what he had seen. The detective, in turn, passed the
information on to an FBI agent. Coincidentally, the FBI had been investigating suspected
gambling in that town for over a year, and in fact had for a time conducted surveillance of
Ceccolini's flower shop, although such surveillance had been curtailed in December of 1973, a
full year before Officer Biro's casual albeit unlawful perusal of the envelope. Four months
after learning of the incident, the FBI agent interviewed Ms. Hennessey in her home in the
presence of several relatives. She told the agent she was studying police science, and was quite
happy to cooperate with the authorities. Ultimately, she provided testimony concerning the
envelope incident that led to Ceccolini's indictment and conviction for perjuriously denying
having taken policy bets in the flower shop.
Following the conviction, however, the trial judge granted Ceccolini's motion to suppress
Ms. Hennessey's testimony, ruling that it was tainted by Officer Biro's illegal examination of
the envelope. Without Ms. Hennessey's testimony, there was little evidence of Ceccolini's
guilt; accordingly, the judge reversed the conviction. The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning
that "the road to Miss Hennessey's testimony from Officer Biro's concededly unconstitutional
search is both straight and uninterrupted." 542 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that "the connection between the lawless conduct of the
police and the discovery of the challenged evidence ha[d] 'become so attenuated as to dissipate
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to determine whether, in any given sequence of events, the "attenuation
point" has been reached, analysis must begin with an understanding of the
principle underlying the attenuation rule. As Justice Powell explained:
"The notion of the 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at
which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so atten-
uated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its
cost.",
3 2 5
the taint.'" Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487 (1963); citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). The Court emphasized
that Ms. Hennessey's decision to testify was entirely voluntary on her part and in no way
coerced or induced by Biro's discovery of the policy slips; that the slips themselves were not
used in questioning her; that substantial periods of time elapsed between Biro's illegal search,
the FBI's initial interview with the witness, and her testimony at trial; and that the FBI might
have eventually interviewed Ms. Hennessey about Ceccolini in any event. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
at 279.
Earlier in its opinion, the Court had reiterated its oft stated principle that the exclusionary
rule should be applied only in situations where suppression of evidence is likely to deter fur-
ther, similar police misconduct. Id. at 275. See supra note 18. Returning to this theme, the
Court stressed that there was "not the slightest evidence to suggest" that Biro had done what
he did with the intent or expectation of uncovering evidence of illicit gambling, or of finding a
witness who might testify about such activity. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80. Given this fact,
the Court concluded,
Application of the exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the slightest
deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer such as Biro. The cost of permanently
silencing Hennessey is too great for an evenhanded system of law enforcement to
bear in order to secure such a speculative and very likely negligible deterrent effect.
Id. at 280.
325. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). See also Cec-
colini, 435 U.S. at 280, quoted supra at note 324. Brown provides a worthwhile contrast to
Ceccolini. In Brown, the police arrested Brown, knowing they lacked lawful grounds to do so.
They then advised him of his Fifth Amendment rights (that is, they read him the "Miranda
warnings") and, within two hours, Brown confessed to a murder. The Court ruled that the
confession should have been suppressed. The brief interval between the unlawful arrest and
the administration of the Miranda warnings was insufficient, the Court held, to attenuate the
taint of the unlawful arrest, particularly in light of the purposeful nature of the police miscon-
duct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05. Accord, Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) (Although
six hours elapsed between the illegal arrest and petitioner's confession, and although petitioner
had been advised of his Miranda rights three times and had been permitted to visit briefly with
his girlfriend and neighbor before he confessed, the confession was the impermissible fruit of
the unlawful arrest.); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (illegal seizure and deten-
tion of suspect for questioning tainted subsequent incriminating statements); cf Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents unlawfully arrested
Wong Sun and charged him with drug related offenses. He was arraigned and released on his
own recognizance. Several days later, of his own volition, he went to the agents' office and
made incriminating statements. The Supreme Court held that these statements were properly
admitted against him at trial. His release from custody, and his own decision several days later
to make statements to the agents, had so attenuated the connection between the arrest and the
statement as to "dissipate the taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
For a detailed discussion of the "tainted fruit" and "attenuation" doctrines, see 3 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 312, at § 11.4; Pitler, supra note 316, at 579 (1968).
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The most logical way to analyze taint and taint aversion issues is
to examine the sequence of events chronologically, defendant-by-defendant.
Each step in an investigative sequence, beginning with the very first, should
be analyzed, to determine whether that step intruded upon any defendant's
Fourth Amendment protected right to privacy. If there were such an intru-
sion into a particular defendant's right to privacy, a determination must be
made whether that intrusion was lawful. For example, if the police searched
defendant X's home and seized incriminating evidence, then admissibility of
that evidence against X at trial depends upon whether the search was lawful.
If the search were unlawful, that is, if it violated defendant X's Fourth
Amendment rights, then, as to defendant X,326 that illegality also taints all
subsequently obtained evidence the government might seek to use against
X327-unless the taint is averted by operation of the independent source,
inevitable discovery, or attenuation doctrines.
B. The Karo "Attenuation" Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion
In Part IV of Karo, a six-judge majority (the White plurality, plus Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist, concurring) held that although information relat-
ing to beeper surveillance in the private residences (including the house at
Taos) would be inadmissible at trial, the physical evidence seized from the
house at Taos-evidence that, but for the beeper surveillance, would not
have been discovered-should not have been suppressed as to any defendant.
The Court ruled the evidence was admissible at trial against all of the
defendants.3 28
Given the long-established concepts of standing and taint aversion, this
result is defensible and, although certainly debatable, probably correct. The
majority's explanation of how it arrived at this result, on the other hand,
326. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
327. Although an unlawful search or seizure may taint subsequent discoveries, it can have
no such effect on a prior lawful search or seizure. A search that is lawful when the police
conduct it on the first of the month cannot retroactively be made unlawful by a transgression
the police commit on the second or third day of the month.
328. The Tenth Circuit held that Karo had the right to seek and win suppression of the
fruits of the beeper surveillance because his rights had been violated by the transfer of the can
of ether containing the beeper to him without authorization of a valid warrant; Horton, Har-
ley, and Steele were entitled to suppress the fruits of the surveillance because they had jointly
rented the house in Taos, the final place from which the beeper was unlawfully monitored; and
Roth could do likewise since he had been a guest at the house for several days and nights.
Because the beeper was not monitored in any location in which Rhodes had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge had erred in suppressing the
evidence as to him. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1441.
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lacks clarity of thought and expression.' 29 The Court begins at the end,
works its way toward the beginning, and glosses over several important as-
pects of the case altogether.
a. Summary
Before examining Part IV of the opinion as the Court wrote it, therefore, a
chronology of the investigation is offered together with a brief summary of
how the Court explicitly or implicitly treated each aspect of it.33°
1. The agents lawfully tracked the beepered can from the informant to
Karo's house.33 1
2. Thereafter the agents engaged in unlawful private location monitor-
ing, violating the rights of Karo and Horton and ultimately leading the
agents to the first storage facility.332
3. Having used the beeper to locate the can somewhere in the first stor-
age facility, the agents used a variety of lawful means to track the can, ulti-
mately, to a particular locker in the second storage facility. The manner in
which this information was acquired 333 sufficed to attenuate the taint of the
unlawful private location monitoring outlined in step two.3 34
4. Similarly, the agents employed only lawful methods to track the can
from the second locker to the vicinity of the house in Taos.33 5
5. Finally, the agents engaged in unlawful private location monitoring of
the can at the house in Taos.3 36 Because the warrant authorizing the search
329. Indeed, Part IV of the opinion reminds me of the pedagogical approach of one of my
least fondly remembered law professors, who regarded it akin to original sin to make any legal
concept easy to understand. Rather, his approach to virtually every subject was to inundate
his class with a melange of references, hypotheticals, parables, and analogies, intending thereby
to force his students always to analyze and synthesize every legal principle for, and teach it to,
themselves, presumably on the theory that even those students who were unsuccessful would
benefit greatly from the intellectual effort involved. Most students, of course, simply bought a
hornbook and stopped attending class-an option not available to attorneys and judges, nor to
law professors who choose to write about the Karo decision.
330. In essence, the next five paragraphs of the text constitute an outline of what the Court
should have said, and how it should have said it, to arrive at the result it did. (One of the perks
of being a law professor is the freedom to indulge in acts of gross presumptuousness.)
331. This stage of the surveillance consisted solely of visual surveillance and in-transit
monitoring, a sort held not to be a search in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See
supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
332. See infra note 338 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
334. This conclusion is at best implicit in the Court's discussion; indeed, the reader is re-
quired to infer it from the Court's rather loose discussion of the facts. See infra notes 345-47,
354-57 and accompanying text.
335. This stage of the investigation consisted solely of visual surveillance and in-transit
monitoring, and hence was not a Fourth Amendment search at all. See supra note 331.
336. See supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text.
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of that house was supported by probable cause independent of this unlawful
monitoring, however, evidence seized pursuant to that warrant was
admissible.33
7
b. The Court's Reasoning
The Court began Part IV by spelling out the ramifications of its holding in
Part III that nonwarrant private location monitoring is an unlawful search.
Rather than begin with the first instance of such monitoring, 338 the Court
focused upon the monitoring in Taos.
[B]y maintaining the beeper the agents verified that the ether
was actually located in the Taos house and that it remained there
while the warrant [to search that house] was sought. This informa-
tion was obtained without a warrant and would therefore be inad-
missible at trial against those with a privacy interest in the house-
Horton, Harley, Steele, and Roth.339
In other words, at trial, the agents would not be permitted to testify that
they monitored the beeper and ascertained thereby that the ether was inside
the house in Taos.
The Court proceeded to focus upon whether the evidence seized pursuant
to the search warrant was properly suppressed by the courts below. Because
information relating to the beeper surveillance at Taos was included in the
warrant application, the use of this information "would . . .invalidate the
warrant for the search of the house" if the information "proved to be critical
to establishing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. ' '31 If, on the
other hand, "sufficient untainted evidence [were] presented in the warrant
affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant was . . . valid" despite the
inclusion of the information tainted by the beeper surveillance.341
The affidavit recounted the months-long tracking of the evi-
dence, including the visual and beeper surveillance of Horton's
pick-up on its trip from Albuquerque to the immediate vicinity of
337. See infra notes 341-43, 345-47 and accompanying text.
338. Later in the opinion the Court commented that "the unwarranted monitoring of the
beeper in Karo's house would foreclose using that evidence [that is, that the beeper had been in
Karo's house] against him .... " Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3307 n.7. Presumably, the fact that the
beeper was later monitored inside Horton's home likewise would be inadmissible against Hor-
ton. The Court did not address whether Horton would be able to suppress the fact that the
ether thereafter was monitored inside Horton's father's home. These issues are discussed more
fully infra at notes 345-62 and accompanying text. This aspect of Karo corresponds to the
portion of the summary accompanying supra note 332.
339. Id. at 3305. This aspect of Karo corresponds to the portion of the summary accompa-
nying supra note 336.
340. Id. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
341. Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 (1978). See supra note 322.
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the Taos residence; its departure a short time later without the
ether; its later return to the residence; and the visual observation of
the residence with its windows open on a cold night.342
The Court concluded that this information alone established probable cause
for the search warrant.
Next, the Court considered whether any of this additional information
"was itself the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation to which any of the
occupants of the house could object." '3 43 Steele and Roth lacked standing to
raise such an objection, the Court decided, because they "had no interest in
any of the arguably private places in which the beeper was monitored prior
to its arrival in Taos. Therefore, the evidence seized in the house would be
admissible against them."
344
Turning to Horton and Harley, the Court quickly reviewed the ether's
earlier stops: Karo's home, Horton's home, Horton's father's home, a locker
rented by Horton and Harley in a storage facility, and then another locker
rented by them in a second storage facility; and finally, to Taos. "Assuming
for present purposes that prior to its arrival at the second warehouse the
beeper was illegally used to locate the ether in a house or other place in
which Horton or Harley had a justifiable claim to privacy,, 345 the Court
concluded that "such use of the beeper does not taint its later use in locating
the ether and tracking it to Taos.",346 The Court explained:
The movement of the ether from the first warehouse was unde-
tected, but by monitoring the beeper the agents discovered that it
had been moved to the second storage facility. No prior monitoring
of the beeper contributed to this discovery; using the beeper for this
purpose was thus untainted by any possible prior illegality. Fur-
thermore, the beeper informed the agents only that the ether was
somewhere in the warehouse; it did not identify the specific locker
in which the ether was located. Monitoring the beeper revealed
nothing about the contents of the locker that Horton and Harley
342. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306. It is unclear from the published opinions in the case whether
the information that the truck departed the house without the beeper was derived from moni-
toring the beeper or from visual surveillance. This aspect of Karo corresponds to the portion
of the summary accompanying supra note 337.
343. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
344. Id.
345. Id. Presumably, neither Horton nor Harley could assert such a claim in Karo's home.
Unquestionably, Horton could assert such an interest in his own home, and perhaps his fa-
ther's. Absent additional information, it is unclear whether Harley could assert such an inter-
est in either of these places. Both Horton and Harley could assert such an interest in the
locker at the first storage facility since they jointly rented the locker. Id. at 3306 n.6. See infra
notes 347, 354-58 and accompanying text.
346. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
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had rented and hence was not a search of that locker. The locker
was identified only when agents traversing the public parts of the
facility found that the smell of ether was coming from a specific
locker.347
Thereafter, the Court stressed, the agents learned that the ether was being
moved from the second locker by visual and not beeper surveillance.348
Likewise, "the ether was seen being loaded into Horton's truck" after its
removal from the second locker,3 49 that is, the agents learned of its presence
in that vehicle by visual and not beeper surveillance.350 Visual and beeper
surveillance tracked the ether to "the vicinity of the house in Taos"; 35 1 but
this beeper surveillance consisted merely of in-transit monitoring, which, the
Court had already held in Knotts, did not constitute a search. 52
Having thus located the Taos residence in a manner (the Court con-
cluded) untainted by the unlawful monitoring which had occurred prior to
the ether's arrival at the second storage facility, the agents proceeded to ac-
quire probable cause to search the Taos house independent of the unlawful
private location beeper monitoring they conducted at that site. Thus, the
Court concluded, "The evidence seized in the house should not have been
suppressed with respect to any of the respondents., 353
Regrettably, the Court's explanation of its reasoning contains a significant
misstatement of fact. It is simply not true that prior monitoring of the
beeper did not contribute to the discovery that the beepered can had been
moved to the second storage facility.354 Had there been "no prior [unlawful]
monitoring of the beeper," the agents would not have "discovered" that the
347. Id. (emphasis added). This aspect of Karo corresponds to the portion of the summary
accompanying supra note 334. The italicized portion of this quotation is a plain misstatement
of fact. See infra notes 355-57 and accompanying text. At the end of the quoted passage, the
Court noted that "Had the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container within a particu-
lar locker," this would have constituted a search of that locker. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306 n.6.
See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
348. 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 3306.
349. Id. at 3306.
350. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
351. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306. Had the agents lost track of the beeper en route to Taos, and
then used the beeper to ascertain that the container was inside, rather than merely "in the
vicinity of," the house in Taos, this presumably would have constituted unlawful private loca-
tion monitoring. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text. The aspect of Karo discussed in this
paragraph corresponds to the portion of my summary accompanying supra note 335.
353. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306-07. The Court noted that although the monitoring of the
beeper inside Karo's home had been illegal, this "did not taint the discovery of the ether in the
second warehouse and the ensuing surveillance of the trip to Taos." Id. at 3307 n.7. The
Court had already concluded that the evidence was admissible as to Steele and Roth. See
supra note 344 and accompanying text.
354. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
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can had been taken from Karo's home to Horton's. 355 Had there been "no
prior [unlawful] monitoring of the beeper," the agents would not have "dis-
covered" that the can had been taken from Horton's residence to his fa-
ther's. 356  Had the agents not engaged in a third instance of "prior
[unlawful] monitoring of the beeper," they would not have "discovered" that
the can had been taken from Horton's father's home to the first storage facil-
ity. 357 These several instances of prior-and unlawful-monitoring not only
"contributed to [the] discovery" that the can had been moved to the second
storage facility; they constituted essential, "but for" steps in that
discovery.358
While this misstatement of fact represents a serious flaw in the Court's
explanation of its reasoning, the reasoning itself is sound. The agents
learned of the ether's removal when the manager of the storage facility vol-
untarily informed them of this fact.3 59 Apparently, the majority concluded,
sub silentio, that this voluntary act on the manager's part sufficed to attenu-
ate the taint of the prior, unlawful monitoring. If this indeed were the
Court's reasoning, it is entirely consistent with prior taint-attenuation
precedent.36°
It is significant that the agents used the beeper to locate the can in the
second warehouse only after learning, in a manner untainted by the prior
355. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300. Because the agents lacked a valid beeper surveillance war-
rant, private location monitoring at Karo's home was unlawful. In the absence of such moni-
toring, the agents would have had no way of knowing whether the can had been removed, let
alone that it had been taken to Horton's home.
356. Once the beeper led the agents to Horton's home, the smell of ether was discernible
from the sidewalk. Nevertheless, it was only by monitoring the beeper two days later that they
learned that the can was no longer there, but had been moved to the home of Horton's father.
Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300.
357. Id.
358. Having ascertained that the ether was inside locker number 143 of the first storage
facility, the agents obtained a court order authorizing installation of an entry tone alarm into
the door jam of the locker. The alarm was designed to alert the agents as soon as the locker
was opened. Somehow, however, the suspects removed the ether from the locker without
sounding the alarm. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300.
359. Id.
360. Karo may be analogized to United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), described
in supra note 324. In each case, an initial illegality led the authorities to a witness who then
voluntarily conveyed additional information to the agents. There are also dissimilarities. In
Ceccolini, the illegality was a casual act, not intended to lead to incriminating evidence, while
in Karo, the illegal monitoring clearly was intended to acquire evidence of crime. In this
respect, the attenuation argument in Karo is weaker than that in Ceccolini. On the other hand,
in Ceccolini, the information volunteered to the authorities proved to be a key aspect of the
government's case, while in Karo, the information volunteered by the manager of the first
storage facility proved to be only the first untainted link in a fairly lengthy investigative se-
quence. In this respect, the attenuation argument in Karo is perhaps stronger than that in
Ceccolini.
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unlawful private location monitoring, that the can was no longer in the first
facility. Monitoring the beeper while the can was in the first locker would
have constituted an unlawful search of that locker.36 ' Monitoring the
beeper and thereby discovering that the ether was no longer in the first locker
also would have constituted an unlawful search of the locker.3 62 This very
likely would have tainted their subsequent discovery that the ether had been
moved to the "general vicinity" of the second storage facility, which in turn
might have tainted all subsequently obtained information and evidence-at
least as to Horton and Harley, the individuals with a privacy interest in the
first locker.
Turning to the second locker, the Court stressed that the beeper revealed
only that the can had been moved to a second storage facility; the agents did
not use the beeper to ascertain in which locker it had been placed. Instead,
they obtained this information through direct observation (the ether's smell)
and the facility manager. Thus, the Court reasoned, "Monitoring the beeper
revealed nothing about the contents of the locker that Horton and Harley
had rented and hence was not a search of that locker., 363 This was indeed
fortunate, because "[h]ad the monitoring disclosed the presence of the
container within a particular locker the result would [have been] otherwise,
for surely Horton and Harley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their own storage locker."'3" Likewise, using the beeper to discover that the
ether had been removed from the second storage locker and was on route to
Taos would have constituted an unlawful search of the locker, 6 and pre-
sumably would have tainted all subsequently obtained information and evi-
dence-including information and evidence derived from the house in Taos.
In sum, the Court held that everything the agents did and learned from
the time the ether was located at the second facility to the time it arrived in
the vicinity of the house in Taos was lawful and untainted. Further,
although the subsequent private location monitoring of the beeper inside
that house was unlawful (and therefore could not be testified to), the warrant
361. The Karo Court said as much with regard to the second locker in the second ware-
house. See Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3307 n.7. See infra text accompanying note 364. There is no
earthly reason why the same result would not apply to the first locker.
362. Discovering that the ether is no longer in the locker intrudes upon defendants' privacy
therein just as much as would monitoring that reveals the ether is still there. If the agents had
discovered by monitoring the beeper that the ether had been taken from the first locker only
after the defendants' rental period had expired, this would not constitute an invasion of defend-
ants' legitimate expectations of privacy in that locker, since defendants' privacy expectations
therein would have expired with their lease.
363. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
364. Id. at 3306 n.6.
365. See supra note 362.
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authorizing the search of the house was based on sufficient untainted infor-
mation to establish probable cause independent of the unlawful monitoring.
Hence, the evidence seized in the house in Taos was admissible against all
defendants.
2. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, objected to two
aspects of Part IV of the majority opinion. First, he disagreed with the ma-
jority's implicit conclusion that the taint of the earlier unlawful private loca-
tion monitoring (of Karo's, Horton's, and Horton's father's homes) was
attenuated by the manner in which the agents learned of the can's removal
from the first locker and of its new location in the second warehouse. Sec-
ond, he objected to the Court's conclusion that an independent, untainted
probable cause existed for the Taos search warrant.366
In disagreeing with the majority's implicit attenuation analysis, Justice
Stevens reasoned:
If monitoring of a beeper constitutes a search because it 'estab-
lishes that the article remains on the premises,' ante, at [104 S. Ct.]
3303, it is no less a search when it establishes that the article has
left the premises. For this reason, the Court's holding in Part IV of
its opinion that any violation of respondents' privacy rights before
the can left the second warehouse did not taint its later monitoring
is flawed. The later monitoring necessarily told police that the
container had left areas the Court considers protected, and there-
fore itself violated privacy rights.3 67
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the question whether the Taos search
warrant application contained sufficient untainted information to establish
probable cause was not properly before the Court. Noting that the issue was
neither included in the petition for certiorari nor briefed by the parties, he
objected to what he categorized as the Court's "de novo examination of the
record" to decide the issue.368
3. Evaluation
Justice Stevens' dissent, except perhaps on the final point, is unpersuasive.
It is, of course, true that when the police "search" someone's home (or auto
or locker) for an object, that search is no less a search if the object they are
366. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303. In addition, Justice Stevens protested the majority's conclu-
sion that using the monitor to determine the general vicinity of the beeper (the second ware-
house) was not a search. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
367. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3313 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 3314.
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looking for happens not to be there, 369 and there is no reason to doubt that
the Karo majority recognized as much. This does not mean, however, that
every subsequent search of a new location for the same object ipso facto also
constitutes a new search of thefirst location. 37 ° The majority's attenuation
analysis, unarticulated and implicit though it is, is consistent with existing
precedent;3 7' and although Justice Stevens may disagree with that analysis,
the majority's rationale is not dramatically or inherently flawed.
The result in Karo, nevertheless, is distressing. There is no gainsaying the
fact that DEA lied to a federal district judge372 and, for all practical pur-
poses, got away with it. 37 3 Further, the result is dependent upon the distinc-
369. See supra note 362.
370. When the agents first conducted private location monitoring at Karo's house, and
discovered the beepered can of ether was still inside, this constituted a search of Karo's home.
The second time they conducted such monitoring, and discovered that the beeper was gone,
also constituted a search of Karo's home. The subsequent monitoring at Horton's home con-
stituted a search of Horton's home; nevertheless, the monitoring that revealed the beeper was
in Horton's house, and the subsequent monitoring that revealed that the beeper had been re-
moved from Horton's house, surely did not constitute further searches of Karo's home.
371. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
373. Some evidence will be suppressed as a result of the Court's decision. At the very end
of his plurality opinion, Justice White noted that "the unwarranted monitoring of the beeper in
Karo's house would foreclose using that evidence against him .... " Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3307
n.7. By this, the Court apparently meant that, at trial, the agents would not be permitted to
testify that private location monitoring of the beeper had revealed the ether's presence in
Karo's home since the ether had been traced to Karo's home in the first place by lawful visual
surveillance and in-transit monitoring, however, the agents should be permitted to testify that
the ether arrived at Karo's home. Id. at 3300. All that would be excluded is testimony that
the beeper enabled the agents to learn that the ether remained there for awhile, and then left
again.
Presumably, Karo would also be able to suppress the fact that the ether was taken to Hor-
ton's home after it left Karo's. The agents learned of the ether's departure from Karo's home,
after all, by using the monitor to "search" Karo's home for the beeper.
Horton clearly should be able to suppress the fact that the can of ether was in his home: the
agents discovered this only by conducting unlawful private location monitoring of the
beepered can while it was there, where clearly Horton enjoyed a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Further, for two distinct reasons, Horton should also be able to suppress the fact that
the ether was taken from his own home to his father's. First, a court might find that Horton
enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his father's home. Even if that proposition is
rejected, the fact remains that the agents were able to track the ether to Horton's father's home
only after their unlawful private location monitoring of Horton's home revealed the ether was
no longer there. Since this constituted a second unlawful search of Horton's home, the evi-
dence of its subsequent location is, developed as to Horton, tainted.
Logically, Karo and Horton should also be able to suppress the fact that the ether was next
taken to the first storage warehouse: as to these defendants, this fact is the fruit of the prior
unlawful monitoring that violated the rights of each. Finally, the Court explicitly ruled that
all information and evidence relating to the second locker, the trip from that locker to the
house in Taos, and the evidence seized in that house is admissible. Id. at 3306. The agents,
however, are not to be permitted to testify that they ascertained the continued presence of the
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tion between general vicinity monitoring and private location monitoring,3 74
a distinction that is readily susceptible to manipulation by law enforcement
officials.3" 5 Such, however, are the vicissitudes of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule and the manner in which it is applied.3 76
VI. THE QUESTIONS STILL UNANSWERED
Twice within a sixteen-month period, the Supreme Court rendered deci-
sions on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to beeper surveillance.
While the Knotts and Karo decisions resolved many of the issues that have
arisen with regard to such surveillance, numerous questions remain unan-
swered. Until they are answered-by subsequent court decisions or by legis-
lation-law enforcement officials and judges will be uncertain as to what is
required for certain types of beeper surveillance to be lawful, with concom-
mitant risks to law enforcement, efficiency, and personal liberty.
A. Installation
1. Consensual Installations
In Karo, the Court held that it constitutes neither a search nor a seizure
for law enforcement officials, acting with the consent of the current owner of
a container of chemicals, to install a beeper into the container and to deliver
the container to the target of an investigation.37 7 The broad terminology
used by the Court suggests that it would reach the same result if a far more
sophisticated device were consensually installed into an item far more pri-
vate and personal in nature-for example, a suitcase or attache case. De-
spite the broad sweep of Part II of the Karo decision, when progress in
miniaturization makes the installation of such a device a practical possibil-
ity,37 different issues will be posed than exist with regard to drums or cans
of chemicals.3 79
2. Trespassory Installations
Further, Karo offers only indirect guidance with regard to trespassory,
that is, nonconsensual, installations.3 8 ° Prior to Karo, the lower courts were
ether in the house in Taos during the several days between its arrival and their execution of a
search warrant at the house. Id. at 3305.
374. See supra notes 12-14, 282-306 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 295-306 and accompanying text.
376. Cf United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), supra note 311.
377. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
378. See supra text following note 5.
379. See supra notes 105-08, 123-24, 142-48 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
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sharply divided over whether such an installation, particularly onto or into a
vehicle, constituted a search or seizure."' 1 Karo implies, however, that many
such installations do not fall within the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection.
3 82
B. Monitoring
1. General Vicinity or Private Location Monitoring
In Knotts, the Court unanimously held that in-transit monitoring does not
constitute a search. 313 In Karo, a four-justice plurality and three otherwise
dissenting justices held that private location monitoring is a search subject to
the warrant requirement,38 4 while the plurality and two concurring justices
held that general vicinity monitoring is not a search.38 5 As yet unresolved is
where the line is to be drawn between general vicinity monitoring and pri-
vate location monitoring.3
8 6
2. Private Location Monitoring: Contraband
Prior to the Karo decision, several courts held or stated in dictum that no
Fourth Amendment rights are violated by the warrantless installation of a
beeper into contraband, stolen property, or items involved in other inher-
ently tainted transactions, so long as the item in question is in the lawful
possession of government agents at the time of installation.38 7 The rationale
underlying these decisions is that a person does not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy with regard to items that are per se unlawful to possess.38 8
Karo, of course, confirms these holdings, albeit on the alternate ground that
consensual installation is neither a search nor a seizure regardless of the ob-
ject into which the beeper is installed.38 9
Prior to Karo, several courts also held or indicated in dictum that a war-
rant should not be required to authorize private location monitoring of a
beeper that has been installed in contraband 90 or into instrumentalities in-
381. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 228-46, 256-60 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 295-306 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
388. See supra text accompanying note 138.
389. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
390. United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
991 (1982); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1976). See United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 942-43
(6th Cir. 1980) (dictum). Sheikh, Dubrofsky, and Emery also uphold the use of a signal alter-
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volved in other inherently tainted transactions. 39 ' Again, the rationale un-
derlying several of these decisions is that there is no reasonable or legitimate
ing beeper. The Ninth Circuit decisions were based on that court's conclusion that private
location monitoring did not constitute a search. "[A] beeper which says no more than 'the
package is being opened' does not constitute an intrusion entitled to the protection of Katz."
Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d at 212. See also United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1320-22 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983). This rationale was rejected in Karo.
The First Circuit, in Emery, and the Fifth Circuit, in Sheikh, somewhat less specifically held
that such monitoring did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, without speci-
fying whether this conclusion was based on the theory that such monitoring was not a search,
or on the alternate theory that the surveillance constituted a search that was reasonable despite
the absence of a warrant.
391. The first decision to assert this concept was United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976). In Perez, attempting to find out who was supplying
minors with heroin, government agents bartered a television set-in which a beeper had been
installed-in exchange for the drug. By monitoring the beeper, the agents tracked the set to a
car driven by one of the adult defendants. Although defendants had failed to preserve the
issue below, the Fifth Circuit went out of its way to "assume without deciding that a person
who accepts an item of personal property in exchange for heroin has no reasonable expectation
that it is cleansed of any device designed to uncover the tainted transaction or identify the
parties." Id. at 863. The Fifth Circuit also endorsed the private location monitoring of the
beeper. Id. Several other courts have cited Perez approvingly, categorizing it with the United
States Customs installation cases discussed supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. See
United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 942 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d
106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); Houlihan v. State, 551 S.W.2d 719,
722 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955 (1977). See also United States v. Washing-
ton, 586 F.2d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 253-54, 258
S.E.2d 872, 878-79 (1979) (citing, without expressly endorsing, the Perez "tainted transaction"
concept), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 123, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
How far does, or should, the Perez "tainted transaction" concept extend? It would seem
clear that no reasonable privacy expectation would be invaded if an electronic device were
installed in a package of currency, which is then left at a "drop" for a kidnapper, nor if a bank
teller inserted a beeper into a package of "bait money," which is then surrendered to a bank
robber. See United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848
(1976) (the court was not required to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied to
the use of the beeper). Likewise, installation of a beeper into purportedly stolen property,
thereafter sold under circumstances clearly establishing that the purchaser is on notice as to
the supposed stolen nature of the item, should also qualify as a "tainted transaction." United
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977) (dictum), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
The courts, however, have properly been unwilling to apply the principle unless the transac-
tion is inherently "tainted" ab initio.
[T]here is a clear line of demarcation between, on the one hand, contraband and
other items, such as stolen goods, whose possession is illegal, and on the other, goods,
whatever their suspected use, whose possession is legal. The narcotics peddler in
whose heroin a beeper is planted has no privacy interest in the substance; but the
same is not so of legally-possessed substances into which a beeper is placed, even if
these are destined later to be used in the commission of a crime.
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978);
State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 253-54, 258 S.E.2d 872, 878-79 (1979) (discussing but
not resolving the issue), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 123, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
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expectation of privacy with regard to such items. a9 2 Thus, the question is
whether this rationale survives the holding in Karo that private location
monitoring constitutes a search that, barring exigent circumstances, must be
authorized in advance by a warrant. a93
Despite Karo, private location monitoring of a beeper installed into a
container of known contraband should not be categorized as a search. Such
use of a beeper closely parallels the use of another sophisticated investigative
technique recently examined by the Supreme Court. In United States v.
Place, 94 the Court held, inter alia, that exposing a suspected drug courier's
suitcases to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search.3 95 The Court
reasoned:
392. See supra note 391.
393. See supra notes 226-46 and accompanying text.
394. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
395. Law enforcement officers at the Miami International Airport became suspicious of
respondent Place as he waited in line to purchase a ticket for a flight to LaGuardia Airport in
New York City. The officers approached him and asked to see his ticket and some identifica-
tion; he complied. When permission was asked to search his suitcase, which he had checked
with the airline, he consented. Because his flight was about to depart, however, the agents
decided not to search the luggage. After they inspected the address tags on the luggage, Place
was allowed to embark on the flight.
Further investigation revealed discrepancies between the information on the address tags
and the information Place had given the airline. The Miami police therefore relayed this infor-
mation concerning Place to DEA agents in New York City.
After Place disembarked at LaGuardia and claimed his two bags, two DEA agents ap-
proached him, identified themselves, and told him they believed he might be carrying narcot-
ics. Place claimed he had recognized the agents as "cops" as soon as he had deplaned (he had
made a similar claim to the Miami police when they had approached him), and claimed that
Miami police had already searched his luggage before he boarded the plane. The agents re-
sponded that they had heard to the contrary, and asked whether he consented to a search of
his luggage. Place demurred. An agent told Place they were going to take his luggage to a
federal judge and attempt to obtain a warrant to search it, and that Place was entitled to
accompany them if he wished. Place declined, but obtained telephone numbers from the
agents where they could be reached. The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport, and,
approximately ninety minutes after the initial seizure, they subjected the bags to a "sniff test"
by a narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted positively to one of the suitcases. Because it was
by then late Friday afternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, when
they obtained a search warrant for that bag. Inside, they found 1,125 grams of cocaine. Place
was convicted of possession and appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, holding that the prolonged detention of the luggage had violated Place's
Fourth Amendment rights. 660 F.2d 44 (1981).
The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, first, that the DEA agents at LaGuardia had a reason-
able suspicion that the suitcase contained narcotics, and that this established an adequate fac-
tual basis to detain the suitcases temporarily. 103 S. Ct. at 2641-44. It further held that
exposing the suitcases to the canine "sniff" was not a search. Id. at 2644-45. In addition, the
Court ruled that under the circumstances, the ninety minute period between the seizure of the
luggage on reasonable suspicion and the canine sniff was excessive. It therefore affirmed the
Second Circuit's reversal of Place's conviction. 103 S. Ct. at 2645-46.
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[A] person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of per-
sonal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. A 'ca-
nine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does
not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontra-
band items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,
as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents
of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a
typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact
that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of
the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited dis-
closure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected
to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discrimi-
nate and more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of
no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the man-
ner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude
that. . . exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a
public place, to a trained canine . . . did not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.196
The parallels between the "canine sniff" and private location monitoring
of a beeper installed into a container of contraband are substantial, so much
so in fact that with the substitution of a few appropriate words, most of the
passage from the Place decision quoted above would apply equally well to
private location monitoring of such a container:
[A] person possesses a privacy interest in [his home] that is pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. [Private location monitoring],
however, does not require [entry into the home]. It does not ex-
pose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view as does, for example, an officer's rummaging
through the [home]. Thus, the manner in which information is
obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive
than a typical search. Moreover, the [beeper] discloses only the
presence or absence of. . . a contraband item. Thus, despite the
fact that the [beeper] tells the authorities something about the con-
tents of the [home], the information obtained is limited. This lim-
ited disclosure also ensures that the [occupant of the home] is not
subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.3 97
396. 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45 (citation omitted).
397. This passage consists of the just quoted passage from United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct.
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The "canine sniff," in other words, may be less sui and more generis than the
Court may have thought.398
While a warrant should not be required to authorize private location mon-
itoring of a beeper inserted inside a container of contraband, a traditional
search and seizure warrant normally would be required to authorize physical
entry into the private location in question and the search for the contraband
(and for that matter, to search for the beeper). 99 To be valid, a search war-
rant, among other things, must "particularly describe" the place to be
searched.' Where the package in question is to be delivered to a specific
address, a warrant to search that location easily may be obtained in advance
of the actual delivery:4" the agent applying for the warrant would have no
difficulty specifying the place to be searched.
Suppose, though, the intended recipient has arranged to pick up the pack-
age at an airport or post office. The agents would have no advance knowl-
edge of where the package is to be taken. Could the agents nevertheless
obtain a warrant before notifying the intended recipient that the package is
available to be picked up, authorizing the entry and search of whatever
premises into which the package later is taken? In other words, would it
satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant "particularly
describ[el" the place to be searched, if the warrant specified that "the place
at 2644-45, with the following revisions: where the words "suitcase" or "luggage" appear in
the actual passage in Place, the word "home" has been substituted; references to the narcotics
dog or canine sniff, have been replaced by references to a beeper or to private location
monitoring.
398. For further support that private location monitoring of a beeper, which has been in-
stalled into a container of contraband, is not a search, see United States v. Jacobsen, '104 S. Ct.
1652 (1984) (removal of a minute quantity of powder from a lawfully seized container did not
constitute a search; warrantless performance of chemical test to determine whether powder
was cocaine was not an unreasonable seizure). Jacobsen is discussed in greater detail supra, at
note 92.
There is, of course, an irony in all this: a container of contraband represents the situation in
which a beeper surveillance warrant could be obtained most easily. No question can exist as to
probable cause, and the agents' ability to determine when the package will be delivered gives
them time to draw up the necessary papers and submit them to a judge. Yet, the clear implica-
tions of Place and Jacobsen remove the use of a beeper from the realm of a Fourth Amendment
search altogether, thereby obviating the need for a warrant.
399. "[I]f truly exigent circumstances exist, no warrant is required under general Fourth
Amendment principles." United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305. For a detailed discussion
of the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement, see 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.5(a), (b) (1978 & Supp. 1984).
400. The full text of the Fourth Amendment is set out at text accompanying supra note 16.
401. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled upon the validity of an "antici-
patory search warrant," numerous courts have upheld such warrants in "controlled delivery"
cases. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 3.7(c). Predelivery search warrants are sought in
controlled delivery of contraband cases because otherwise there is some risk that the contra-
band will be moved elsewhere while the agents are seeking a post delivery warrant.
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to be searched" is whatever location to which the package is taken?" 2
I know of no black letter law covering such a warrant. Language in Karo
permits the inference, however, that such a warrant would be valid. In justi-
fying its holding that private location monitoring constitutes a search that,
absent exigent circumstances, must be authorized by a warrant,40 3 the Court
commented:
We are also unpersuaded by the argument that a warrant should
not be required because of the difficulty in satisfying the particular-
ity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Government con-
tends that it would be impossible to describe the "place" to be
searched, because the location of the place is precisely what is
sought to be discovered through [the use of the beeper]. However
true that may be, it will still be possible to describe the object into
which the beeper is to be placed, the circumstances that led the
agents to wish to install the beeper, and the length of time for
which beeper surveillance is requested. In our view, this informa-
tion will suffice to permit issuance of a warrant authorizing beeper
installation and surveillance.'
The situation about which the Court was speaking and the situation hy-
pothesized quite obviously are distinguishable. Private location monitoring
is as minimally intrusive a search as has yet been devised," 5 in dramatic
contrast to the entry of law enforcement officials into a premises and the
search for the container, the contraband and the beeper. It is difficult to see,
however, why this distinction should make any difference in assessing the
validity of either warrant insofar as the particularity requirement is con-
cerned. The primary purpose underlying the constitutional requirement that
a warrant must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched" is to mini-
mize the risk that the officers will mistakenly search the wrong premises."
With an electronic beacon to guide the officers, such a risk would be minimal
indeed.4" Given that the alternative to such a search warrant would often
402. If the agents are able to use a signal altering beeper (see text following supra note 14),
the warrant might specify that the place to be searched is the premises in which the beeper is
located at the time the beeper signals that the compartment containing the contraband is being
opened.
403. See supra notes 226-46 and accompanying text.
404. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305 (citation omitted).
405. Cf text accompanying supra note 397.
406. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 399, at § 4.5, at 72. Professor LaFave suggests that the
particularity requirement is also related to the probable cause requirement: if the agents can-
not specifically describe the place to be searched, questions may arise as to whether they truly
know where the items sought are. Id. Where the beeper is implanted in a container of contra-
band, the existence of probable cause is axiomatic.
407. Circumstances can be imagined, of course, in which the beeper reveals only that it is
somewhere within a warren of small, closely crowded private premises, but not precisely which
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have to be a warrantless search justified by exigent circumstances, 4°8 the case
in favor of the validity of such a warrant is particularly compelling.
4 0 9
3. Private Location Monitoring of Vehicles
Assume a beeper is lawfully installed into or onto a vehicle,4" but that
surveillants nevertheless lose track of the vehicle. Eventually the beeper en-
ables them to trace the car to a residential street. This use of the beeper
consists merely of general vicinity monitoring, and therefore is not a
search.4 1 If the car is visible from the street, the situation poses no Fourth
Amendment issue.
Suppose, though, the car is not visible from the street; it must, therefore,
be parked in one of the several one- or two-car garages connected to the
houses that line the street. Would monitoring the beeper to determine which
garage contains the vehicle constitute a search; and if so, would it be unlaw-
ful without a warrant?
Knotts and Karo point in somewhat different directions. A garage is a
private location; monitoring that reveals which garage contains the car
therefore would, according to Karo, constitute a search requiring a war-
rant.4" 2 The Knotts decision, on the other hand, quite specifically held that
"[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,"
because by driving on public streets, the driver "voluntarily convey[s] to
anyone who want[s] to look the fact that he [is] traveling over particular
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he [makes], and the
one. In such a case, the agents would lack probable cause to search any of the premises,
because the beeper has not revealed the location to which the beeper was taken.
408. See supra note 266. The longer the agents wait after the beepered object is taken
inside the premises, the greater the risk that the contraband will be removed from the package
and taken to a different premises. The presence of the beeper inside the package also creates a
substantial risk that the recipients, upon seeing the beeper and recognizing its implications,
will destroy the contraband before law enforcement officers can enter and seize it. Where a
signal altering beeper has been employed, the most propitious time for entry and search is as
soon as the beeper indicates that the package or compartment has been opened.
409. "A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to
discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting."
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). But see Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981) (where police have warrant to arrest X and believe that X is in Y's home, they
may not, in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, enter Ys home to search for X
unless they first obtain a warrant authorizing the search of Y's home for X).
410. See supra notes 126-31, 149-62 and accompanying text.
411. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306-07; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. See supra notes 282-306 and
accompanying text.
412. If the garage is affixed to a home, a search of the garage is in a real sense a search of a
portion of the home as well.
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fact of his final destination when he exit[s] from public roads onto private
property." '4 1 3 That police acquire the same information electronically rather
than visually, Knotts holds, does not retroactively create a reasonable pri-
vacy expectation that did not exist in the first place.414
While the legal principles enunciated in either case logically might be ap-
plied to the situation under discussion, Karo appears to-and should-con-
trol. The Karo decision clearly limited the Knotts approach to general
vicinity monitoring by refusing to apply it to private location monitoring.41 5
Furthermore, categorizing such monitoring as a search is not likely to im-
pose severe additional burdens upon the investigators.41 6 The need to pro-
vide lower courts and investigators with something approximating a "bright
line" dividing monitoring constituting a search from that which is not is
another reason why the Karo rule should be applied to the situation at
hand.417 Thus, even when the beepered object is a vehicle, the Karo rule
strikes the proper balance between the competing interests of efficient law
enforcement and individual privacy.41 8
413. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. The Court also emphasized the "diminished expectation
of privacy" a person enjoys in an automobile generally. Id. at 281.
414. "A police car following Petschen at a distance throughout his journey could have
observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with
the drum of chloroform still in the car." Id. at 285.
415. It is clear that the Court was unwilling in Karo to apply the Knotts "could have"
analysis in too broad a fashion. See supra note 414. In Karo, the agents "could have" main-
tained constant visual surveillance of Karo's home, and thereby "could have" learned how
long the ether was kept there. They theoretically "could have" conducted an around-the-clock
visual surveillance of the first locker. In theory, they "could have" walked into the second
storage facility one foot behind Horton and Harley and watched as the suspects loaded the
ether into the second locker. The Court, nevertheless, explicitly ruled that the electronic
equivalents of these "could haves" do constitute searches subject to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3306 n.6 (the locker); id. at 3307 n.7 (Karo's home);
see also id. at 3304 n.4 ("There would be nothing left of the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy if anything that a hypothetical government informant might reveal is stripped of consti-
tutional protection." (emphasis in original)).
416. In most instances, the agents will have been able to note the vehicle's license plate,
from which they can learn the owner's name and address. If the listed owner lives on the block
indicated by the beeper, probable cause would thereby exist to believe that the car is in the
garage attached to that house. If the listed owner does not live on that block, the agents are
still permitted to monitor the beeper some distance away (so they cannot learn from the beeper
in which particular garage the car is located; see supra notes 282-306 and accompanying text),
to ascertain when the car is being moved; once this occurs, they can again conduct in-transit
monitoring. Finally, "if truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required under general
Fourth Amendment principles." Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305.
417. Indeed, the Karo Court went out of its way to state, in dictum, that private location
monitoring of a storage locker is a search. 104 S. Ct. at 3306 n.6. This suggests that the Court
may have been seeking to lay down a bright line. On the other hand, the line still has some
frayed edges. See supra notes 295-306 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
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C. Issues Relating to the Warrant Requirement
In Karo, the Court held that private location monitoring constitutes a
search that, barring exigent circumstances, is lawful only if authorized by a
warrant.4 9  This holding leaves several important questions unresolved.
These questions involve the source of judicial authority to issue warrants
tailored to the peculiar circumstances of beeper surveillance; procedural
matters relating to the issuance and execution of such warrants; post-execu-
tion procedures; and the factual showings required to support such warrants.
1. Judicial Authority to Issue Beeper Surveillance Warrants
The Fourth Amendment instructs, rather laconically, that "no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized."4 2° Thus it provides little explicit guidance as to who may seek
and who may issue a search warrant, what it should contain, how it is to be
executed, and what must be done after the search is completed. Under fed-
eral law, search warrants are regulated by rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Because beeper surveillance differs so substantially
from traditional searches, however, it would be virtually impossible to draft
an effective beeper warrant that complies with that rule's provisions.421
Despite the absence of legislation explicitly authorizing the issuance of
beeper surveillance warrants, judicial authority clearly exists to issue war-
rants that differ significantly from a rule 41 warrant. On several prior occa-
sions, the Supreme Court has held this to be the case with regard to other
forms of electronic surveillance,422 and the Court said as much again in
419. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303. See supra notes 226-50 and accompanying text.
420. The Fourth Amendment is set out in full supra at text accompanying note 16.
421. Although two federal statutes regulate other forms of electronic surveillance, they
clearly are inapplicable to beeper surveillance. The interception of wire and oral communica-
tions for law enforcement purposes is regulated by title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982). Electronic surveillance conducted
within the United States for national security and foreign intelligence purposes is regulated by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982).
For a detailed analysis of title III and related issues, see generally C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING
AND EAVESDROPPING (1978 & Supp. 1984). For an analysis of FISA, see id. at ch. 18 (Supp.
1984).
422. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977) (warrant authorizing
use of pen register); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (suppressing evidence
derived from installation of an eavesdropping device to the outside of a phone booth, but
commenting that "a . . . judicial order could have accommodated the legitimate needs of law
enforcement"); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (upholding warrant authorizing
consensual interception of specified conversations).
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Karo.423
In addition, judicial flexibility and creativity is explicitly permitted by rule
57(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and by the All Writs
Act.4 24 Rule 57(b) provides: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by
rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these
rules or with any applicable statute." The All Writs Act reads: "The
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The Supreme Court has re-
lied upon these provisions in the past to uphold electronic surveillance
search warrants not explicitly authorized by statute,425 and they are equally
applicable in the context of beeper surveillance.
2. Procedural Matters
Given the substantial differences between private location monitoring and
a traditional search, rule 41 and the vast volume of search warrant related
case law426 provide little direct guidance to the investigator and the judge
with regard to the issuance and execution of a beeper warrant. The need for
legislative standards is particularly acute in this regard; unless and until such
legislation is enacted,427 judges and investigators will have to endure by rely-
ing on common sense and general Fourth Amendment principles.
a. Particularity
The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant particularly de-
scribe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Be-
cause the very purpose of beeper surveillance is to determine the places to
which the beepered object will be taken, it will often be impossible for gov-
ernment agents to specify in advance "the place to be searched" by the
surveillance. In Karo, however, the Court explicitly stated that the constitu-
tional particularity requirement would be satisfied so long as the warrant
and application "describe the object into which the beeper is to be placed,
the circumstances that led the agents to wish to install the beeper, and the
length of time for which beeper surveillance is requested.
428
423. 104 S. Ct. at 3305. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
424. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
425. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 170, 172 (pen register).
426. See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 399, at §§ 4.5-.12.
427. See infra text following note 487.
428. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305. See supra text accompanying note 404.
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b. Time and Duration of Surveillance
Rule 41(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a
search warrant must be executed within ten days of issuance, and normally
must be executed during the daytime. Such limitations are wholly impracti-
cable when applied to beeper or transponder surveillance, and the nation's
courts have recognized as much. Although courts have invalidated warrants
containing no termination date,429 various courts have issued or upheld war-
rants authorizing surveillance for periods of up to ninety days.430
Certainly, a beeper warrant should have a termination date, at which time
the investigators must report to a judge the progress achieved or explain the
lack thereof. As to the maximum allowable period, there is no clear answer.
In Berger v. New York, the Supreme Court held that it violated the Constitu-
tion for a state to authorize issuance of an eavesdropping warrant for sixty
days on a single showing of probable cause.43' In response, when Congress
enacted title III, it authorized judges to issue wire or oral interception orders
of up to thirty days' duration.432 Presumably, therefore, a beeper warrant of
thirty days' duration is constitutionally safe, but a sixty-day warrant might
not be. On the other hand, the analogy to wiretapping and eavesdropping
orders is far from exact. The latter forms of surveillance are substantially
more intrusive than private location beeper monitoring, and experience has
shown that the targets of beeper investigations often allow extensive periods
of time to elapse before taking the beepered chemical container to their clan-
destine laboratory.433
Until the matter is resolved by legislation or by the Supreme Court, the
429. United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cofer,
444 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1978); see United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th
Cir. 1977) (warrant must contain reasonable time limitation). But see United States v. Butts,
729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (reversing a panel's suppression of the fruits of tran-
sponder surveillance of an airplane two days after the 30-day warrant had expired).
430. United States v. Chavez, 603 F.2d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1979) (60 day warrant followed
by 60-day renewal); see United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 852 (1 1th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Cady, 651 F.2d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 1981). In Long and Cady, a warrant authorized
surveillance for 90 days. In each case, the court held the actual duration of the surveillance
was reasonable (17 days in Cady, a week in Long), and therefore concluded it was unnecessary
to address whether surveillance for the entire authorized period would have been excessive.
Long, 674 F.2d at 852; Cady, 651 F.2d at 291. See also Cofer, 444 F. Supp. at 149-50 (conclud-
ing, in dictum, that 30 days should be the maximum permitted period). Several other courts
have noted the issuance of 30-day warrants without comment. See United States v. Kupper,
693 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th
Cir. 1976).
431. 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
432. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982).
433. In Karo, more than four-and-one-half months elapsed between Karo's purchase and
the arrival of the ether in Taos. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300.
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cautious approach is probably the wisest. Investigators should seek, and
judges should issue, warrants of no more than thirty days' duration. If the
investigation has not concluded by the end of this period, the agents should
submit a report to the issuing judge detailing what has happened to the
beeper during this period, together with whatever other information about
the suspects they have gathered in the interim, and seek a renewal for an
additional thirty days. So long as the judge is satisfied that the agents have
been reasonably diligent in pursuing the investigation-and often, as in
Karo, diligence will amount to little more than watchful waiting-the judge
should have no qualms about issuing an extension of the warrant for an
additional thirty days. Indeed, given the comparatively minor intrusion in-
volved in private location monitoring, it would be appropriate for a judge to
grant a series of extensions unless intervening events substantially negate the
original factual basis for the warrant.
c. Geography and Jurisdiction
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a search
warrant must be obtained from a magistrate or judge sitting in the judicial
district "wherein the property or person sought is located. . . ,,4.4 To ap-
ply this provision to a beeper warrant would be an exercise in absurdity. As
the Fifth Circuit has noted, "To require a warrant from each jurisdiction
into and through which the [beepered container] might travel, or come to
rest, would be to put an almost impossible burden upon the government for
no valid purpose." '4 3 5
A beeper warrant should, therefore, expressly authorize thirty days' sur-
veillance wherever the beepered object is taken.436 At the end of the thirty-
day period, administrative convenience should dictate whether a renewal
should be sought from the issuing judge, or from a judge in the jurisdiction
in which the beepered object is then located. While there is no explicit statu-
tory authority for such a practice, rule 57(b), the All Writs Act, and simple
common sense should suffice to justify it.
434. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1982) (a judge may issue a title
III wiretapping or eavesdropping warrant only if the location to be tapped or bugged is
"within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting .... ").
435. United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1389 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935
(1981).
436. Matters of geography and jurisdiction present particularly acute problems with regard
to warrants issued by state judges: such a warrant would be without effect once the beeper
crossed into a different state.
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d. Inventory and Notice: "Necessity"
Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure directs that the
target of a search warrant must be given "a copy of the warrant and a receipt
for the property taken" at the time the search is conducted. Obviously,
presearch or midsearch notice would totally frustrate the very purpose of
beeper surveillance. The Supreme Court has held on three occasions that
such notice is not required with regard to electronic surveillance of commu-
nications,437 and these holdings, together with the discretion afforded a
judge by the All Writs Act and rule 57(b), negate any need for presurveil-
lance notice in the beeper context.
At the completion of the investigation, on the other hand, the issuing judge
should require the investigators to submit an inventory to the court listing
all locations that were subjected to private location monitoring, and listing
all known individuals with privacy interests in such locations. The judge
should then order that notice of such surveillance be served within ninety
days of termination of the surveillance on those individuals who the judge
concludes should receive such notice.4 3 Where premature notice would
437. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court held, inter alia, that New
York's eavesdropping statute was unconstitutional because "it permits unconsented entry"
without first requiring "some showing of special facts" or "exigent circumstances." Such a
showing of exigency, the Court continued, "in order to avoid notice, would appear more im-
portant in eavesdropping,. . . than that required when conventional procedures of search and
seizure are utilized." 388 U.S. at 60. It is not altogether clear what kind of "special facts" or
"exigent circumstances" the Court had in mind: exigent circumstances justifying entry with-
out notice, or exigent circumstances justifying the use of electronic surveillance. Clearly, how-
ever, the Berger court acknowledged that presearch notice was not an absolute constitutional
prerequisite to a lawful entry for purposes of installing an eavesdropping device.
In Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 249-54 (1979), the Court held that, although title III
did not explicitly authorize surreptitious entry into a premises to install a listening device, such
authority was implicit in the statute. In addition, in Katz, 389 U.S. at 355-56 n. 16, the Court
acknowledged that it would be absurd to require presearch notice in a wiretapping or eaves-
dropping context.
438. Some kind of inventory procedure is probably a constitutional prerequisite to a valid
electronic search of any sort. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 60 (condemning New York's eavesdrop-
ping statute for the absence of such a provision). Title III, enacted in 1968, requires that no
later than 90 days after interception of communication ceases, the issuing judge must "cause"
notice concerning the interceptions to be served upon those who are named as targets of the
interception order. Such notice is also to be served upon any other individual whom the judge
determines should be notified. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982). In United States v. Donovan,
429 U.S. 413 (1977), the Supreme Court held that this provision required the investigators to
provide the judge with the information the judge would need to exercise discretion as to who is
to be notified, and outlined procedures whereby this obligation might best be satisfied. Id. at
430-32. The inventory and notice procedures suggested in the text accompanying this footnote
are modeled after the procedures outlined in title III and Donovan. See C. FISHMAN, supra
note 66, at §§ 203-208.
The purpose of the title III notice provision is two-fold. First, it assures that those whose
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jeopardize an investigation, postponements should be permitted, so long as
those whose privacy has been intruded upon are notified eventually.4 39
Titlc iI provides that before a wiretap or eavesdrop warrant may be is-
sued, the applicant must show, and the judge must find, that "normal inves-
tigative procedures" have not provided and would not provide the evidence
sought, or would be too dangerous to employ."' Several commentators
have argued that this provision is constitutionally mandated by Berger and
Katz as a substitute for the presearch notice normally required." 1 Because
beeper surveillance, including private location monitoring, is already far less
intrusive than many traditional investigative procedures (for example, entry
and search pursuant to a search warrant), it is difficult to see any procedural
or constitutional purpose that would be served in requiring a similar show-
ing as a prerequisite to a private location monitoring beeper surveillance
warrant.
3. Appropriate Fourth Amendment Standard
The government argued in Karo that if private location monitoring is clas-
sified as a search, a showing of reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause should suffice to justify such a search. In a footnote, the Court dis-
posed-temporarily--of the question:
privacy has been intruded upon learn of the intrusion, thereby enabling them to bring a civil
cause of action if they believe the invasion to have been unlawful. Second, the notice provision
in and of itself "should insure the community that the [interception] techniques are reasonably
employed." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2194. Notice of private location beeper surveillance would serve the same
purposes.
439. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982) (permitting such postponements).
440. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c), (3)(c) (1982). See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 66, at
§§ 88-92.
441. See, e.g., Cook, Electronic Surveillance, Title III, and the Requirement of Necessity, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 571, 577-78 (1976); Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III:
Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 135-36
(1983); Hodges, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment. The Arrival of Big
Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 288-89 (1976). Additional support for the theory that
the "other procedures" showing is a constitutional prerequisite has been drawn from sugges-
tions in Berger and Katz that the Fourth Amendment as a general rule requires investigators to
use the least intrusive method available to acquire the information or evidence. Berger, 388
U.S. at 57 (see supra note 437); Katz, 389 U.S. at 355-56; see also supra note 437. The Supreme
Court has since rejected this latter proposition, however. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 560-62 (1978) (where investigators seek a warrant authorizing the search of a news-
paper office for evidence of crime, the only factual showing required by the Fourth Amend-
ment is probable cause; even if the employees of the newspaper are not themselves suspected of
wrongdoing, there is no additional requirement that the applicant show that less intrusive
methods would not likely produce the items sought). For a further discussion of Zurcher and
the congressional response to it, see supra note 121.
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That issue, however, is not before us. The initial warrant was
not invalidated for want of probable cause, which plainly existed,
but for misleading statements in the affidavit [submitted in support
of the original beeper surveillance warrant prior to the informer's
sale of the ether to the suspects]. . . . It will be time enough to
resolve the probable cause-reasonable suspicion issue in a case that
requires it.44 2
It is difficult to know what to make of this footnote. Having held that
private location monitoring constitutes a search that normally must be au-
thorized by a warrant, the Court quite logically could have dispensed with
the probable cause-reasonable suspicion issue by quoting the explicit lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment: "no warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause."" 3 Thus, although this footnote is on one level unremarkable-
the Court merely avoided an issue it was not obliged to decide-the very fact
that the Court acknowledged the issue as an unresolved question is
noteworthy.
The concluding section of this article urges Congress to enact legislation
that would authorize the issuance of a beeper surveillance order upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion that such surveillance (including private lo-
cation monitoring) will reveal evidence of a particular crime. This of course
raises the obvious question: would the Supreme Court uphold the constitu-
tionality of such legislation?
For the Court to hold, in a subsequent case, that reasonable suspicion
rather than probable cause suffices, the Court, implicitly or explicitly, would
have to choose one of two options. The first is to ignore the explicit lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment-that is, to engage in judicial legislation of
the most blatant sort, in total rejection of the concept of judicial restraint.
The second is to acknowledge that the references in Karo to "warrant"
should henceforth be read to mean "court order similar in many respects to
a search warrant."'4"
This subsection of the article examines the probable cause-reasonable
suspicion issue.
a. The Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements
As a rule, the search of a person or of a home or other private location is
lawful only if the police have probable cause to believe that the item or per-
son sought will be found therein and the search has been authorized by a
442. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305 n.5.
443. See infra text following note 487.
444. It may be argued, of course, that the second option consists merely of the first option,
superficially disguised.
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warrant. Although the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches in
exceptional circumstances," 5 in the absence of a valid consent the Court has
always insisted upon probable cause before police officers may lawfully enter
onto private premises, let alone search them." 6 Even in the realm of admin-
istrative searches to enforce safety and health regulations unrelated to en-
forcement of the criminal law, the Court has insisted that officials obtain a
warrant based upon probable cause. The showing of "probable cause," how-
ever, required to authorize such searches differs significantly from the prob-
able cause necessary to justify a law enforcement search.447
445. Exceptions to the warrant requirment include consent searches (see supra notes 63-65;
see generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE ch. 8 (1978 & Supp. 1984)), searches
conducted during hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect or other emergency situation (see supra note
266), and searches incident to arrest (see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). In
Chimel, the Court held that if police lawfully arrest a person in his home, they may lawfully
search the immediate area in which the arrest took place, but not the whole house nor, neces-
sarily, the whole room. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra at § 6.3(b). It should be noted that
while the officers do not need a warrant, or even probable cause, to conduct a search incident
to arrest, the precedent arrest must be lawful, that is, the police officer must have had probable
cause to believe that the arrestee was committing or had committed an offense. Further, if the
arrest and subsequent search incident occurs in the arrestee's home, the officers usually must
have an arrest warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See generally 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra at § 6.1.
446. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 445, at §§ 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, 6.6. Two narrow and
partial exceptions may be said to exist to the probable cause requirement. If the police have
probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime, and have probable cause to
believe that a particular premises is the suspect's home, then assuming they have an arrest
warrant or exigent circumstances exist, they may enter the premises in an effort to arrest the
suspect, even though they lack probable cause to believe that the suspect is at home at the
time. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (inference); see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note
445, at § 6.1 nn.26.3-26.4. Second, if a police officer lawfully arrests a person outside his
home, and circumstances require the arrestee to enter his home before going to the police
station, the officer may lawfully enter the home with the arrestee, regardless of the lack of
probable cause to believe that anything unlawful might be found therein. Washington v. Chr-
isman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (after arresting an under-age student for carrying alcoholic beverages
on campus, it was lawful for campus police officer to accompany student into his dormitory
room to obtain his identification; contraband in plain view once the officer was inside the room
was properly seized). In each of these situations, although the officer lacked probable cause
that focused on the premises, probable cause existed to arrest the occupant for a specific crime.
447. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) ("administrative" search of resi-
dence by municipal health and safety inspectors constitutes a significant Fourth Amendment
intrusion that, absent resident's consent, is unlawful without a warrant). In Camara, the
Court stated that, to secure such a warrant, the applicant need not establish probable cause
that a particular residence contains violations of the health or housing code being enforced.
Rather, it suffices if the applicant demonstrates that reasonable legislative or administrative
standards exist for conducting searches of dwellings in a particular area or of a particular type.
Id. at 534-39; see Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (same concerning workplace
inspections pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967) (similar holding with regard to right of fire inspector to inspect a locked
commercial warehouse). If the employer does not consent to inspection of the job site, a war-
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b. The "Reasonable Suspicion" Exception to the Probable Cause
Requirement
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires probable cause as a
condition precedent to a lawful search, commencing with the seminal deci-
sion of Terry v. Ohio," the Supreme Court has held that in appropriate
circumstances, law enforcement officials may temporarily detain (seize) an
individual or a suitcase and may also sometimes frisk (search) the individual
in the absence of probable cause, so long as the officials have a "reasonable
suspicion" justifying the detention or search. 449
rant must be obtained. Probable cause for such a warrant is established if the particular loca-
tion was chosen to be searched "on the basis of a general administrative plan for the
enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources"-for example, the type of industry,
number of employees. Id. at 323-24.
448. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
449. Id. at 27. In general, the Court has been willing to find that a reasonable suspicion
exists so long as the officer is able to articulate specific aspects of the situation that prompted
the suspicion. In Terry, an experienced police officer saw two men standing on a Cleveland
street corner in the middle of the afternoon; one of the suspects walked up the street, peered
into a store, walked on, started back, looked into the store again, and then returned to his
companion. A few minutes later the companion did basically the same thing. While the officer
watched, the two men made a total of approximately one dozen such trips. They also con-
ferred with a third man. The officer, thinking that the suspects were "casing" a store prior to
committing a robbery, stopped them, grabbed Terry, patted him down, and found a weapon.
Id. at 5-7. The Court concluded that the officer had had a reasonable suspicion that Terry and
his companion were planning to commit a crime, and were armed and dangerous. Hence, the
stop (seizure) and carefully limited search (frisk) were reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
at 29-31.
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), while a police sergeant was patrolling the streets
of a high crime district at 2:15 in the morning, a person known to the sergeant approached and
told him that an individual seated in a nearby car, carrying narcotics, had a gun at his waist.
(The informant apparently did not reveal how he had acquired this information.) The Court
held that this tip sufficed to establish a reasonable suspicion that the individual was armed;
hence, it was lawful for the officer to pat the area of the individual's waistband and remove the
fully loaded revolver found. Id. at 146-47. See also Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2641-44, supra text
accompanying notes 394-96, infra notes 450-52 and accompanying text (temporary detention
of airline passenger's luggage lawful on reasonable suspicion that suitcases contain narcotics);
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (reasonable suspicion of narcotics possession
justifies temporary detention of airline passenger at airport); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 705 (1981) (approving brief detention of occupants on premises while authorities search
premises pursuant to valid warrant). But see Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980)
(that an airline traveler appeared to fit a "drug courier profile" did not, by itself, establish
reasonable suspicion); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (presence of a "suspicious-
looking" person in an alley where drug traffic was known to be heavy did not in and of itself
establish reasonable suspicion justifying temporary detention and demand that he identify him-
self).
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1973), the Court held that immigration
officials could lawfully stop a vehicle in the general vicinity of the nation's border if the officials
had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal immigrants. The mere fact that
the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry was insufficient to meet this standard. The
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To determine whether a particular seizure, detention, or search fits within
the "reasonable suspicion" exception to the probable cause requirement,
"[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmen-
tal interests alleged to justify the intrusion. '450  For example, the Court
recently held that law enforcement officials could seize and detain an airline
passenger's luggage for a brief period of time if they had a reasonable suspi-
cion that the luggage contained narcotics.45' The Court reasoned that soci-
ety's compelling interest in preventing the distribution of drugs and the
"inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports" justified the
limited intrusion occasioned by the detention of the luggage on less than
probable cause.452
c. Evaluation and Analysis
The government should often be able to establish probable cause for a
beeper warrant with comparatively little difficulty. To begin with, if a trust-
worthy informant provides reliably obtained information that a suspect will
use soon-to-be-purchased chemicals or equipment to manufacture illicit
drugs, probable cause to install the beeper is established.453 Indeed, even an
anonymous tip, coupled with sufficient corroboration, will establish probable
cause.
4 54
Court suggested, however, several factors that would be relevant in assessing the reasonable-
ness of the officer's suspicion, including the characteristics of the area: information the officer
might have received about recent illegal border crossings in the area; the behavior of the driver
(for example, apparent attempts to evade the officers); whether the vehicle was a kind fre-
quently used for transporting concealed aliens; whether the vehicle appeared to be heavily
loaded, or carrying an unusually large number of passengers; whether the passengers' or
driver's appearance-haircut, clothing, etc.-was characteristic of persons who live in Mexico;
and any other facts which the officer, in light of his experience, considered meaningful. Id. at
284-87. See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (stop near border of vehicle
suspected of transporting illegal aliens; "totality of the circumstances" must be assessed to
determine if there is a "particularized suspicion ... that the . . . individual being stopped is
engaged in wrongdoing").
450. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2642.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 2643. The Court also held that exposing the suitcases to a specially trained
narcotics detection dog did not constitute a search. Id. at 2645. The Court, however, further
held that 90 minutes was too long a period to hold the suitcases until they and the dog were
brought together. Id. at 2644-46.
453. In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the Supreme Court held that to
establish probable cause for a search warrant based on informant hearsay, the supporting affi-
davit must set forth facts from which an issuing magistrate could conclude that the informant
is credible, and must also set forth sufficient facts to establish that the informant obtained the
information in a reliable way. Id. at 415-18.
454. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), rejecting the rigid Spinelli-like formula
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Frequently, however, an investigation commences when a chemical com-
pany notifies law enforcement officials that someone has placed an order for
precursor chemicals. 4 55 In such cases, investigators lack direct evidence that
the suspect will use these items to manufacture illicit drugs, and the key
question is whether probable cause can be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. For example, in United States v. Moore,4 5 6 the manager of a
chemical company informed a DEA agent that Moore, purporting to repre-
sent a plastics company at a specified address, had placed an order for sub-
stantial amounts of various chemicals, all ingredients and precursors of
phencyclidine. Agents ascertained that the alleged business address was an
apartment house, and that neither Moore nor the company he claimed to
represent was licensed to manufacture controlled substances. The First Cir-
cuit held that, based on these facts,
the agents had probable cause to believe that a controlled sub-
stance was about to be made illegally. The call from the drug com-
pany, the discovery that the address given by the purchasers [an
apartment building] was not one where a chemical manufacturer
would operate, and the nature of chemicals purchased, in light of
the agents' familiarity with the manufacture of controlled sub-
stances, together created a sufficient basis for believing a criminal
enterprise [was] under way.4 57
It is difficult to determine from many of the reported cases, however, the
precise nature of the information available to the agents. If a suspect orders
everything that is needed to manufacture a particular controlled substance
(for example, phencyclidine, methaqualone, methamphetamine), and if the
only known use for this particular combination of chemicals is the manufac-
ture of that controlled substance,4 5 there can be little doubt that probable
for determining the existence of probable cause based on informant hearsay, and substituting a
broader "totality of the circumstances" test. In Gates, the Court held that an anonymous but
detailed tip, several aspects of which had been corroborated by police officers, established
probable cause for search warrant.
455. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Brock, 667
F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983); United States v. Bernard, 625
F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (discussed infra notes
456-59 and accompanying text); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976); Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 273 S.E.2d 621 (1980).
456. 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
457. Id. at 113. Moore is quoted approvingly in Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 273
S.E.2d 621, 625 (1980), which is factually similar.
458. To establish that chemicals in question are precursors to or essential ingredients in the
preparation of controlled substances, the government should be required to offer expert opin-
ion (for example, the affidavit or testimony of a chemist or experienced investigator).
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cause exists to believe that the chemicals have been ordered for that precise
purpose. The same conclusion should be drawn where investigators learn
that a suspect, who is not licensed to manufacture controlled substances, has
ordered specialized equipment, the only likely use for which is the manufac-
ture of a controlled substance.459
The less complete the agents' information, however, the greater the uncer-
tainty. Suppose, for example, the agents have learned that a suspect has
ordered or obtained many of the chemicals necessary to manufacture a con-
trolled substance, but lack specific information that the suspect has also or-
dered or obtained other, equally essential ingredients. When coupled with
other suspicious circumstances, this should still suffice to establish probable
cause.46° Indeed, one court found probable cause even where the informa-
tion concerned only a single precursor chemical.461
459. See United States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498 (8th Cir. 1983). In Bentley, DEA agents
learned from a reliable informant that individuals had ordered a tablet press and punches and
dies bearing a marking that was a pharmaceutical identification for methaqualone. They ascer-
tained that neither of the names involved in the orders were registered with DEA for the
manufacture of methaqualone. Submitting this information in an affidavit, the agents obtained
a court order authorizing the placement of a beeper in the base of the tablet press. The Tenth
Circuit concluded that, "[a]lthough a close case may be presented," the affidavit established
probable cause to believe the equipment was going to be used for unlawful purposes. Id. at
1503. In actuality, the case does not seem close at all; the existence of probable cause is quite
obvious.
460. See United States v. Anton, 633 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084
(1981). In Anton, which did not involve the use of a beeper, agents learned that defendant had
ordered numerous chemicals, some under a fictitious name, and brought them to his home.
Visual surveillance (including an examination of empty containers found in the trash) over a
three-month period enabled the investigators to compile a lengthy list of the chemicals defend-
ant had been using. In the opinion of a DEA chemist, the list was a near-complete recipe of
the essential ingredients for the manufacture of MDA, a controlled substance. This informa-
tion was included in an affidavit, together with a statement that no legitimate commercial or
industrial activity appeared to be occurring at the residence, and a warrant was issued author-
izing the search of the residence. Quantities of MDA were found during the search, and the
defendant was charged. A district court judge concluded that the affidavit failed to establish
probable cause. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating:
Here, large quantities of chemicals were being purchased, sometimes under a false
name. Although some or all of these chemicals may have household uses, when
several are bought at the same time a strong inference arises that they are being
combined. When the possible combinations of these chemicals includes an end prod-
uct which is an illegal substance, it is reasonable to infer that manufacture of such a
substance is taking place. The empty containers and movement of various chemical
pails [from the garage to the house and back, as observed by the officers conducting
visual surveillance] raise an inference that the chemicals were being used. The fact
that no legitimate business use of such large quantities of chemicals appeared to be
taking place at Anton's residence further buttresses the probability that an illegal use
was occurring. Probable cause did exist for the search . . ..
Id. at 1254.
461. In United States v. Ellery, 678 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1982), for example, the owner-
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If probable cause is made out whenever someone not registered with the
DEA for the manufacture of controlled substances seeks to obtain one or
more precursor chemicals or specialized lab equipment, then requiring prob-
able cause imposes no barrier whatsoever to investigative use of beepers,46 2
and requiring a warrant imposes only a minor administrative inconvenience
(barring exigent circumstances, which would excuse the failure to obtain a
warrant in any event).46 3 By the same token, requiring a warrant would
contribute precious little to the protection of individual privacy.4 4 Assum-
ing this fact alone does not amount to probable cause, as it obviously cannot,
there will nevertheless be times when the purchase of a single precursor
chemical will arouse reasonable suspicions.46 If the lack of probable cause
proprietor of a chemical company received a mail order from a man identifying himself as
"Tom Thomson," requesting that five kilograms of norephedrine hydrochloride be shipped to
a residential apartment in Chicago. He notified DEA agents, who subsequently submitted an
affidavit, seeking court authorization to place a beeper in the package of the substance. The
affidavit informed the issuing judge that the substance has no common household use, but is an
important ingredient necessary for the manufacture of amphetamine, that no businesses ap-
peared to be operating at the address listed in the letter, and that no residence or telephone was
listed in "Thomson's" name at that address. The affidavit also alleged that a high risk of
detection existed if normal surveillance procedures were employed. The latter allegation is
apparently modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1982), which provides that an application for
a wiretap or eavesdropping warrant must establish that other investigative procedures have
been tried and failed, or reasonably appear to be either unlikely to succeed if tried or too
dangerous. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1982) (permitting a judge to issue the wiretap or eaves-
dropping warrant only if, inter alia, the judge concludes that the application has made an
adequate showing concerning the unavailability of other investigative procedures); C. FiSH-
MAN, supra note 66, at §§ 88-89. The Seventh Circuit held that these facts, as interpreted in an
experienced investigator's affidavit, established probable cause. Ellery, 678 F.2d at 677-78.
Ultimately, the beeper enabled the agents to track the package to defendant Ellery's apartment
in a different building. After additional information was accumulated, the agents obtained and
executed a search warrant, seizing substantial quantities of several controlled substances and
precursor chemicals necessary for the production of several others.
462. Indeed, to establish so permissive a standard of probable cause in precursor chemical
cases might eventually affect the probable cause determination in other situations, thereby
diminishing the overall protection to privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
463. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305 ("[I]f truly exigent circumstances exist, no warrant is re-
quired under general Fourth Amendment principles.").
464. Many of the chemicals necessary to manufacture or prepare illicit drugs have common
and lawful industrial uses. A few examples will suffice. I have been informed by a DEA
chemist that ether and hydrochloric acid are necessary for the preparation of cocaine hydro-
chloride, the basic form of cocaine; acetic anhydride, a widely used industrial solvent, which is
also used in making perfume, is essential in the "cooking" process in producing heroin; pure,
concentrated ammonia is an ingredient in the manufacture of amphetamine and related drugs;
and sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, and sodium bicarbonate are all useful in the separation
and purification of a wide variety of drugs (including, for example, methamphetamine).
465. Suppose DEA agents learn that X has ordered a substantial quantity of pure, concen-
trated ammonia. Checking into X's background, they learn that he is sharing living quarters
with Y, who had previously been arrested for possession of a small quantity of amphetamines.
Given that ammonia is a precursor of amphetamines, this information would provide the
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in such cases precludes private location monitoring, there is substantial risk
that the investigation will produce nothing-perhaps at a cost of considera-
ble time and effort.466
agents with reason to suspect that X and Y, or unknown associates, are preparing to manufac-
ture amphetamines. Without knowing more, however, it is, to say the least, questionable that
the information establishes probable cause. By installing a beeper in the ammonia container,
the agents can conduct in-transit and general vicinity monitoring. With luck, such monitor-
ing-which Knotts and Karo hold are not a search at all, see supra notes 56-74, 166-84 and
accompanying text-will enable them to discover the precise location to which the ammonia
was taken. If fate is particularly kind, visual surveillance of that location might reveal addi-
tional information--empty containers of other precursor chemicals, for example-sufficient to
establish probable cause, at which point the agents could obtain a warrant authorizing a search
of the premises. Alternatively, they might discover that the ammonia has been taken to a
manufacturing plant, which has many legitimate uses for the substance, information which
would enable them to close out the investigation with few, if any, qualms. On the other hand,
in-transit and general vicinity monitoring, even when coupled with other investigative tech-
niques, might not suffice to reveal the particular premises to which the ammonia was taken.
Alternatively, the agents might learn that the ammonia has been taken to a location-the
home of third person, about whom nothing is known, or a rented storage locker-which does
little to dispel the agents' suspicions, but does equally little toward elevating it to probable
cause.
466. Continuing the situation hypothesized in supra note 466, once having located the am-
monia, other investigative options, in the absence of private location monitoring, are available
to the agents, including visual surveillance and the use of informants or undercover agents.
Visual surveillance, however, has several potential drawbacks. First, the physical location or
layout of the ammonia's location may render it impossible to conduct such surveillance. Sec-
ond, investigators might have to watch around-the-clock to safeguard against the drum being
taken elsewhere during gaps in the surveillance. If reported cases are any indication, it is
common for those involved in the manufacture of illicit drugs to bring their supplies to at least
one temporary resting place for a day or more before they are taken to the illicit laboratory.
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (three homes and two rented storage
lockers); United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Taylor, 716
F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978). Third, the more intensive the surveillance, the
greater the risk it will be detected by the suspects, in which case the suspects might simply
obtain more ammonia from a different source, leaving the container in question behind as bait
to distract the investigators. Fourth, if the suspects have not yet accumulated everything they
need to begin production, such surveillance might be fruitless for several weeks or months-as
in the Karo case, where no use was made of the ether for more than four months until it was
finally taken to a clandestine laboratory. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text. Such
surveillance would constitute an enormous drain on law enforcement resources already
stretched dangerously thin, perhaps unnecessarily, given the substantial possibility that the
ammonia was sought for a lawful purpose in the first place. See infra note 474 (concerning the
magnitude of the drug problem in America). Sixth, extensive and prolonged visual surveil-
lance, though not a search under the Fourth Amendment, see generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 16, at § 2.7(e), nevertheless is, in many respects, far more intrusive than private location
monitoring would be. See infra note 483.
Other options are also available. For example, informants could be questioned to ascertain
if anything is known of the activities of X and Y; an undercover agent might attempt to strike
up an acquaintance with the suspects; or chemical companies in the area might be questioned
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Thus, to require probable cause as the factual predicate for a private loca-
tion monitoring warrant will hamper effective and efficient enforcement of
the nation's drug laws. This, in and of itself, is of course insufficient reason
to exempt such surveillance and such warrants from the probable cause re-
quirement. The Fourth Amendment's insistence upon probable cause no
doubt "interferes" frequently with police efficiency, but such "interference"
is one of the prices we pay for the "right . . .to be secure in [our] persons,
houses, papers and effects . ",467 Absent a "knowing exposure" or other
voluntary relinquishment of Fourth Amendment protection, the Supreme
Court has never upheld law enforcement intrusion into a suspect's home or
other private location unless probable cause for such intrusion could be
shown. Nor should any exception to this rule be created unless circum-
stances are particularly compelling.4 68
Private location monitoring, at least in precursor chemical cases, presents
just such circumstances. Such monitoring should be lawful so long as the
monitoring agents have obtained a court order predicated upon reasonable
suspicion that the chemical installed with a beeper is being or eventually will
be used469 for criminal purposes.47 °
to determine whether X or Y had purchased other chemicals or laboratory equipment. Such
techniques might succeed. On the other hand, they might alert the suspects to the investiga-
tion; or such methods might produce no additional information-a result that would not nec-
essarily dispel the initial suspicion.
The final option is to allow the investigation to lie dormant or to die, unless the agents
happen upon additional information serendipitously.
467. U.S. CONST., amend. IV. See supra text accompanying note 16.
468. State and lower federal courts have upheld police entries into homes where there is
reasonable suspicion that someone is in need of assistance or is threatened with death or bodily
harm, and occasionally for other purposes as well. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE §§ 6.5(d), 6.6 (1978 & Supp. 1984). While this principle is undoubtedly sound, it is
predicated on the judgment that the protection of human life from imminent risk is more
important than affording the location in question all of the traditional protections usually guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment. The principle is clearly inapplicable to the legitimate but
substantially less immediately compelling need of enabling the police to keep track of items
which, regardless of the underlying intent with which they are possessed, are not themselves
contraband.
469. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1982) (judge may issue eavesdropping warrant upon a show-
ing of probable cause to believe that "an individual is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a particular offense . . [and that] particular communications concerning that of-
fense will be [intercepted] .... " (emphasis added)); see C. FISHMAN, supra note 66, at § 69.
470. If trespassory attachment of a tracking device to the exterior of a vehicle is classified as
a "seizure" (see supra notes 152, 158-62 and accompanying text), reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle is being used in criminal conduct should suffice to justify the "seizure." The placement
of the device is, as the Supreme Court said in Karo with regard to a beeper in a chemical
container, "at most... a technical trespass on the space occupied by the [device]." 104 S. Ct.
at 3302. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Placement of a beeper or transponder
normally permits the investigators to acquire only information that is itself not protected by
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Would such a court order survive a Fourth Amendment challenge? To
determine whether a particular search or seizure fits within the "reasonable
suspicion" exception to the probable cause requirement, the Supreme Court
held, in United States v. Place, "We must balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." 47'
Private location monitoring in precursor chemical cases satisfies both prongs
of this test. First, the intrusion is comparatively minor: the surveillance
reveals only whether the beepered object is within the premises in question.
the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 410-18 and accompanying text. The need to employ
a beeper or transponder to track a vehicle is often substantial, and cars and airplanes are even
more "transient" than "drug courier activity at airports." See supra note 452 and accompany-
ing text. This should excuse such installations from the warrant requirement. If use of a
device is prohibited in the absence of probable cause, there is significant risk that the investiga-
tors will "lose" the vehicle, at least for the period of time that is important to the investigation.
Installation of a tracking device in the interior of a vehicle, on the other hand, should and
will likely be held unlawful in the absence of probable cause. Interior installation is, theoreti-
cally, far more intrusive than exterior attachment-and even, arguably, more intrusive than
private location monitoring of a beepered chemical container-because it requires what they
do not: physical entry by an investigator into a private location. Although "fo]ne has a lesser
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle," United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, probable
cause as a rule is required before police may lawfully search the interior of an automobile or
other vehicle, even though a search warrant generally is not required. See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (when police law-
fully-that is, with probable cause-arrest an occupant of a car, they may lawfully search the
passenger compartment, and all containers therein, incident to the lawful arrest).
Still, arguments exist in favor of applying the reasonable suspicion standard, rather than
requiring probable cause, for interior installation of a tracking device in a vehicle. Physical
entry into a vehicle often reveals little that is not already plainly visible from outside. Further,
vehicles-particularly aircraft, where the need for interior installation is apparently far greater
than with automobiles-are subject to extensive safety regulations and periodic inspections, a
factor that diminishes considerably the privacy expectations one enjoys therein. Finally, if the
entering agent avoids exploring or examining the interior of the vehicle beyond that which is
necessary to install the device, this helps keep the degree of intrusion to a minimum-hardly a
"search" at all.
471. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1983). See supra notes 394-96 and
accompanying text. In Place, the Court reasoned that society's compelling interest in prevent-
ing the distribution of drugs and the "inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at
airports" justified the brief detention of a disembarking airline passenger's luggage in the ab-
sence of probable cause, so long as reasonable suspicion existed. 103 S. Ct. at 2643. Society's
interest in interdicting the manufacture of illicit drugs is equally compelling in the precursor
chemical context. The conduct in question in such investigations is not as "transient" as "drug
courier activity at airports." Indeed, sometimes, as in Karo, the suspects will wait for months,
and relocate the chemicals several times, before finally taking their supplies to the clandestine
laboratory. Private location monitoring and temporary detention of a suitcase are nonetheless
analogous in that each is a comparatively minor intrusion, and that in each situation, law
enforcement agents often have no other less intrusive, practical alternative available to them.
See supra notes 465-66; infra note 488.
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Indeed, in some instances, such surveillance might even protect the premises
and its occupants from a far greater intrusion.4 72 Second, in precursor
chemical cases, the intrusion is justified by society's compelling need to pre-
vent the manufacture of illicit drugs.473
472. Such monitoring might reveal that the item in question has been moved from the
premises, which might dissuade the investigators from obtaining a warrant authorizing them
to conduct a search.
473. Statistics provided to me by the Public Affairs Office of the DEA suggest the magni-
tude of the problem. In 1983, for example, DEA agents and state and local law enforcment
officers assigned to various DEA Task Forces seized 20,194,113 dosage units of "dangerous
drugs"-stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens, not including heroin, cocaine or cannabis.
In 1982, DEA agents and affiliated local enforcement officers seized 51,003,831 dosage units.
These statistics do not include seizures by state and local police who were not affiliated with
DEA. To fully appreciate these figures, one must understand that the number of dosage units
seized probably represents only a small fraction of those manufactured and consumed.
The financial aspects of the dangerous drug problem are equally depressing. Although the
"street price" of a dosage unit of a dangerous drug varies from substance to substance and
from region to region, the DEA official with whom I spoke advised me that undercover
purchases by its agents average from three to five dollars per dosage unit. Overall, DEA esti-
mates that total sales of such drugs total in the tens of billions of dollars annually. It is,
lamentably, reasonable to assume that little of this money is reported to the Internal Revenue
Service. It is equally reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of this money is used to
finance other illicit ventures.
A third way to examine the magnitude of the problem is to assess the toll such drugs take on
those who consume them. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) estimates that in
1982, more than four million people in this country used hallucinogens-more than three mil-
lion of them falling within the 12-25 age group. NIDA Population Projections Based on the
National Survey on Drug Abuse 1982, Table 3A-B at 8 (1983). Similarly, NIDA estimated
that in 1982, more than seven million people indulged in the nonmedical use of stimulants-
4.83 million of whom were age 25 or below. Id. Table 9A-B at 17.
It is impossible to assess with any accuracy the long-range impact that the use of drugs will
have upon the mental and physical health of those who abuse them but locally conducted
studies provide dramatic hints as to the short-range impact. For example, a four-month study
revealed that the hallucinogen PCP is responsible for 35% to 45% of the emergency admis-
sions at St. Elizabeth's, a federal mental hospital in Washington, D.C. See Wash. Post, Aug. 7,
1984, at Al, col. 7. Indeed, Washington's drug users often refer to PCP as "the key to St.
E.'s" and "Hinckley," for would-be presidential assassin John Hinckley, who is confined at St.
Elizabeth's Hospital. Id.
NIDA has attempted to provide information on a national scale concerning the short-range
impact of drug ingestion. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) consists of a non-
random sample of emergency rooms in 26 standard metropolitan statistical areas located
throughout the continental United States, and selected emergency rooms in other areas of the
nation. In 1981, out of 4,706 emergency room facilities in the United States, 819 participated
in DAWN. A report was submitted for each drug abuse patient who visited a DAWN emer-
gency room. DAWN defines drug abuse as the nonmedical use of a substance for psychic
effect, dependence, or suicide attempt/gesture. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE STA-
TISTICAL SERIES, ANNUAL DATA REPORT 1981 at 1, 2 (Series I, Number 1, 1982). In 1981,
the participating emergency rooms reported a total of 121,268 drug abuse episodes in which
patients receiving treatment mentioned having abused one or more drugs shortly before suffer-
ing the effects that prompted their being taken to the emergency room. The typical patient
mentioned having taken 1.644 different drugs per episode. Among the more frequently men-
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Several arguments can be made against applying the reasonable suspicion
standard to private location monitoring. First, unlike the situations in which
the standard has been applied in the past, private location monitoring in-
trudes into the privacy of a fixed premises--often a person's home, to which
the Fourth Amendment affords especially strong protection.474
While this aspect of private location monitoring distinguishes it from ex-
isting reasonable suspicion precedents, this distinction is not necessarily dis-
positive.47 5 The privacy of the home, like the right to be secure from
476intrusions upon one's person, is a cherished one, but it is not inviolable.
A physical search of one's house constitutes a devastating intrusion into in-
dividual privacy and a substantial offense against individual dignity. It is
appropriate, therefore, to insist upon probable cause and a warrant before
such an intrusion should be permitted. If, however, the physical entry into
and search of, for example, a person's home, office, or storage locker, ranks
near the top on any list of intrusiveness and offensiveness, private location
monitoring of a beeper within such a location surely must rank near the
bottom.4 77 There is no inherent reason why the authorities should be forced
tioned: 6,082 patients admitted having abused amphetamines, 5,884 admitted having abused
hallucinogens, and 7,977 admitted having abused barbiturate sedatives. Id. Table 2.07, at 24.
See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE REPORT OF ANNUAL DATA FOR 1982
(Series I, No. 2, 1983) (listing similar statistics). The DAWN network in 1982 consisted of 816
participating emergency rooms, out of 4,668 nationwide. These emergency rooms reported a
total of 120,145 drug abuse episodes. Id. Table 1.1, at 4. Admitted amphetamine abusers
totaled 5,081; 7,163 admitted having abused hallucinogens, and 7,256 admitted having abused
barbiturate sedatives. Id. Table 2.07, at 24. There is apparently no way to distinguish usage
involving lawfully manufactured versus illicitly produced drugs in several of the categories (for
example, amphetamines, or barbiturates). Nevertheless, these figures provide grim evidence of
the human toll exacted by the illicit manufacture and distribution of narcotics and other drugs.
474. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
475. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The first case to enunciate and apply the reason-
able suspicion standard, Terry authorizes the physical seizure of a suspect's person and a phys-
ical patdown of the suspect's clothing, procedures which are arguably far more intrusive and
far more offensive than beeper surveillance.
476. See supra note 475.
477. To date, beeper technology has developed to the extent that once the beepered object
comes to rest, law enforcement officials can, by monitoring the signal from a number of differ-
ent locations, obtain a "fix" on where the beeper is. Sometimes the beeper provides informa-
tion as to the particular premises (for example, a private residence or office) it is in or near;
sometimes, only the building (for example, an office or apartment building). See supra notes 7,
231. In the latter situation, the officers' ability to further pinpoint the beeper's location de-
pends upon whether they can walk through the building monitoring the signals.
The more sophisticated the beeper, of course, the more information it reveals. A signal
altering beeper, for example, reveals more than merely its location; it also reveals the fact that
someone inside the premises is opening the package, container or compartment in which the
beeper was installed. This significantly magnifies the intrusiveness of the beeper surveillance.
Use of such a beeper (except in per se contraband cases, see supra notes 387-98 and accompa-
nying text) should therefore be lawful only if the agents have a warrant based on probable
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to offer the same degree of justification for the latter as they are justly re-
quired to do for the former. Indeed, as this article has attempted to demon-
strate, when the degree of intrusiveness and the societal interest involved are
478balanced, persuasive reasons emerge for applying the less demanding rea-
sonable suspicion standard.
A second argument against the constitutionality of applying the reason-
able suspicion standard to private location monitoring is that the investiga-
tive procedures to which the standard has been applied to date take at most
several minutes, 4 79 while surveillance of the beeper may continue for months
before an investigation is terminated.4"' The thought that agents might
monitor a beepered object in a suspect's home for several months, without
probable cause, is unsettling. Yet, if agents who have lawfully learned (by
visual surveillance, in-transit or general vicinity monitoring, or a combina-
tion of all three) the whereabouts of the beepered object are determined to
learn whether the object will be left or moved, the maintenance of an
around-the-clock visual surveillance of the premises would not constitute a
search at all.4"' Private location monitoring, even over an extended period,
simply permits the agents to achieve the same goal-probably with greater
success, certainly at less expense, and probably with less intrusion into the
lives of those who occupy the premises in question. 4 8' Further, because such
monitoring is lawful only pursuant to a warrant, the need for prolonged sur-
veillance will be subjected to periodic judicial scrutiny.4" 3 Thus, while the
potential duration of private location monitoring distinguishes it from ex-
isting "reasonable suspicion" searches, this distinction does not render the
surveillance so intrusive as to mandate application of the probable cause and
warrant requirements.
cause rather than merely a reasonable suspicion to believe that the container or its contents are
being used for a criminal purpose. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text. At the
extreme, a beeper that is also capable of transmitting sounds and conversations would consti-
tute an eavesdropping "device," as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1982). Hence, its use
would be lawful only if an eavesdropping warrant were obtained pursuant to title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982), or a
corresponding state statute.
478. See supra notes 449-52, 471 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
480. In United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), the surveillance lasted more than
four months. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
481. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 2.7(e).
482. Around-the-clock visual surveillance will reveal far more about the occupants (for
instance, when they come, when they go or who visits them) than merely monitoring the
beeper.
483. See supra notes 429-33 and accompanying text. Conscientious law enforcement offi-
cials are aware that if an investigative technique is abused, judicial, legislative or executive
action might substantially restrict or preclude its use altogether.
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Finally, it might be argued that the principle of judicial restraint militates
against the acceptance of new exceptions to black letter constitutional stan-
dards: the Fourth Amendment explicitly directs that "no warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause." '484 A certain degree of flexibility and
creativity is essential, however, if the courts and Congress sensibly are to
apply eighteenth century concepts and language to twentieth century sur-
veillance procedures. Private location beeper surveillance "seizes" nothing,
and constitutes a "search" only in a very limited and somewhat artificial
sense. If the Fourth Amendment is to be interpreted with sufficient flexibil-
ity so as to apply to such surveillance-as the Court properly held 4 '-a
corresponding degree of flexibility must be afforded to the courts and Con-
gress in determining the appropriate standard by which the "reasonable-
ness" of such a search is determined.4" 6 The reasonable suspicion standard
strikes the best balance between the protection of individual privacy and so-
ciety's profound interest in effective law enforcement, particularly with re-
gard to the importation or manufacture of illicit drugs.
VII. THE LEGISLATIVE ANSWER: A MODEST PROPOSAL
The unsettled questions of policy and procedure can best be resolved by
legislation. To properly balance the interests of individual privacy and effec-
tive law enforcement, such legislation should regulate all aspects of the use
of electronic tracking devices, including those---consensual installation and
in-transit and general vicinity monitoring-that currently are immune from
judicial scrutiny. Such legislation should provide as follows:
1. A court order should be required to authorize the consensual installa-
tion of a beeper into any object in which a person other than the consenting
party will subsequently acquire a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
effect of this would be to require a court order in precursor chemical cases,
but not in cases where customs officials intercept narcotics or other contra-
484. At least one Justice has expressed concern that each additional exception to the prob-
able cause and warrant requirements adds momentum to the "tendency on the part of the
Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment
requires only that any seizure be reasonable." United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2652
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (commenting upon the Court's conclusion that reasonable suspi-
cion that an airline passenger's luggage contained narcotics was sufficient justification to detain
the luggage temporarily, until it could be exposed to a trained narcotics detection dog).
485. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
486. It should be remembered that should the Court hold that reasonable suspicion is con-
stitutionally sufficient to authorize issuance of a private location monitoring warrant, Congress
would nevertheless have unlimited authority to impose whatever restrictions or regulations it
saw fit. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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band per se that is mailed or shipped to the United States from overseas, nor
in other inherently tainted transactions.
2. Similarly, a court order should be required to authorize the trespas-
sory installation of a tracking device to the exterior of a vehicle.
3. The court order should, for a period of up to thirty days, authorize
law enforcement officials to conduct in-transit, general vicinity and private
location monitoring, wherever the object in question is taken.
4. To secure such a court order, an investigator should be required to
submit affidavits or other evidence establishing a reasonable suspicion that
evidence or information relating to particularly described criminal conduct
(manufacture, importation or distribution of drugs, trafficking in stolen
property, etc.) will be discovered by the use of the device.48 7
5. Where investigators seek to conduct a trespassory (i.e., nonconsen-
sual) installation into the interior of a vehicle (for example, into the passen-
ger or storage compartment of a car, truck, airplane, etc.), they should first
be required to obtain a court order based upon probable cause to believe that
evidence or information relating to particularly described criminal conduct
will be discovered by the use of the device.
6. At the end of the thirty day period, investigators should be required to
report to the issuing judge (or a judge of comparable jurisdiction in the fed-
eral district in which the beepered object is then located) the progress of the
investigation to date. Where appropriate, they may request an extension of
the court order for an additional thirty days. Extensions should be granted
so long as reasonable suspicion continues to exist that the use of the beeper is
revealing or will reveal information relating to the specified criminal
conduct.
7. In exigent circumstances, investigators should be permitted to install
a beeper without first obtaining a beeper surveillance order, provided that an
application for such an order is submitted to an appropriate judge within
ninety six hours of the installation. If the judge concludes that the grounds
for such an order existed at the time of the installation and that circum-
stances rendered it impracticable to obtain such an order in advance of the
installation, the judge should issue an order retroactively approving the in-
487. The very fact that Congress enacted such legislation would add weight to the argu-
ment that reasonable suspicion suffices to justify the issuance of a beeper surveillance order.
The Court has traditionally given considerable deference to Congress when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of legislation regulating criminal procedure, including search and seizure legisla-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marques, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2578, 2581 (1983);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). Compare Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 n.32, 601 (1980).
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stallation and use of the beeper and authorizing continued use of the beeper
for a thirty day period commencing with the installation.
8. Within 90 days of the termination of surveillance, investigators should
be required to submit an inventory to an appropriate judge listing all loca-
tions that were subjected to private location monitoring and listing all
known individuals with a privacy interest in such locations. The judge
would then order that notice of the surveillance be served on those individu-
als who the judge concludes should receive notice. Upon a showing that
notice would jeopardize an investigation or endanger someone's safety, no-
tice should be postponed.
9. A defendant in a criminal prosecution whose reasonable expectations
of privacy were intruded upon by beeper surveillance should be empowered,
prior to trial, to bring a motion seeking to suppress the evidence or informa-
tion derived from the surveillance. Such motion shall be granted if a court
concludes that the surveillance was conducted in violation of the statute.
Such legislation would have several benefits. First, it would ensure judi-
cial oversight of those aspects of beeper surveillance--consensual installa-
tion, in-transit and general vicinity monitoring-which currently are beyond
the scope of the Fourth Amendment, thereby enhancing individual privacy
and providing a check against potential abuse. Second, it would enhance
effective law enforcement by resolving the uncertainties which currently ex-
ist in the law. At present, investigators who have reasonable suspicion but
lack probable cause cannot know whether they must, or can, obtain a court
order authorizing trespassory exterior installation of a beeper onto a vehicle,
and must guess at when lawful warrantless general vicinity monitoring
crosses the line and becomes unlawful private location monitoring. A judge
to whom an application is submitted for an order authorizing trespassory
installation or private location monitoring likewise cannot now know
whether reasonable suspicion suffices, or whether probable cause is required.
By requiring reasonable suspicion for all aspects of beeper surveillance, such
legislation would establish a uniform standard that would enable investiga-
tors and judges to know what is required without imposing excessive barriers
to the use of a minimally intrusive and highly effective investigative tech-
nique. Finally, such legislation would establish standardized procedures
governing the issuance and execution of such court orders while assuring
that those whose privacy is invaded by the surveillance eventually receive
notice of what has occurred.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since our nation was founded, Americans have cherished the right, em-
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
bodied in the Fourth Amendment, to be free from unlawful snooping by the
government. That right is now threatened by advances in technology that
were unimaginable even a generation ago. At the same time, an equally pre-
cious right-to live in safety, confident that those who obey the laws will be
protected from those who do not-is also threatened, by criminal organiza-
tions who utilize both technology and terror for their own purposes, and by
a pervasive traffic in illicit drugs that corrupts the health, minds and souls of
its immediate victims, and degrades the quality of life of all who come into
even indirect contact with it.
With ever increasing frequency, the nation's courts are being faced with
the task of striking an appropriate balance between these often conflicting
but equally essential values: individual privacy, and effective and efficient
law enforcement. To deny the police the right to utilize the fruits of technol-
ogy, or to place unwieldy preconditions on such use, is to surrender a signifi-
cant advantage to society's predators; to permit such use without adequate
judicial oversight risks placing our right to privacy in the sole discretion of
the police.
In Knotts and Karo, the Supreme Court was called upon to reconcile these
values as applied to electronic tracking devices. Proceeding with caution,
the Court declined to categorize as either a search or a seizure those aspects
of beeper surveillance that do no more than assist the police in monitoring
public conduct. The executive and legislative branches of government,
therefore, are free to permit, regulate or prohibit such surveillance as they
deem appropriate. When a beeper was used to intrude into a private loca-
tion, on the other hand, the Court, remaining true to fundamental Fourth
Amendment principles, insisted that investigators first obtain a warrant.
Although the Karo opinion is something less than a model of clarity, ulti-
mately the Court struck the right balance.
Knotts and Karo leave several important questions unanswered. Neither
case required the Court to consider whether trespassory installation of a
beeper constitutes a search or seizure. It is still unclear where the line is to
be drawn between beeper surveillance of public conduct (in-transit and gen-
eral vicinity monitoring), which is not a search, and surveillance of private
conduct (private location monitoring), which is.
The most important unanswered question is whether a warrant authoriz-
ing private location monitoring must be based, as traditional search warrants
must be, upon probable cause, or whether the less demanding standard of
reasonable suspicion will suffice. Law enforcement officials often are able to
acquire probable cause to conduct private location monitoring of a beeper
installed into a container of precursor chemicals to be sold to a suspect.
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Cases have arisen and are likely to arise, however, where reasonable suspi-
cions exist although probable cause is lacking. It is in just such instances
that the need to install a beeper, and to conduct private location monitoring,
is the greatest. In many cases, such surveillance will be the most efficient,
least expensive, and by far the least intrusive means available to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that criminal activity is afoot, and if
so, where.488 Thus, the vital but oft-conflicting interests of effective law en-
forcement anct individual privacy can best be balanced by the enactment of
legislation that establishes comprehensive standards regulating such surveil-
lance, and that requires reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, as
the legal prerequisite to court-authorized private location beeper
surveillance.
488. Resuming the situation hypothesized in supra notes 466-67, if a private location moni-
toring warrant may be obtained based on reasonable suspicion, the agents' options are multi-
plied considerably. They can and should conduct visual surveillance, make inquiries of
informants, and attempt to infiltrate with an undercover agent, as circumstances and resources
permit. Most important, they can also monitor the location of the ammonia, unobtrusively
and with minimal intrusion. If nothing comes of such surveillance, little is lost, either in terms
of law enforcement resources or individual privacy. Alternatively, if the private location mon-
itoring, together with more traditional techniques, leads to the acquisition of probable cause,
criminals will be brought to the bar of justice, dangerous contraband will be kept from poison-
ing the nation's streets, and perhaps fewer lives will be ruined by or lost to the scourge of illicit
drugs.
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